The Times is about Afghanistan but very is applicable to all WOT intervention plus Vietnam also.
The piece is by a former special inspector general for Afghanistan reconstruction since 2012.
a gaping disconnect between reality and what senior U.S. officials had been telling Americans for decades: that success was just around the corner.
The U.S. government struggled to carry out a coherent strategy, fostered overly ambitious expectations, started unsustainable projects and did not understand the country or its people. American agencies measured success not by what they accomplished, but by dollars spent or checklists of completed tasks.
a perverse incentive drove our system. To win promotions and bigger salaries, military and civilian leaders felt they had to sell their tours of duty, deployments, programs and projects as successes — even when they were not.
As one former U.S. military adviser told my office, the entire system became a self-licking ice cream cone: More money was always being spent to justify previous spending.