Robert Reuben, Alan Greenspan & Larry Summers
They were there to carry water for Goldman Sachs metal.
In the devastating aftermath of the economic meltdown, FRONTLINE sifts the ashes for clues about why it happened and examines critical moments when it might have gone much differently. Looking back into the 1990s, veteran FRONTLINE producer/director Michael Kirk (Inside the Meltdown, Breaking the Bank ) discovers early warnings of the crash, reveals an intense battle among high-ranking members of the Clinton administration, and uncovers a concerted effort not to regulate the emerging, highly complex, and lucrative derivatives markets, which would become the ticking time-bomb within the American economy.
Brooksley Born
https://www.liquisearch.com/brooksley_born/born_and_the_otc_derivatives_market
Born was particularly concerned about swaps, financial instruments that are traded over the counter between banks, insurance companies or other funds or companies, and thus have no transparency except to the two counterparties and the counterpartiesâ regulators, if any. CFTC regulation was strenuously opposed by Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, and by Treasury Secretaries Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers. On May 7, 1998, former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt joined Rubin and Greenspan in objecting to the issuance of the CFTCâs concept release. Their response dismissed Bornâs analysis and focused on the hypothetical possibility that CFTC regulation of swaps and other OTC derivative instruments could create a âlegal uncertaintyâ regarding such financial instruments, hypothetically reducing the value of the instruments. They argued that the imposition of regulatory costs would âstifle financial innovationâ and encourage financial capital to transfer its transactions offshore. The disagreement between Born and the Executive Officeâs top economic policy advisors has been described not only as a classic Washington turf war, but also a war of ideologies, insofar as it is possible to argue that Bornâs actions were consistent with Keynesian and neoclassical economics while Greenspan, Rubin, Levitt, and Summers consistently espoused neoliberal, and neoconservative policies.
Born declined to publicly comment on the unfolding 2008 crisis until March 2009, when she said: âThe market grew so enormously, with so little oversight and regulation, that it made the financial crisis much deeper and more pervasive than it otherwise would have been.â She also lamented the influence of Wall Street lobbyists on the process and the refusal of regulators to discuss even modest reforms.