Why Finance is Too Important to Leave to Larry Summers?

True or False?

Yves here. While it might seem that Larry Summers has finally faded from public life, think again! Wikipedia reports that Summers joined the board of OpenAI in November 2023. And one can be sure he’d want to influence the economic policies of a Harris Administration, if not though a formal role, then though op-ed and back channels.

Keep in mind that Summers has one of the leaders of the hawkish view of our current inflation, which Americans have been dutifully told has been tamed, even if many are still suffering from higher prices. A snapshot of this views from 2022: History Shows No Example of Hiking US Rates Too Fast, Summers Says.
Former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers argued against the Federal Reserve holding back from aggressive monetary tightening, saying that greater economic damage would result from any hesitation.

“History records many, many instances when policy adjustments to inflation were excessively delayed and there were very substantial costs to that,” Summers told Bloomberg Television’s “Wall Street Week” with David Westin. “I am aware of no major example in which the central bank reacted with excessive speed to inflation and a large cost was paid.”

From original link:

In fact, as Dutch economist Servaas Storm showed over several papers, carefully parsing data, [our inflation is due largely if not entirely to a reduction in supply: the impact of Covid on the workforce and supply chains and sanctions blowback](https://www.ineteconomics.org/perspectives/blog/inflation-in-a-time-of-corona-and-war). Biden deficits may have come to play a role, but Summers’ notion that too much demand caused the inflation meant his call for Fed interest rate hikes was administering the wrong medicine.

Financial TimesMartin Wolf (2022) is the latest influential voice sounding the alarm bell on ‘the threat of stagflation’ and calling for the Fed to drastically raise interest rates to bring inflation down to its target level. Published on May 24, Wolf’s diagnosis of where the stagflation in the US economy is coming from reflects current establishment opinion: nominal demand, fuelled by over-expansionary fiscal and monetary policies during the COVID-19 crisis, is exceeding US supply. To bring down inflation, these macroeconomic policy errors need to be corrected convincingly and as soon as possible.

Summers’ and Wolf’s calls for action are echoed by many observers in the financial sector.

A more acute assessment would recognize that interest rates are a socially very costly tool to ‘control’ inflation—especially when the sources of the inflationary surge lie in an unprecedented constellation of (mostly) supply-side bottlenecks which are driving up prices. Similarly, a close look at the past record of monetary tightening shows that the Fed has hardly ever managed to guide the economy to a soft landing with interest rate increases.[1] A key reason is that small interest rate hikes do not reduce inflation (at all). It takes large interest rate hikes, but those come with massive collateral damage to the real economy—and this collateral damage might well be larger than the damage done by allowing inflation to remain high for some, while actively managing its consequences (especially in terms of the distribution of incomes).

There are reasons to believe that the collateral damage wrought by substantially higher interest rates will be even higher today than in 1980. The key point is that more than a decade of extraordinarily low interest rates have led to a significant increase in corporate and public debts and an unsustainable bout of asset price inflation in the housing market, the stock market, and almost all other financial markets. A large interest rate hike will create a financial crash.

A new INET working paper on US inflation

In a new Working Paper for INET, I attempt to recover the lost plot, arguing that the recent inflation has mostly supply-side origins, caused by the COVID-19 crisis and the Ukraine war, and has been enabled by mistaken past and current macroeconomic policy choices.

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That’s indeed what the Fed thought for another full year and didn’t raise interest rates until inflation was raging.

What would have been the right medicine back in 2021?

DB2

The above sentence reflects a fundamental lack of understanding of inflation on the part of the author. The only way prices go down after inflation is with deflation - which is worse. On a macro level, we don’t want prices to go back down. We simply don’t what them to keep going up more than 2% a year. That is the goal.

That being stated, there would seem to be an excess risk of overreacting to inflation when rates are very near the goal (2.5-3%) by taking short term rates dramatically higher from here.

To not have waited. They should have started with a quarter point back in September instead of waiting until March. If they had started in September, they could have increased a quarter point per month/meeting and still have ended up at that same ending point, but more gradually than the massive three-quarter jumps we experienced, and inflation may have not climbed to 9% in the meantime.

The history of the fed is one of consistently waiting too long to act. We often discuss stock market volatility but the chart of fed funds rate changes looks like a roller coaster when it should instead (IMO) look more like rolling hills.

image

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How would “not have waited” increased supply? OR reduced demand?

If they had started earlier they could have made the increase more gradual and not caught banks and others by surprise (SVB, for example) and given them more time to unwind positions and prepare for a different era. As it was they were behind the curve and had to bounce quickly once they realized the error.

(There’s no guarantee SVB would have managed anyway, they seemed quite asleep at the wheel - but there were lots of other banks which were stressed by the sudden rise, and some of that, at least, might have been avoided.)

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You are publicly admitting bank management in many banks is unable to properly do the job they are paid to do. SVB was merely a nice wake-up siren that woke up those who were not paying attention.

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Congress created new unemployment programs during the pandemic. All of them ended in September 2021. What did these programs do? And how much money did they give out?

August 23, 2021FDA approved the first COVID-19 vaccine, Comirnaty (COVID-19 Vaccine, mRNA), which was previously known as Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine, for the prevention of COVID-19 disease in individuals 16 years of age and older.

The peak in the Money Supply was April 2022.

The peak in inflation was June 2022.

Why did the FED lower rates during Covid to zero?

This is why the FED flooded the money supply. And could not stop on time.

In March April 2020 there was no economy.

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Yowsah! How quickly we forget. And then, of course, there are the people who did not forget but do not want to pay the piper.

d fb

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There was something more fundamental.

Covid was only a coincidence. There was going to be a problem like this anyway.

The multiplier effect had a global crash before Covid. That drought was ongoing.

This is the equivalent of 2% US bonds in corporate pension funds by 1980. The nation was insolvent, not because of the federal debt but the pension liabilities.

We switched to supply-side econ in 1981.

This time we needed to switch to demand-side economics. The economy was not working and the multiplier effect had stalled out.

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Of course I am. Why would I not? That said, even competent managers can get blindsided by unforeseen events, and woe be unto the manager who takes his foot off the gas too early and damages his institution while the party is still in full swing.

The issue is whether the Fed waiting too long. Clearly they did. It’s very much like a driver who waits too long to turn the wheel, then overcorrects in a hurry, send the car lurching. That they have managed to navigate the curve without wrecking it is an accomplishment, but there was damage at the beginning (spilled drinks, perhaps?) which could have been avoided had the Fed acted more prudently, earlier, and with less panic once they woke up.

And yeah, banking is a boring business. PNC has a whole ad campaign on the air about it right now. Nobody disputes it. Maybe that’s why there are periodic blowups which have led to regulation like the FDIC and more to try to contain the damage.

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The issue is priming the pump to revive the multiplier effect.

1946 saw a much higher inflation peak while the US switched over to demand side economics. The pay off later was worth it.

In 2022 we primed the pump for an industrial buildout. We can not do without that.

And today we will find out if they’ve lost their timidity or not. Given the recent history I would say “not”, and expect a .25 rate cut. A .50 cut would be more appropriate, given that “the war is over” (inflation, that is) for all intents and purposes, and it’s time to unlock some of the things that have been holding back - auto sales and home sales most notably, but also investment in new business and even skyscraper conversion.

But, I’m expecting, and I hope I’m wrong, a wimpy 25 basis point reduction.

Krugman, by contrast, is arguing for a far more massive approach:

What I think the Fed should do is big rate cuts. The discussion has been between 25 and 50 basis points, where a basis point is a hundredth of a percentage point. That’s just the jargon people use. I would say it’s 50 for sure, but if you really look at it, I would say that even if they cut by 50, or half a percentage point, interest rates will be about 300 basis points higher than they were on the eve of the pandemic. And inflation is under control — what justifies those 300 extra basis points or three percentage points?

I would like to see the Fed cut by 200, 250, 300 basis points quite quickly, right away, with rhetoric that makes it clear that this is just the beginning.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/18/opinion/paul-krugman-fed-rate-increase.html

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The FED directors are not grunt workers. The directors do not operate in a mode.