A serious question. Because trade advisor Peter Navarro thinks so.
White House trade adviser Peter Navarro said Thursday that President Trump deserves a Nobel Prize for his commitment to “restructuring” global trade rates.
“I’m thinking that since he’s basically taught the world trade economics, he might be up for the Nobel on economics because this is a fundamental restructuring of the international trade environment in a way where the biggest market in the world has said, you’re not going to cheat us anymore,” Navarro said during an appearance on Fox Business Network.
I’ve mentioned before that Navarro was one of my professors in grad school. He taught Economics. My entire class of 50 some students banded together to try to get him removed, he was that much of a jerk back then. (Late 1990s) He used his power to demean students and make life difficult.
He knows full well that Trump has a limited understanding of economics and deserves no such award. My guess is that he likes the power he wields having the ear of the President, and is willing to say whatever it takes to maintain that power.
So, is he giving up on the “peace prize”? Several people, eager to flatter him, have nominated him, but the people he has targeted for his “peacemaking” are apparently not so eager to cooperate for the “greater glory” of “himself”.
Sounds like a typical “JC” to me. Use every opportunity to remind everyone who has the power of professional life and death over them.
The sophisticated leaders of the ‚biggest market‘ spout nonsen…, I mean emerging scientific epiphanies such as trade surpluses equal ‚cheating‘, enact almost arbitrary tarif…, errm, tariff rates based on the most rigorous scientific analysis, on the rest of the world, throw in politically motivated add-ons like for Canada and Brazil, and then claim they deserve a nobel prize.
Will this be backed up JC-style with a decent 50% tariff threat on Sweden for the Nobel prize committee to see the light - or the denial of visas for the committee‘s members?
Losing 14.8% of China’s exports to the U.S., valued at roughly $502 billion in 2023, would have a notable but not catastrophic impact on China’s economy. Estimates suggest that a complete loss of U.S.-bound exports could reduce China’s GDP by about 0.8% to 1% directly, with potential second-order effects (e.g., on manufacturing investment and consumer sentiment) pushing the total impact to around 2.5% over a few years if unmitigated. However, China’s economy is diversified, with exports to the U.S. accounting for only 2.9% of its GDP in 2023. Mitigation strategies like redirecting exports to other markets (e.g., Southeast Asia, EU) and boosting domestic sales could offset much of this, potentially limiting the GDP hit to 0.3% to 0.6% over 2025–2027, assuming a 20% tariff increase. Higher tariffs (e.g., 60%) could amplify the impact, but China’s shift toward other markets and domestic stimulus would cushion the blow.
So I asked. How much would BRICS trade have to grow to absorb all the U.S. Exports without China increasing its share of exports to the BRICS.
To offset the loss of 14.8% of China’s exports to the U.S. (approximately $502 billion in 2023), intra-BRICS trade would need to increase significantly to absorb this surplus without causing a net contraction in China’s trade balance. Below is an analysis of how much trade within BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, plus new members Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, UAE, and Indonesia) would need to rise to compensate, assuming the goal is to maintain China’s trade surplus and ensure all BRICS members benefit through increased trade.
Key Assumptions and Context
• Current Intra-BRICS Trade: Intra-BRICS trade is relatively low, accounting for about 6% of the total trade of BRICS countries, though China’s dominance in the bloc drives much of this. In 2023, China’s exports to BRICS countries were significant but smaller than its U.S. exports, with estimates suggesting intra-BRICS trade (including new members) was around $300–400 billion total, of which China’s exports to BRICS partners like India, Brazil, and Russia were key components.
• China’s Trade Surplus: China’s overall trade surplus in 2024 was approximately $992.2 billion, with the U.S. accounting for a significant portion ($76.6 billion in Q1 2023 alone). Losing $502 billion in U.S. exports would require redirecting this trade to other markets to avoid economic contraction.
• BRICS Capacity: BRICS countries, particularly India, Brazil, and new members like the UAE and Iran, have growing consumer markets and resource needs that could absorb Chinese goods. However, their economies vary in size and import capacity, with India and Brazil being the largest potential markets after China itself.
• Trade Facilitation: Increasing intra-BRICS trade would require overcoming barriers like inadequate financial infrastructure (e.g., for non-dollar transactions), geopolitical tensions (e.g., China-India rivalry), and varying economic priorities among members.
Estimating Required Trade Increase
1. Magnitude of Lost Exports: The $502 billion in exports to the U.S. represents 14.8% of China’s total exports of $3.4 trillion in 2023. To fully absorb this within BRICS, the bloc’s total trade (exports and imports among members) would need to increase to cover this amount, with China redirecting its exports to BRICS partners and those partners increasing their exports to each other to balance trade flows.
2. Current Intra-BRICS Trade Baseline: Assuming intra-BRICS trade in 2023 was approximately $400 billion (a high-end estimate based on available data), this represents trade among all members, not just China’s exports. China’s exports to BRICS countries are likely around $150–200 billion, with India, Brazil, and Russia being the largest importers.
3. Required Increase:
• To absorb $502 billion in Chinese exports, intra-BRICS trade would need to more than double, increasing by approximately 125–150% from the current $400 billion to around $900–1,000 billion annually.
• This assumes all $502 billion is redirected to BRICS countries, with China increasing its exports to them by roughly 250–300% (from $150–200 billion to $650–700 billion).
• For balanced trade (where all BRICS members increase trade, not just China’s exports), other BRICS countries would need to boost their exports to each other and to China significantly. For example:
• India, with a growing consumer market, could increase imports from China (e.g., electronics, machinery) and exports to China (e.g., agricultural products, pharmaceuticals) by 50–100%, potentially absorbing $100–150 billion of the surplus.
• Brazil and Russia, with smaller import capacities, could each absorb $50–100 billion through increased trade in commodities (e.g., soy, oil) and manufactured goods.
• New members like the UAE, Iran, and Indonesia could collectively absorb $100–150 billion, leveraging their oil wealth and growing markets.
• This would require BRICS countries to increase their intra-bloc imports by 50–100% each, depending on their economic size and capacity, leading to a total intra-BRICS trade volume of $900–1,000 billion.
4. Feasibility and Mechanisms:
• Infrastructure and Policy: Achieving this would require significant improvements in trade infrastructure, such as the BRICS Pay initiative (a blockchain-based payment system to bypass SWIFT) and increased use of local currencies like the Chinese yuan to reduce dollar dependence.
• New Development Bank (NDB): The NDB could finance trade facilitation projects, such as port and rail upgrades, to boost logistics efficiency.
• Market Diversification: China would need to tailor its exports (e.g., consumer electronics, vehicles) to BRICS markets, while other members increase exports of commodities (e.g., oil from Iran/UAE, soy from Brazil) and medium-tech goods (e.g., from India).
• Geopolitical Challenges: Tensions, such as between China and India, could hinder cooperation. Coordinated policies to reduce trade barriers and align economic incentives are critical.
Economic Implications
• For China: Redirecting $502 billion in exports to BRICS would prevent a GDP contraction of 0.8–2.5% (as estimated previously) by maintaining export-driven growth. However, this assumes BRICS countries can absorb such a large volume without saturating their markets or triggering protectionist responses.
• For BRICS Members: Increased trade would boost their economies, with India potentially gaining 0.5–1% in GDP growth from higher exports to China, and oil-producing members like Iran and the UAE benefiting from stable demand. However, smaller economies like Ethiopia may struggle to scale imports significantly.
• Global Impact: A 125–150% increase in intra-BRICS trade could shift global trade patterns, reducing reliance on Western markets and strengthening BRICS as a commodities and manufacturing hub. This aligns with BRICS’ goal of a multipolar economic order but risks escalating tensions with the U.S., especially under high-tariff policies.
Conclusion
To fully consume the $502 billion surplus from lost U.S. exports, intra-BRICS trade would need to increase by approximately 125–150%, reaching $900–1,000 billion annually. This would involve China boosting its exports to BRICS partners by 250–300% and other members increasing their intra-bloc trade by 50–100% each. While feasible with aggressive policy coordination, infrastructure investment, and currency diversification, geopolitical tensions and economic disparities within BRICS pose challenges. The New Development Bank and BRICS Pay could facilitate this shift, but it would take years to scale to this level without destabilizing smaller members’ economies.
Considering that the U.S. cannot replace Chinese manufacturing goods immediately it will have to import those goods from somewhere. Mostly from China, then if not from BRICS. No matter how high the tariffs are. That probably will provide enough time for the BRICS to grow enough to absorb all of the lost US imports. This new trading pattern is the likely result of the new US trade strategy. This new trading pattern will probably give rise to a new world order.
Two things:
One: In economics it is a given that any action will have unintended consequences.
Two: Donald Trump is not an idiot. So his efforts may yield some results he is looking for without destroying the world economy.
As a professor, he had the ability to challenge the world by educating the next generation—and instead, chose to imitate the very ignorance he very likely once despised.
Well, the repeated “winning” of golf tournaments at resorts he owns, and various entities inventing awards to give him has generated a lot of mockery. Maybe his nibs sees a Nobel as something less of a farce.
A while back, I read a comment from somebody who follows golf for a living state that the handicap that Trump claims he has would mean that if he ever golfed against Jack Nicklaus, Trump would be giving Nicklaus strokes. ( might have been in Rick Reilly’s book, Commandeer In Cheat ). And this was at a time that Nicklaus still played good golf.
I’d luv to see a match between Trump and the head of North Korea, they are 2 peas in a pod when it comes to honesty on the golf course ( or the lack thereof ).
But even more than Trump’s golf handicap, I’d luv to see the media dig into how much Trump’s golf forays are costing the American taxpayer. No austerity when it comes to that.
