Himalaya Shipping (HSHP) does not seem to be too good at quarterly releases. However, the company does seem to be quite regular with monthly updates. The company owns 12 Newcastlemaxes (all dual fueled) and swaps some vessels between fixed charters and index based charters. SHSP also pays a monthly dividend. Recent events.
Shift of pair of charters from index-based to fixed rate
Aug 2025 div and avg Time Charter Equivalent (TCE)
Again, Newcatlemaxes are vessels in the Cape category (largest dry bulk category). Although large, over 200K DWT, not the largest vessels dry bulk vessels out there (Chinamax vessels are almost double the size). In any case, I would guess, with HSHPâs debt load, the company probably needs the vessels to earn about $20K - $21K daily. For any Newcastlemax owner, above $30K daily is very good. Q3 is usually a strong quarter for dry bulk shipping.
Interesting company but there is no information on their website about their history or how they started or how long theyâve been around. Five of the six management team apparently live in Norway and the corporate offices are in Bermuda. And management seems to be âcontractedâ management. Although I do like monthly dividends!
Several years back, when Johan Fredriksen and a trusted side-kick Tor Olav Troim (TOT) had a major disagreement, and went their separate ways, there were some major ramifications.
Fredrikson dumped his Golar LNG (GLNG) stake, and included a significant chunk to TOT and the GLNG staff.
TOT left all JF-backed boards
Other key personnel picked sides - some immediately, some later.
Troim left and started his own parallel empire to Fredriksen (For offshore drilling thereâs Borr Drilling, and Himalaya was the dry bulk parallel to Golden Ocean (GOGL))
Key management figures nudged out of Fredriksen-backed entities have usually found a place in TOT-backed entities (Blankenship, Steen, Bilung as three good examples)
TOT is still present in the background. The HSHP board chair works for Magni Partners (thatâs Troimâs investment fund, that owns a major chunk of HSHP). Troim does not have the financial resources that Fredriksen has, so the entities he backs are likely going to be newer, and more debt heavy. IIRC, Troim has ordered VLCCs for a tanker entity. [Edit: An article which mentions the addition of two more VLCCs to the original two Magni Partners orders two more VLCCs from New Times - Splash247 ]
Thank you; that is most enlightening. I recognize the world of work has changed, but do you see any issues with management living in Norway and the company is in Bermuda? Or that management seems to work for multiple companies?
Here is a question for you: what is the advantage of creating a new corporation for 4 VLCC ships instead of just adding the 4 ships to an already operating company? To be frank I also thought I saw mention that HSHP was going to be adding 2 VLCC to itâs fleet; but I can no longer find where I saw that. (so probably faulty memory)
Actually, depending on the size of the shipping entity, it is not unusual at all for the corporate staff to be located at multiple locations across the globe. For tax reasons, shipping owners might choose Bermuda/Bahamas, corporate reasons might opt for Marshall Islands, logistical reasons have staff in a US city (NY or Houston), European city (London, Athens, Oslo) and a presence in the Far East (Singapore or Hong Kong). The new Golden Ocean had a predecessor entity, Knightsbridge (which actually started as a tanker company). At one point in time, Knightsbridge had no actual management. Their âvirtualâ management was provided by Frontline Management Services - SHSPâs board member Alexandra Blankenship was the virtual CEO of Knightsbridge Tankers for several years. She was also concurrently director of various Fredriksen backed entities. As noted earlier, Peter Livanos had a tie-in with Euronav while also being involved with the Gaslog entities. So, it isnât restricted to Fredriksen backed entities.
A lot of tanker companies start small. NATâs original fleet was 3 Suezmax vessels. The aforementioned Knightsbridge Tankers was 4 VLCCs. I think Songa was also 3 or 4 VLCCs. Fredriksen had a holding company (ITCL) composed of three tanker entities (4 Suezmax, 2 VLCCs, 4 VLCCs) funded via bond offerings, and servicing oil majors - Chevron, Chevron and BP. Shipping, and specifically tankers, are a very capital intensive business. ITCLâs shipping entities were okay as long as they had contracts with oil majors. Once the vessels lost contract coverage, they became a major liability for Fredriksen. Luckily, the ITCL assets were ring-fenced, so Fredriksen just surrendered the vessels rather than transfer the debt obligations over to Frontline (the old entity) . As I noted earlier, Troim does not have the kind of financial resources that Fredriksen has built up over the years (decades actually).
As I mentioned, ITCL was a holding company whose subsidiaries were funded by bond offerings. Fredriksen transferred ownership of ITCL to Frontline (the old Frontline entity). From a reporting perspective, the ITCL assets and liabilities were consoldated. However, from a legal perspective, the assets and liabilities were separate. Only revenue from ITCL assets could be used to cover ITCL debt obligations. In the early years, when a majority of the ITCL vessels were under contract, the subsidiary easily covered the bond obligations, and still had excess cash available. But again, the cash could only be used to cover ITCL obligations. If Frontline parent needed to fund a purchase or make a maintenance payment, it could not use the cash from ITCL for that purpose. Until Frontline fully paid the bondholders, those vessels and other related assets e.g. cash on the ITCL books, belonged to the bond-holders. Eventually, when ITCL assets had challenges, the liability side i.e. debt obligations, did not impact Frontline as much. The company just surrendered the vessels