That depends have you sold?
There is no such thing as a good entry without a profitable sell.
No, because I didn’t buy.
DB2
Far be it from me to worry about this then.
No - the pessimistic assumptions are not supported by science.
As noted in the very link you provide, there’s almost no formal scientific literature to support the idea that changes in the climate - even the tipping point scenarios - will lead to civilization collapsing. When discussing these scenarios, climate scientists assume that civilization and the global economy is relatively brittle and inflexible, incapable of absorbing these kinds of changes. But there’s no support for that claim - which is why that paper is calling for research into the question.
But as also noted in that paper, there’s good reason to think that civilization is more robust than climatologists give it credit for. For example, countries that have had to deal with very large and rapid relative sea level rise due to subsidence haven’t had cataclysmic reactions - they’ve just used a bunch of adaptive measures, like engineering controls and moving populations slowly over time, to mitigate the impacts.
If you want a recent example, you can look at Russia’s response to international sanctions - a man-made catastrophe for their economy, so one that’s vastly faster than a climatological one. Russia’s economy is actually anticipated to grow this year, rather than shrink, despite global sanctions. How? Because basically they re-oriented their entire export sector away from Europe and towards Asia, mostly China and India where exports have risen 25% and tripled, respectively. In just two years. Even with the international community trying to stop them from adapting - they’ve managed to reorient most of their export industries from Europe-centric to China/India centric.
So when James Hansen talks about storms in the Atlantic making transatlantic shipping nigh-on impossible (a remote but presumably plausible possibility), he might assume that this would be a catastrophic and civilization destroying impact. But the folks who actually study the global economy - production, trade, and development - might reach a different conclusion. Transatlantic trade is important…but the total volume of such trade is barely 8% of world GDP, and only a tiny fraction of that is the addition to GDP from the trade itself. If you had a magic button that eliminated transatlantic shipping instantly it would be really terrible (but see the Russian counter-example) - but if you had to eliminate it over five decades, people would manage.
4 Likes
That’s hardly comparable to an ecological catastrophe. What did the Ethiopia famine in the 1980s do that nation’s social fabric? What did the Dust Bowl do the US Midwest? How about the impact of the potato famine on Ireland? And those were just regional disruptions. On a larger scale, climate-driven impacts on agriculture and the spread of the Black Death pandemic devastated much of Europe during the Medieval period. Perhaps worth noting that home-grown malaria was detected in Florida this year. Not a good sign for a state that depends on tourism and probably a harbinger of a lot of tropical diseases heading our way. We literally shut down the economy for Covid. What if it had been a lot worse than expected and a vaccine much harder to develop?
A diaspora of people from the Indian subcontinent due to a failure of the monsoons and lethal wet bulb temperatures would make the recent Syrian migrations pale in significance. Insect pollination is required for 75% of global crops, so a mass extinction within that group would have major consequences. Same with a collapse of fish populations due to ocean acidification or rising temps. Famines tend to be disruptive to the social network.
But hey, sticking one’s head in the ground is one way to deal with difficult problems.
4 Likes
Which is why it’s so frustrating to see climate scientists - and Greens in general - act as if sticking their head in the ground is an effective way to deal with the problem they face. They should be aware by now that merely pointing out how dramatic the impacts of climate change may be to the climate is not going to build support for people in advanced western economies to undergo privation. Mere handwaving to the fact that climate change involves bad things happening isn’t going to do it. For years - decades - the Green movement has ignored the fact that while predicting impacts to the climate is a scientific question, deciding what to do in response to those impacts is a political question. Sticking their head in the sand and acting as though all they had to do was demonstrate that the climate science was real, without having to do the work to demonstrate that the economic and sociological science was real.
Yes, famines tend to be disruptive to the social network. Famines also tend not to completely destroy civilization or the global economy. Yes, rising sea levels are problematic for coastal communities. They also tend not to completely destroy those coastal communities or the countries that house them. What is an existential issue for certain low-lying island micro states isn’t really that important an issue for large wealthy western economies. Yes, the Dust Bowl had a serious impact on the Midwest - and didn’t result in the destruction of U.S civilization, even in conjunction with the global Great Depression.
Civilization and global economic systems are chock-a-block with effective feedback mechanisms to respond to these kinds of exogenous shocks - and there’s very little serious support for the idea that they can’t handle it, other than some hand-waving towards the fact that climate scientists believe (without much evidence) that the shocks to the climate will have much, much larger impacts on humans than what’s happened in the past.
One great example is this statement from your post:
Is it true? Let’s assume for the sake of argument that insect pollination is required for 75% of “global crops.” But does that mean that a mass extinction within that group would have major consequences? After all, regardless of the proportion of “global crops” that are affected by insect pollination, staple crops generally are not pollinated by insects:
Most staple food grains, like corn, wheat, rice, soybean and sorghum, need no insect help at all; they are wind or self-pollinated. Other staple food crops, like bananas and plantains, are propagated from cuttings, and produce fruit without pollination (parthenocarpy). Further, foods such as root vegetables and leafy vegetables will produce a useful food crop without pollination, though pollination may be required for the purpose of seed production or breeding.
So while pollinator collapse might affect a lot of different crops, it is extremely unlikely to cause a catastrophic global famine. Why? Because the crops that don’t require pollination provide something like 80-85% of the world’s calories (whether eaten directly or “processed” through a cow or pig or chicken). All of them are self-pollinating. For obvious reasons - self-pollinating crops have one less failure point for production, which is why they are staples. And for the one crop that does seem to be both large and depend partially on pollinators (rape and mustard see), humans - being resourceful - would shift their agricultural proportions away from that and start growing other stuff.
2 Likes
The trouble is that you are thinking very small. You seem to believe for example that the collapse of the Greenland ice mass will only cause regional flooding. That’s just the immediate impact. Secondary impacts will likely be slowing of major ocean currents that in turn will cause major changes in climate patterns that are at this point largely unpredictable.
What the scientific community is saying is that we don’t really know what will happen when temperatures increase by >2C, but it could really be very bad. It could mean desertification of the American MidWest, rerouting of the Indian monsoon so essential to feeding the billions on that subcontinent, or the loss of major ocean fisheries. We are barely beginning to understand the impact of climate change and habitat disruption on the generation and spread of diseases. And there is the threat that the melting of the Arctic permafrost will release a gigaton of greenhouse gases, making any effort to control warming a lost cause. So while you with all your legal training may be convinced that climate change is mostly benign, I’ve given you links indicating that the scientific community with actual expertise in climate and the environment are taking the threat to civilization seriously.
You assert that the wealthy US can deal with the worst of climate change. There are masses of people to the south of us who are going to be most impacted by global warming with crop failures and weather disasters. When temperatures increase >2C, the only way for those in Central and South America to “adapt” is to migrate. They will be heading north in numbers. It is already happening. How long can we keep them out and still retain a semblance of a liberal democracy? We have the biggest military so we can probably defend “Fortress America”, but we will become a very different America. May as well sell the Statue of Liberty for scrap because the inscription will soon no longer be relevant.
I guess they don’t teach about ecosystems in law school. Why do plants produce flowers that smell good with bright colors? To attract pollinators. A major decline in pollinators means a major shift in plant populations. Ecosystems will change dramatically, probably leading to massive extinctions of wildlife. The impact of that is unpredictable. But chances are it will be major and negative.
From MIT, a description of melting permafrost as a possible positive feedback loop for accelerating global warming:
3 Likes
Have you? You gave me a link to an article where someone - in 2022 - is calling for scientists to start studying whether there’s actually any real possibility of civilization collapsing from climate change. I may be just a lawyer, and not a scientist, but I do know how to read an article that’s written in lay language and understand what they’re saying.
No, they don’t teach about ecosystems in law school. They teach you how to read. What you wrote in your post is that:
Insect pollination is required for 75% of global crops, so a mass extinction within that group would have major consequences.
Crops. Not ecosystems, not all flowering plants. Crops. And regardless of whether there might exist some measure of “global crops” that results in 75% of them requiring insect pollination, global crops for human consumption by volume are almost entirely not pollinated by insects. Every significant staple crop is self-pollinating. Having wheat or rice disappear from massive production would have “major consequences” - having almonds or strawberries disappear from massive production would not. Yes, the world would be worse without almonds and strawberries being cheap and plentiful - or even existing - but that’s not an existential threat to civilization.
There really isn’t a great scientific basis for statements beyond talking about the extremes (saying that 1.5 to 2.0 C will be survivable, and that greater than 5.0 C will not be survivable), and concluding that the “semi-failure” of 2.2 C to 2.7 C will present a really non-trivial risk of civilization being destroyed. Maybe there might actually be a non-trivial risk there - but as your link pointed out, there’s not really any scientific analysis that provides support for that claim.
Especially since many of these claims aren’t climate claims. Let’s take this horrible from your parade:
Remember, this scenario is playing out over decades from now. How do you know we’re still going to want to keep them out in 2055? When the U.S. is a majority-minority country? How do you know that Canada - with vast areas opening up due to modest warming and a current total fertility rate of only 1.40 (and falling!) might not be really excited to have a bunch of folks immigrating to provide young workers for their aging population? Or how these countries will respond when (and if) climate really does get intolerable down there, and it’s far more obvious that the humanitarian crisis is driven by climate and not political and criminal factors in a handful of (relatively northern) countries?
This is a socio-political prediction - that mass migration will be unwelcome. and resisted - not a climate prediction.
4 Likes
That’s the point. Everyone is obviously entitled to their opinion, but I’m just wondering how you can be so confident in yours in a field you don’t know much about. In any case, my links are intended to be entry points for further investigation for those interested. But hey, if you need to be spoon fed, I have a bit of time.
This paper presents evidence that the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) a major ocean current will most likely collapse in the next 50 years or so. Warning of a forthcoming collapse of the Atlantic meridional overturning circulation | Nature Communications
This paper finds that a 2.7C increase in global warming will place about one-third of the global population outside of the “human climate niche”, defined by historical examination as the conditions suitable for dense human populations. That seems like a lot of people to me. Quantifying the human cost of global warming | Nature Sustainability
This paper explorers catastrophic climate scenarios and identifies the “four climate horsemen”:
There are many potential contributors to climate-induced morbidity and mortality, but the “four horsemen” of the climate change end game are likely to be famine and undernutrition, extreme weather events, conflict, and vector-borne diseases. These will be worsened by additional risks and impacts such as mortality from air pollution and sea level rise. https://www.pnas.org/doi/full/10.1073/pnas.2108146119
As Captain America said “I can do this all day”. In other words, there are lots of research papers on the potential impact of tipping points. None of them conclusive, but together they indicate that there is a genuine risk that policy makers should not ignore. In general, the more complex a system, the more likely there will be unexpected tipping points where large changes can suddenly occur. We see it in economics all the time. Market crashes are typically unexpected. Climate is far more complex than our economic system. We should be prepared to expect the unexpected.
This isn’t a court of law and we aren’t arguing a case. You don’t need to define topics so narrowly. The stat was meant to suggest how important pollinators are to plants in general. But we can discuss the impact on crops if you want. Reduce the 75% or so of food crops that depend on insect pollination and the diversity of food products is markedly reduced. The global diet becomes dependent on a small number of plant species. Sure, you will still have the staples to provide calories, but the fruits, nuts, and vegetables that provide much of the other nutrients needed will become scarce. Such a marked reduction in food diversity greatly decreases food security. Sustainable agriculture becomes more difficult. Famine and malnutrition become more frequent.
But look, this isn’t about winning an argument. It is about whether the undefined but tangible risk of climate catastrophe in the future is worth making some economic sacrifices today.
I think yes.
You on other hand won’t even consider the possibility of catastrophic climatic events despite ample evidence that the scientific community is taking it very seriously. Your response is that the really bad stuff will never happen, based as far as I can tell on wishful thinking. That doesn’t seem rational to me.
The same way you know that catastrophic climate events won’t happen. It’s a guess, an opinion. But not unreasonable given what we see today.
2 Likes
Asking for a little help. Can you please point out the data from SlowBoring Blog that support your statement below about not ending up in a catastrophe?
I’m not seeing it, especially the “almost certainly” part. Thank you in advance.
2 Likes
No, it’s not. My response is that “really bad stuff” is not the same as civilization ending.
That’s why, for example, I emphasized the difference between “crops” and “plants.” If 75% of crops for human consumption depended on pollination, then a loss of pollinators (itself hardly a guaranteed consequence of 2.2.-2.7 degree change) might be a threat to civilization. But since all staple crops are self-pollinating…it’s just not. Losing food diversity and no longer having certain types of agriculture is bad, but it’s not going to end civilization. The global diet is already dependent on a small number of plant species, and has been for centuries.
The same holds for all your other examples - while they are all climate events (whether they are “catastrophes” depends on the degree to which they happen), they are not self-evidently civilization-ending outcomes. Humans are resilient and operate on time scales vastly faster than climate (even the tipping point scenarios).
This goes back to the central point - why don’t voters (and therefore politicians) support more material actions to fight climate change? In large part, because scientists can’t actually support their assumptions that these impacts would actually end civilization. People in wealthy developed countries hear of climate horsemen like “famine” and “sea level rise” and recognize - rightly - that they and their children and children’s children are not the ones who will face serious harm from those events.
Significant climate events may happen - but they’re a lot less likely at 2.7 C than the 5.0 or 6.0 C that was on the table previously. And taking 5.0 and 6.0 off the table means that the events that would have certainly affected your children and children’s children are not going to happen. The events you describe above might happen (but they’re not necessarily going to, or even likely to) - but even if they do, there’s no evidence or even likelihood they would end civilization.
1 Like
Sure - here’s the key quote, and a lot of the meat is in the links:
But people should know that we’ve gotten a lot of good news about RCP 8.5 over the past few years. Think about every optimistic climate story you’ve ever read: the falling cost of solar power, improvements in lithium-ion batteries, surging sales of electric vehicles. Even closures of coal plants under economic pressure from cheap natural gas — a fossil fuel that, while not exactly clean, is definitely cleaner than coal.
The upshot of all of this is that future industrial development is on track to be cleaner than past industrial development, even without any new policy changes or technological breakthroughs. Is it on track to stabilize global emissions and limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius? It is not. But we can pretty confidently say that scenarios that just project the past upward emissions curve forward are very unlikely. For that to happen, we’d need a huge resurgence of the coal industry and for every single auto company in the world to be somehow wrong about electric cars.
But this extreme scenario is actually very unlikely. The current International Energy Administration energy market projections suggest we’re on track for two to three degrees Celsius of warming (median forecast of 2.2 degrees). This is bad, which is why world governments agreed to a lower target. But it’s a lot less than the warming involved in scenarios where “those living in coastal areas from Texas to New England … will face dramatic increases in hurricane-driven flood risk as the Earth heats up.”
The “almost certainly” part is an inference from what Yglesias describes as what would have to happen for us to go back to the RCP 8.5 scenario - not just stopping where we are now, but going back to massive coal production and undoing all the price reductions in solar panels and wind turbines and everything. That’s just not going to happen. We’re “almost certainly” never going to land on the RCP 8.5 trendline, which is what motivated him to decry the continued references to RCP 8.5 in climate alarmism discussion.
3 Likes
“Really bad stuff” was the plague in the 14th century, which killed an estimated 1/3 of the population of Europe. (There were others in Asia and presumably the US and South America, but those civilizations were not so well documented.) It didn’t end civilization, although it surely dug a hole which took a while to come out of.
“Really bad stuff” was World War II, industrial warfare on a scale never before seen in human history, ending with the use of nuclear weapons and a use of so-called “conventional weapons” 10 times anything prior.
“Really bad stuff” was the Great War, with chemical weapons, and the hidebound generals whose only tactic seemed to be sending more and more troops to stop machine gun bullets with their chests.
“Really bad stuff” was Mt. Tambora in Indonesia, erupting for days and sending the planet into a cooling phase that lasted for years and diminishing crops across the world. Yet we’re still here.
There are lots of “really bad stuff” things throughout history, but humans are a resilient bunch. Yes, millions could be killed or affected, yes, there could be mass migrations to avoid the effects of a changing environment, yes, it will be different, perhaps vastly different from anything known before. It probably will not “end civilization.” That’s a possible outcome, I’ll admit, but a vanishingly small one given the range of other possibilities.
2 Likes
Definitions are important.
The PNAS article linked upthread (https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2210525119 ) defines three categories of civilization collapses in order of severity.
In the first, climate change causes collapse in specific, vulnerable locations while civilization elsewhere is largely able to adapt to climate impacts. Call this local collapse …
…In our second scenario, urban- and sometimes even national-level collapses are widespread, but some large urban centers and national governments still exist. These existing centers experience negative climate impacts such as persistent water and food scarcity. In his book discussing the ethics and politics of a potential post-apocalyptic world, philosopher Tim Mulgan refers to this type of scenario as the *broken world…
… In our third scenario, which we label global collapse , all large urban areas across the globe are virtually abandoned, functioning nation states no longer exist, and the world’s population undergoes a significant decline.
I think we can agree that the first scenario is easy to see happening. The collapse of the Greenland ice mass would doom many island nations. A shift in the monsoon pattern could devastate the Indian subcontinent.
The second scenario seems plausible to me. Temperature rise approaching 4C would probably make most equatorial regions uninhabitable. Mass migrations out of these areas destabilize many governments. A collapsing AMOC significantly alters the climate in many agricultural regions, destabilizing the global food supply. The wealthy northern nations build walls and look inward.
The third scenario could occur through positive feedback loops. Temperature rise >3C accelerates melting of the Arctic permafrost, which releases greenhouse gases. This increase warming, which increases permafrost melt…positive feed back loop-1. The Amazon forest habitat is destabilized and is subject to massive wildfires as the tropics heat up. Less Amazon forest means less CO2 uptake, which leads to higher CO2 atmospheric levels and greater loss of Amazon forest…positive feedback loop-2. At this point we have lost any ability to control global warming. Mass extinctions occur on land and in the oceans with rising temperatures and acidification. The global climate becomes more erratic and severe…you can imagine the rest.
Note added: The issue then is how much should we be willing to sacrifice today to reduce risk of each of these scenarios? Even the most “minor” one seems terrible to me and worth the imposition of a significant carbon tax, but your mileage may vary.
3 Likes
This statement illustrates the problem exactly - the type of conclusory assumption of some horrible outcome, which actually seems to be the less likely outcome. What on earth are you basing this on? Why would mass migration out of these areas “destabilize many governments”?
We’re talking about shifts that will take place over decades. This isn’t trying to move 100 million people out of Central America in the space of a few years - we’re talking a slow, gradual shift in population. During a time when the TFR of the developed economies is so low that their populations will all have peaked, and start declining. When they’ll need and welcome having more people move in - much like Canada has, in response to its dangerously low fertility rate.
Honestly, mass immigration to super-low TFR places like Canada and Japan and many European nations is more likely to be stabilizing than destabilizing, compared to the status quo. They need more young people, more people having kids, in order to keep their societies going.
Rapid waves of refugees can cause societal distress, but I’m hard pressed to think of a single government in history that has been “destabilized” even by a rapid wave of refugees - perhaps you can provide a few examples? But there have been lots of large-scale population movements between countries that happen over decades that have been…well, just fine. I mean, between 1880 and 1920 literally 20 million immigrants left Europe (a continent of about 200 million in 1880) to the U.S. (a country of about 50 million in 1880). And while it caused all kinds of tensions and problems and political fighting and Know-nothings and everything else, it never came anywhere close to destabilizing the U.S.
The Paris Accords were designed to keep temperature rise below 2C. That would be a successful global climate policy. Unfortunately, the world is not currently on track to meet the agreement goals.
This means that the most likely outcome is a >2C rise that will hopefully be kept below 3C. That is what I consider to be a partially successful global policy.
Unfortunately as has been noted by several posts, China and to a lesser extent India are expanding their coal plant capacity. If all these plants come online then blowing past the 3C mark becomes plausible if not probable. At this point, the issue shifts to potential positive feedback loops such as melting Arctic permafrost and a declining Amazon rain forest. If those tipping points occur, then a 4C rise is likely. This I define as a failure of global climate policy. At this point, the risk of severe and catastrophic climate events I fear becomes a reality.
1 Like
Fair enough - but that’s something that most climate advocates would consider a failure, not a partial success. Which is why there’s so much handwringing, and why Greens and climate advocates are lamenting the world’s stupidity and short-sightedness.
My point, though, is that landing between 2 and 3 C is not going to result in a global hellscape. It’s not going to result in your kids (and their kids) having horrible lives. Or even lives that are materially worse than our lives as kids. Or even necessarily lives that are worse than if we had implemented all the costly (to the OECD) policies to keep temp rises below 2 C.
The people in western advanced economies who are resisting expensive action against climate change aren’t necessarily being foolish or short-sighted. The marginal costs of climate action rise the more you try to reduce emissions, and you can get to “negative but manageable for people in the OECD” outcomes far more cheaply than “below 1.5 C” outcomes. Which is why climate policy as applied looks the way it does.
Climate change has already destabilized much of Central America leading first to mass migrations within the area and now migrations out of the region. This instability significantly contributed to the dysfunction of local governments. This is all happening in real time, not just decades. It is an interesting question to ask how much did this mass migration of Central American refugees to the US southern border contribute to the Jan 6 insurrection?
There is also a growing consensus that climate change played a major role in the Syrian diaspora, which in turn destabilized much of the Middle East. Drought and famine, which now occurs more frequently with climate change, can destabilize weak governments, leading to armed conflict and social chaos.
My point is that you don’t have the expertise or knowledge to make that statement. You have no idea what temps will cause the Arctic permafrost to irreversibly melt and create a positive feedback loop for global warming. No one does. At this point it is just a matter of relative probabilities. The probability of it happening declines the more we mitigate global warming.
It is extraordinarily foolish. A small decline in GDP today is not a threat to regional or global civilization. Climate change that triggers tipping points that most climate scientist believe are real could be such a threat.
To disregard such a significant the long-term risk is incredibly myopic.
2 Likes
I mean - that’s just unsupportable. Climate change didn’t destabilize the Northern Triangle countries. Years and years of civil war, being used as a proxy battlefield in the cold war, and economic and government corruption destabilized those countries. Climate change might be one factor among many that led to poor conditions there - but climate change isn’t what caused those areas to be unstable.
And once more - even if everyone left Central America, it wouldn’t destabilize the countries they go to. The entire population of Central America is only 50 million people. Could the U.S. and Canada absorb 50 million people over, say, three or four decades without being destabilized? Absolutely.
It’s not foolish. No one makes decisions based on “a small decline in GDP.” To meaningfully fight climate change means incurring real costs. These would not be trivial. US emissions are about 50 tons per year per household. A social cost of carbon of $200 per ton is a $10K cost. Actual household costs would be much lower if you actually had a pigouvian tax and dividend, but they’d still be several thousand - and that’s before you get into the massive costs that would have to be borne to cover the costs of the really big players (China and India and other developing nations).
If there was actual evidence to show that the parade of climate horribles would actually lead to the end of civilization in the OECD nations, they’d be more inclined to support it. But there just isn’t. There’s evidence that climate change might cause famine or large-scale migrations…but no real evidence (or even a good argument) why that would present any likely risk of civilizational catastrophe to the wealthy developed countries whose support you need.
Yeah - if you could show the long-term risk was significant, it would be myopic. But there’s not really much basis for concluding that it’s significant. Not the possibility that there might be some climate tipping points - that possibility and the outcome of it destroying civilization in OECD countries.
Meanwhile, you don’t have to be myopic to rationally engage in behavior that has some low-probability catastrophic risks. Whenever you get in a car, the worst case scenario is that you might be killed. The same is true if you take a shower. Or even if you eat solid food. Yet we don’t have regulators limiting cars to 35 MPG, or safety harnesses in our shower, or eat only liquid diets. Because even if a non-zero risk could result in catastrophe, even rational people are willing to absorb it.
1 Like
I had to look up “pigouvian.”
1 Like