SHOP: thoughts on Q4

I finally had some time to analyze the Q4 results and listen to the earnings call.

Wow. Amazing.

Here are some important takeaways:

  1. Revenue growth continued at a blistering pace.

Q    y/y    1yr growth
Q216 92.9%  
Q316 88.6%
Q416 85.8%
Q117 75.2%  85%
Q217 75.2%  80%
Q317 72.1%  77%
Q417 70.9%  73%

No issues here.

  1. Margins on subscription revenue are stable and margins on merchant revenue are expanding:

	Subscription Revenue in $000					
	      2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Revenue	      19200	38339	66668	111979	188606	310031
Cost of Rev   4291	8504	16790	24531	39478	61267
Gross Profit  14909	29835	49878	87448	149128	248764
GM	      78%	78%	75%	78%	79%	80%


	Merchant Revenue in $000					
	      2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Revenue	      4513	11913	38350	93254	200724	363273
Cost of Rev   485	5009	26433	69631	140357	231784
Gross Profit  4028	6904	11917	23623	60367	131489
GM	      89%	58%	31%	**25%	30%	36%**

As the merchant base continues to increase, we can expect revenue to continue to grow while the development costs of adding new functionality should decline as a percentage of revenue. I expect SHOP to be hugely profitable.

  1. Merchants continue to flock to SHOP in huge numbers. Pay close attention here Fools! In the Q3 results, SHOP stopped reporting merchant additions and stopped providing details on the composition of merchants. Some on this board were worried about churn. I argued that it is a non-issue. I think the latest results put this debate to rest!

SHOP reported more than 609,000 merchants at the end of Q4. Holy moly! This means that in 2017, SHOP had net additions of 231,500 merchants or 61.3% y/y growth in total merchants. The churn is factored in. Why does it matter? SHOP gives people an easy way to try out a business and during this period, merchants are paying the monthly subscription fees. The important things is that the total number is growing. Yes, some will shut down their businesses after they decide that they don’t want to continue. There are failed businesses in there. But now, look at the GMV: it was $9.1B during Q4 which is up from $5.5B in Q4 2016; that’s an increase of 65%. Note: the increase in GMV is higher than the percentage increase in total merchant number which tells is that on average each merchant is increasing business volume; yes, it’s slightly higher but remember that since churn is factored in the business volume of the remaining merchants and the new ones outweighs any negative effect from churn. Another important point to note is that SHOP does not need to spend great effort to acquire new merchants. There is a lot of self-onboarding and more than 16,000 of Shopify’s partners referred merchants to the Shopify platform. Thus, since the customer acquisition costs are low, churn is not much of an issue at all.

Shopify Plus merchants were also reported at more than 3600, up from 2500 in the prior year; that’s a 44% increase. But note that Shopify Plus merchants contribution of MRR was 21%, up from 17% from the prior year. This is in spite of the fact that total merchant number increased at 61.3% and Shopify Plus merchants increased at only 44.0%. SHOP started Shopify Plus to give the highly successful merchants a clear path to increased service and functionality which is important to keep them at Shopify rather than changing platforms. Interestingly, though, most of the new Shopify Plus additions were not graduates of the basic Shopify platform; most were not Shopify merchants/customers before; they migrated from other platforms; the COO said that SHOP has seen migrations from all of the competing enterprise platforms. They are migrating because SHOP not only gives the necessary functionality but also because SHOP Plus enables them to behave more like entrepreneurs by allowing them to hit easily and seamlessly hit all of the channels (FB, Instagram, etc.) that SMBs have typically only used. SHOP only really started putting a serious effort into Shopify Plus in 2017. SHOP will continue this effort in 2018 and beyond by adding 500 people to sales, support, and development (to add functionality) to Shopify Plus.

In summary, it was an absolutely amazing report and I think that the future for SHOP looks very bright indeed. I’m not selling any shares because I continue to believe that the stock can increase 10x; in fact, this report makes me more confident that SHOP will get there eventually.

Chris

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Hey Chris,

Great post and rundown of the quarter! I agree SHOP has become one of my highest conviction stocks. It’s been rising through the ranks in portfolio position.

The cross channel (Storefront, FB, Instagram, etc) is a huge advantage for a SHOP customer. And for SHOP it means more service revenue and more GMV. Their customers know they will always have whatever the newest trend is in ecommerce at the push of a button (and maybe a few more bucks to SHOP). That to me is tremendous CAP.

Darth

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I’m not selling any shares because I continue to believe that the stock can increase 10x; in fact, this report makes me more confident that SHOP will get there eventually.

Is anyone worried about dilution? SHOP keeps issuing shares: almost 12 million shares last year alone (https://seekingalpha.com/pr/17075654-shopify-announces-fourt… ). This even with a greatly increasing stock price, which provides incentives to the company to issue yet more shares.

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Thanks Chris. A previous post, which I can’t seem to find, had a link to a very enlightening interview with the COO. I hope that many of you heard it. I think it was at a gathering regarding SaaS. He mentioned a couple things that were worth pondering.

Paraphrasing, he said that most people now think of Shopify as the leading provider of merchant solutions for E-commerce. He then said that this time next year, he hopes that people think of Shopify in the same way for Commerce. The runway is a lot longer.

The second thing in the interview was a small item of providing a very large portion of merchants needs, such as shipping…which led me to sell my position in STMP, but again made the runway look longer, and optionality more promising.

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That is $1.560 billion worth of dilution in one year. $500 million of this was a secondary, with money in the bank. The other $1 billion simply went to increasing the company’s market cap.

That is an incredibly high price to pay for compensating employees. $1 billion in a year.

Offsetting this, the employees will be paying back to SHOP money to exercise the options at the share price at the grant. So some of this $1 billion should come back as cash, but still that is an incredibly large dilution, net of money raised, for just one year.

I don’t know if that will continue or not.

I have found that with every company there is a lot to like, and a lot of FUD, sometimes legitimate. I wonder what it was like to own, say Microsoft in 1980 or 1982 or so. Was there the same amount of fear, uncertainty, and doubt? With Intel? With Qualcomm there certainly was. With Cisco? I don’t know.

A historical lesson in fear, uncertainty, and doubt may be quite valuable lesson for all of us. If anyone goes back that far.

Tinker

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I wonder what it was like to own, say Microsoft in 1980 or 1982 or so. Was there the same amount of fear, uncertainty, and doubt?

I was a young thing then, at my first real job out of school, and didn’t know squat about business. I was under the idealistic impression that the company with the best products would win. At work we used to joke that Microsoft took the “Quick” out of QDOS (which stood for “Quick & Dirty Operating System,” which is what MS bought and released as DOS). I remember buying some shares in Compaq and in Commodore I think around then. When I saw people buying PCs to avoid IT, I thought about buying Microsoft stock, but the price was rising and so I thought it was too expensive. I didn’t know diddley!

I remember losing a little on the Commodore, but more than doubling on the Compaq. Anyway, I don’t remember feeling that Microsoft was going to rule the world - their OS really sucked compared to “real” OSes like VMS. A bit later on I got interested in Sun Microsystems when I saw them taking sales away from D.E.C. the way D.E.C. had taken sales away from IBM. While I recognized the pattern, I was too young and stupid to do anything about it, and it would be decades before Christensen would explain it in print. Besides, I was spending all my money to live in LA at the time. Young and foolish!

As I recall, even many MS employees didn’t take advantage of the long term train the MS was. I remember reading about $50K snowblowers (they sold some stock to buy a snowblower, which a couple years later would have been worth $50K, or a really nice BMW at the time).

With Intel?

I bought some INTC in the early 1990’s and had a nice little run until the FDIV bug in 1994. I got out a year or two later, having lost a small amount. I felt bad about that as it then rose - until the dot-com bust, when it all crashed. About the only thing I did right was to get and hold on to as much of my SBC and employer stock purchase plan stock as I could.

Those were the days.

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<<<There is a lot of self-onboarding and more than 16,000 of Shopify’s partners referred merchants to the Shopify platform. Thus, since the customer acquisition costs are low, churn is not much of an issue at all.>>>

This is one of the goodwill assets that are not on the balance sheet anywhere that I was talking about on the other thread discussing accounting issues and R&D.

The on boarding is recognized as traditional goodwill in regard to the value of the brand. In legal cases you can really screw the other side by getting the court to find that the business (even if it is a solo practice) has not just personal goodwill but professional goodwill, such as brand power. It does pay to get a good attorney.

However, the network of partners is not valued anywhere on the balance sheet with SHOP. How much is this worth? A lot more than just price to earnings, enterprise value to free cash flow, etc. It is clearly worth a lot of money, in excess of a billion dollars probably, at least, and it is a long-term asset that keeps on giving, will keep growing, and will not depreciate away.

As Denny describes it - oh I forget the term - need rest I guess, it continues to expandy thingy :wink: sorry, brain not working. Just had problem with Windows that screwed my night…hate Windows, but still that is the ultimate in goodwill that is not recognized on the balance sheet.

Tinker

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Oh yes, increasing returns. That network continues to produce increasing returns year after year.

Btw/ my issue with the merchant number is not the churn. That is expected. It is just that it is misleading, as most of the profits come from Shopify Plus, and very few of the other merchants upgrade to Shopify Plus. As I stated, it is an internal contradiction in so far as these numbers are made up of drop shippers selling the same undifferentiated products.

But as Duma correctly pointed out, it is the growth in Shopify Plus that will move this company forward. And as I said, no doubt management recognized the problem that I brought up and is likely to do something about it. Well sure enough, they are now making it the focus of their business it seems. So good for them.

That network of 16,000 partners is a gem to have without question and of great value. If you took out the goodwill value of this network from the market cap of the company, total valuation would probably come out to be much more reasonable. Another case of taking an “expensive” stock and properly valuing it and putting it into perspective.

Tinker

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Btw/ my issue with the merchant number is not the churn. That is expected. It is just that it is misleading, as most of the profits come from Shopify Plus, and very few of the other merchants upgrade to Shopify Plus. As I stated, it is an internal contradiction in so far as these numbers are made up of drop shippers selling the same undifferentiated products.

Well, hmmm, let’s see…

$29/mo x 12 x 600,000…

Annual $209M in revenue.

I sure like those drop shippers. SHOP is adding a net 50,000 merchants per quarter. That’s an additional $70M per year just in monthly fees.

The above does not even count the $0.30 per transaction and the percentage of revenue.

I just don’t get how the SMBs whether they’re drop shippers or not can be a bad thing.

Chris

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Chris,

My issue is not the present but the future. On NPI we went through the numbers, comparingSHOP to Salesforce and figuring out how many merchants it takes if SHOP grows like Salesforce did to get to its market cap, which would become a 6x.

What was discovered was just how many millions of merchants it would take to make that happen. That is fine if all things are equal, like it is with Amazon when a customer is a customer. But the more undifferentiated dropshippers you get, the more of your customer base that is competing directly against each other, so therefore at some point all profits will be competed away. There are only so many merchants you can have in the market and still be viable. Thus there is a ceiling on the number of these UNDIFFERENTIATED dropshippers.

This does not apply to differentiated merchants. But to the point that the rapid growth in merchants applies to the undifferentiated merchants, such as once dominated eBay, that is a real issue and the numbers are therefore misleading if you plot into the future.

That is why Shopify Plus is so important.

I hope that clarifies my concerns. Also, as I predicted, very few of the $29 merchants are moving upscale to Shopify Plus, it is mostly new businessses.

I do think however that businesses referred by the 16,000 referral sources will be of higher quality as they are actually paying someone to start their businesses with SHOP, and thus already have money and most likely a differentiated business.

It would be great if SHOP would break out undifferentiated from the differentiated merchants we would love to see dominate the numbers. But reality is that,like with eBAy, a large portion are the undifferentiated merchants, and as eBay discovered, there are only so many of those the market can support.

Thus I am talking future looking, prognosticating. You need to calculate how many such merchants it takes to get to $10 billion in revenues, and let me know if you think the market, not the technology, can support that many businesses if a material portion are undifferentiated dropshippers.

I believe SHOPs new and focus, and they are putting a lot of resources into it now, is due to looking at the exact same economic reality. That Shopify Plus is not drawing many businesses that started on Shopify in the cheaper programs, and that the laws of economics make it harder and harder for undifferentiated merchants to stay in business the more such merchants enter the market. That is basic economics.

To the extent these are differentiated businesses, that is a different matter. But I can, for example, buy the same Alibaba sources Apple Watch bands, for $15 probably from a dozen or more merchants. I do not even remember the name that I bought my first two from. I will have to look back. How many undifferentiated merchants can profitably sell the same product? It becomes harder the more merchants that enter the field and copy the Sam business models.

That is my point, and SHOP management is taking steps to address this issue by putting a ton of resources now into Shopify Plus to attract more established and differentiated businesses.

Tinker

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My issue is not the present but the future. On NPI we went through the numbers, comparingSHOP to Salesforce and figuring out how many merchants it takes if SHOP grows like Salesforce did to get to its market cap, which would become a 6x.

I can’t remember what those numbers are…how many SMBs there are. SHOP only has 600k now. For some reason the number 20 million in the USA is sticking in my head. I do know for sure the SHOP currently only has a very small fraction of the total and those that is currently has are predominately in the US and Canada. During the conference call last week, SHOP said the they will focus on expansion into Germany, Japan, and France. Germany and Japan are the 4th and 3rd largest economies. There is this global trend, I look at it more like a big tidal wave, that merchants are moving from brick and mortar to online. We are still very early and SHOP is positioned to capture a lot of opportunity still. In fact, SHOP is accelerating this shift by making it incredibly easy to go to online commerce.

Even drop shippers can differentiate themselves. In today’s online world, businesses can blog, leverage their networks, provide, information, etc to reach new customers for manufacturers. Being a reseller can be a very low cost business so many drop shippers will likely keep their stores open even is volume is small. SHOP will keep collecting the $29 per month for each basic business.

In the end, we will see what happens but if you say that undifferentiated businesses are and issue then we would need to see a slow down in new businesses that join the SHOP network. There’s no evidence of that yet. In fact, the opposite is true…SHOP added on average 58,000 new merchants per quarter in 2017. Unlike, WIX which allows free websites, SHOP charges its merchants a minimum of $29 per month; that’s about $350 per year and it’s higher if the merchant sells anything.

Chris

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I don’t know, in my opinion, we are putting too much stock into this drop ship poor quality type merchant when evaluating the worthiness of SHOP as an investment. It seems reminiscent of the NVDA/Crypto currency debate. Just assume it’s importance is approximately zero and evaluate SHOP based off that assumption.

After all, correct me if I’m wrong, the only reason Shopify has an association with drop shipping to the degree they do is from the acquisition of Oberlo. I’m sure there is a reason SHOP wanted this acquisition. Access to their customers and networks. Maybe they thought their cross channel platform and other merchant solutions could help Oberlo merchants achieve greater success. Maybe they just wanted to tuck in some extra revenue. I don’t know and quite frankly don’t care. It’s certainly not a drag on revenue. SHOP has no debt so they are not making payments on it. It’s not shrinking by any measure. It’s probably not likely to be a huge home run for SHOPs top or bottom line but for any business not every endeavor and not every segment has to be. And as other segments over take this segment as a piece of the overall revenue pie it’s relevance becomes even less significant.

What is a home run for Shopify is…Shopify. From platform to management to solutions to networking. They have the “best mouse trap in the world” as we have discussed so many times it’s not worth repeating again. And really the numbers as far as revenue growth and earnings growth and with no significant slow down in sight show this to be the case.

Darth

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