Square's coming 4th quarter announcement

I was looking today at Schwab analyst’s estimates for the coming fourth quarter announcement on 2/21/18 :

Current Quarter vs. Prior Year:
For the fourth quarter 2017, analysts estimate SQ will generate revenues of $265.7M, a DECREASE of 41.22% over the prior year fourth quarter results.

Then I looked at Yahoo finance :

Revenue Estimate Current Qtr. (Dec 2017)
No. of Analysts 27
Avg. Estimate 265.65M
Low Estimate 244.7M
High Estimate 278.37M
Year Ago Sales 451.92M
SALES GROWTH (year/est) -41.20%

Same thing .

They both have EPS estimates at $0.07 which is an increase over the prior year fourth quarter of -$.04

But revenues at minus 41 % ?

What do you think about these SQ prognostications Saul ?

Frank

2 Likes

I realize the quarter is not even over yet .

I was looking today at Schwab analyst’s estimates for the coming fourth quarter :
Current Quarter vs. Prior Year:
For the fourth quarter 2017, analysts estimate SQ will generate revenues of $265.7M, a DECREASE of 41.22% over the prior year fourth quarter results.

Then I looked at Yahoo finance :
Revenue Estimate Current Qtr.
Avg. Estimate 265.65M
Year Ago Sales 451.92M
SALES GROWTH (year/est) -41.20%

You are right Frank. That makes no sense, and it’s why I tell people in the Knowledgebase to get their information from the company’s press release, not from Yahoo or Schwab, because who knows what Yahoo’s computer picks up.

Here’s the problem. It’s GAAP nonsense again. As I understand it, GAAP forces Square to report, as revenue, not only its cut of sales, but the amount it collects and has to pass through to Visa and MasterCard. Being honest, Square gives its true revenue as Adjusted Revenue, which is much lower than the phony GAAP revenue, since it eliminates the credit card cuts.

The Analysts Estimates of 265.7 that you see are real revenue (probably slightly underestimated). That estimate of 265 is up 38% from the 192 they had the year before, and from 257 sequentially. They will probably beat it handily.

The 451.9 from a year ago that you are worried about is the false GAAP revenue that includes VISA’s money and MasterCard’s money. No-one pays any attention to that.

The -41% growth shows what happens if you let a computer do the figuring without knowing what it’s doing. It’s comparing the phony GAAP revenue from the year ago quarter, with the analysts’ estimate for real revenue for this quarter.

I hope this was clear.

Saul

For Knowledgebase for this board,
please go to Post #17774, 17775 and 17776.
We had to post it in three parts this time.

A link to the Knowledgebase is also at the top of the Announcements column
that is on the right side of every page on this board

48 Likes

Very clear Saul.

Thanks,

Frank

1 Like

Here’s the problem. It’s GAAP nonsense again. As I understand it, GAAP forces Square to report, as
revenue, not only its cut of sales, but the amount it collects and has to pass through to Visa and
MasterCard. Being honest, Square gives its true revenue as Adjusted Revenue, which is much lower than
the phony GAAP revenue, since it eliminates the credit card cuts.

That statement is not only laughable but irresponsible.

It’s laughable because GAAP didn’t force Square to report transaction-based revenue. Square had
to convince the SEC that they wanted to report revenue that way! Go look up the letters back and
forth to the SEC from Square in 2015 – it’ll give you a better idea of just who Square deals
with on the processing side, and why they wanted to report revenue that way.

It’s irresponsible because it not only trashes GAAP unfairly (when you mistakenly call it “phony
revenue”) but it shows a misunderstanding of the purpose of GAAP. It’s NOT meant as a tool for you
to use for valuing a stock. Remember AudioEye (AEYE) and how you were fooled? Those guys were having
a field day making up revenue numbers. The only reason they were caught was because of GAAP.

You have a large following here. People admire and respect you, rightly so. Me too. And like it or
not your words carry extra weight.

Ears

18 Likes

that statement is not only laughable but irresponsible

I guess we’ll see when the actual fourth quarter results are announced Ears.

PS your choice of words could have been better thought out before you hit the submit button.

No need to be insulting

Frank

13 Likes

The -41% growth shows what happens if you let a computer do the figuring without knowing what it’s doing. It’s comparing the phony GAAP revenue from the year ago quarter, with the analysts’ estimate for real revenue for this quarter.

Saul,
Even though the discrepancy didn’t really concern me. I just wrote it off to some reporting peculiarity. It’s great to have you so clearly explain what’s really going on. If I had tried to figure it out, I don’t know if I would have ever unraveled it. In just a few words you’ve made it completely clear. I’m still learning a lot from you. A lot . . . .

2 Likes

Ears,
I posted a note of gratitude to Saul before I read your not. You have taken issue with Saul’s analysis, but you’ve raised a number of issues without elucidating any of them.

I’m not defending Saul’s analysis, which I found reasonable and plausible. And I’m not criticizing your statements. I just want to understand your analysis better as you have alluded to Saul’s clarification of the revenue decline as a …statement [that] is not only laughable but irresponsible. That’s quite an indictment.

You then referenced some letters between Square and the SEC, but didn’t really explain what the content was or why it was relevant to the specific discrepancy under discussion. I would greatly a[[reciate a summary of those letters and a little more explanation of how they might explain a 41% decline in YOY revenue decline.

I will concur fully with your statement that GAAP is NOT meant as a tool for you
to use for valuing a stock. This is (as I understand it) the primary reason that Saul does not really pay close attention to GAAP. And I kind of get what GAAP is really supposed to do. GAAP is supposed to give financial analysts, investors, economists and anyone else who might be interested a common measuring stick: twelve inches to a foot, 100 centimeters to a meter. It may be flawed, but everyone must abide with the same flaws. There’s no monkey-business allowed (well, kinda, sorta). That’s truly useful. Just maybe not the most useful tool for investors.

Anyway, I have a lot of respect for almost everyone who posts on this board. But I’ve got especially high respect for people like Saul and you and Bear and Denny and a few others who have a great deal more investment experience and knowledge than I do. So when I see a debate break out that I just don’t understand, I really want to at least understand what the underlying issues are.

Would you care to elaborate your post?

17 Likes

brittlerock,

Just saw your note, thanks. I don’t have time this morning to fully respond, but will try to
get back to you later this afternoon or evening.

In the meantime, check out the link below. When Square did their IPO in 2015, they had to file a
registration statement with the SEC. The SEC will review the registration, and in some cases may
respond with comments. In turn, the company will respond to those questions and comments. This back
and forth communication can go on for a while, and is available on the SEC site. The SEC questions
and comments are found in documents labeled “UPLOAD” and Square’s responses are found in documents
called “DRSLTR”. Also read any S-1 and S-1/A documents before and after the SEC questions – it
will show you the changes Square makes. This is an excellent way to learn more about Square’s
business, not just revenue but how the back-end processing works and their competitive positioning.

https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&a…

(Note: when you are on that page, click on the “Previous 40” button to see more documents.)

Thanks,
Ears

8 Likes

Ears,
Thanks, I guess. The link you provided references hundreds of pages of documents. I don’t have the time or the ability to read and retain all of that. Can you summarise the salient points? This is just too much to digest.

As an aside, do you actually labor through all this sort of documentation and form a deep understanding from what you’ve read before making any investment decision? If so, my hat’s off to you (if I wore a hat).

This seems a little like what lawyers sometimes do during discovery. They might turn over a truckload of documents. Separating wheat from chaff takes a team of opposing lawyers to read through all the stuff in order to find a few grains of useful material.

2 Likes

Brittlerock,

Back to your questions…

You then referenced some letters between Square and the SEC, but didn’t really explain what the
content was or why it was relevant to the specific discrepancy under discussion. I would greatly
appreciate a summary of those letters and a little more explanation of how they might explain a
41% decline in YOY revenue decline.

Saul was absolutely on the mark with his explanation to Frank that the supposed 41% decline had
to do with Schwab and Yahoo mistakenly comparing two different kinds of revenue – revenue that
included transaction fees with revenue that didn’t. I didn’t have a problem with that.

What I thought was funny was when Saul said that GAAP forced Square to report revenue that
included transaction fees but that Square was honest and reported it’s “true revenue” as adjusted
revenue. And that just didn’t square with the facts. Quite the opposite! So if you look back at the
exchange of letters between the SEC and Square you can see that Square had a choice about how it
wanted to report top line revenue – it could report revenue with transaction fees or without. And
Square chose to report top line with fees, using GAAP standards as a guide.

Below is what they said in one of their letters to the SEC. (When they say “gross basis” they mean
with fees, and when they say “net basis” they mean without fees.)


The Company considered whether to recognize revenue on a gross or net basis using the following
indicators from ASC 605-45:
 
  a. The Company is the primary obligor in the arrangement. The Company acts as the merchant of
     record for its sellers, and works directly with payment card networks and banks so that 
     sellers do not need to manage the complex systems, rules, and requirements of the payments
     industry. As the merchant of record, Square is liable for the settlement of the underlying
     transactions. The use of any third parties to process the transactions is not transparent to
     sellers who view Square as the ultimate party responsible, as the Company is responsible for
     remitting payments to the seller.
 
  b. The Company has latitude in establishing price. The Company has complete latitude in
     establishing the price charged to its customers for the service. The fee charged by the
     Company is not contractually dependent upon the fee charged by suppliers, which primarily
     consists of fees charged by payment card processors and payment card verification services.
     As a result, the Company bears the margin risk and reward of the transaction.
 
  c. The Company changes the product or performs part of the service. The Company provides the
     interface between the seller and end consumer to enable the transaction to take place and the
     Company is responsible for the service being provided. The Company also provides customer
     service and issue resolution to its customers, including seller payment protection in certain
     cases of fraud and unresolved disputes.
 
  d. The Company has discretion in supplier selection. The Company has complete discretion in
     selecting the suppliers with whom it contracts in providing payment processing services.
 
  e. The Company is involved in the determination of product and service specifications. The
     Company has complete discretion in determining the service specifications. For example,
     the Company offers sellers a variety of settlement options, including instant settlement,
     standard settlement terms, as well as the ability to hold seller funds if required.
 
  f. The Company has credit risk. As noted above, the Company bears the risk of fraudulent
     transactions as well as certain risks of return transactions and chargebacks. The Company
     bears the risk as there is no refund of vendor fees when a fraudulent transaction occurs.

Based on the factors above, the Company determined that recognizing revenue on a gross basis is appropriate.

Now the reason they made that choice and why it’s significant is that Square has a different business model from its
competitors. Square sits between the merchant and the processors, and banks, and networks. Square is the merchant of
record for its sellers. “SQ” appears as the seller on the buyer’s credit card statement. Square assumes all the risk,
including fraud, defaults, and chargebacks. Square is not dependent on fees charged by suppliers but can establish its
own prices. Square can choose which intermediaries it wants to work with.

It’s competitors can’t do any of these things! That’s why that top line revenue is not phony or
trivial. There’s a relationship between gross payment volume, transaction-based revenue, and
adjusted revenue. That relationship is important to track, and that transaction-based revenue may
take on more meaning going forward because Square has control of it and its competitors don’t.

In any case, it wasn’t Square being forced…Square chose how to report.

Now, as to why they report adjusted revenue…it has nothing to do with honesty. It’s because right
now that’s how they manage the business, and more important it’s because their competitors all have a
business model where they pass through the transaction fees to their merchants. So Square would look
square reporting with fees when their competitors report without fees.

Here is what they say in their letter to the SEC:


The Company respectfully advises the Staff that it has revised the disclosure on page 58 to clarify that
Adjusted Revenue, with its exclusion of transaction costs, is a primary metric used by management to measure
the Company’s business performance, and as such, the Company believes that it would be useful for the investor
community in evaluating the Company’s business. In addition, the Company supplementally advises the Staff that
because other payment processors, including Heartland Payments, Global Payments, Vantiv, Evertec, and Fleetcor
exclude these costs in their net revenue calculation, the Company’s inclusion of the Adjusted Revenue non-GAAP
performance metric allows investors to more easily compare revenue metrics across these companies. These payment
processors exclude such transaction costs from their GAAP revenue because they pass these costs directly through
to their customers and do not bear the risk of these costs. However, the Company does bear the risk of these costs
as it does not merely pass through these costs to its customers. This increased comparability is afforded regardless
of whether or not a company passes these costs through to its customers.


As an aside, do you actually labor through all this sort of documentation and form a deep
understanding from what you’ve read before making any investment decision?

Yes.


Hope this helps.

Thanks,
Ears

33 Likes

Ears,
Thanks so much for explaining your issues with Saul’s post. I very much appreciate the effort and explanation. I also have a new respect for the depth of investment study and analysis you attend to. I’m impressed. Absolutely you are better informed than I, and dare venture the vast majority of investors.

Sort of reminds of the book “The Big Short.” It took a lot of in depth, detail study and analysis to figure out how sub-prime mortgages were getting bundled into derivative investment vehicles (which magically got high credit ratings). Then it took a lot of guts to take and hold the short position.

3 Likes

how sub-prime mortgages were getting bundled into derivative investment vehicles (which magically got high credit ratings).

There’s nothing magical about turning some sub-prime housing debt into a AAA-rated MBS tranche at all whatsoever.

Bonds are merely a collection of cash flows.

Let’s take 3000 random subprime borrowers from TMF – I’m going to also assume that Bank ABC has used traditional income verification methods [W-2, tax returns] to show that we’re actually employed. And we put 20% down so we have skin in the game as per normal.

We all borrow $150k for a house on a fixed 30-yr mortgage, at 4%.

I’m going to create a tranche that is solely comprised of the very FIRST payment for all 3000 of us subprime borrowers.

Maturity: 1 month paper. Coupon: Let’s be really generous and say 2%.

Any rational person is going to agree that the overwhelming majority of us will not default on our very FIRST payment of $716 per month.

That is AAA-rated paper by anyone’s standard, no matter how risk-averse.

No magic involved. You can create and sell this paper all day and in size.

In fact, to make it even more secure, the Bank can retain an equity piece of say 3% where they take all the risk on 90 people defaulting on their very first mortgage payment - but keep all that excess interest in the 200 bps spread.

7 Likes

Back atcha, brittlerock. I very much appreciate the insights from your work experience as well
as your posts on China. Please keep sharing. Thanks!

2 Likes

I’m going to also assume that Bank ABC has used traditional income verification methods [W-2, tax returns] to show that we’re actually employed. And we put 20% down so we have skin in the game as per normal.

Therein lies the rub. In many cases none of this was true. In the run-up to the 2008 meltdown, mortgage lenders (i.e., Countrywide, others) were not verifying income, a lot of loans were going out at $0 down, and people were flipping houses even before the transaction closed.

I know this to be true. My former girl friend who was living in the Chicago area got a $0 down mortgage. She had quit one job which she held for under a year (sexual harassment) and been in her new job less than 6 months. But I’m pretty sure she told me they never asked about work history anyway. Mortgage companies were tripping over themselves to write paper under the philosophy if we don’t write this borrower up, someone else will.

And imagine, after 2008 Congress put some curbs on the banking industry, but not to worry, Congress is busily unraveling those regulations now. What could go wrong?

She bought one side of a duplex. Turns out she was a good credit risk and never defaulted, but there’s no way a lender could have been confident of that.

But, she was cute. Maybe the broker just got lost in her curly blond hair and big brown eyes and just gave her the money anyway . . .

12 Likes

Then there’s this:
It is clear to anyone who has studied the financial crisis of 2008 that the private sector’s drive for short-term profit was behind it. More than 84 percent of the sub-prime mortgages in 2006 were issued by private lending. These private firms made nearly 83 percent of the subprime loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers that year. Out of the top 25 subprime lenders in 2006, only one was subject to the usual mortgage laws and regulations. The nonbank underwriters made more than 12 million subprime mortgages with a value of nearly $2 trillion. The lenders who made these were exempt from federal regulations.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/#3…

2 Likes