Do you want to say anything about the dead in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, or Syria?
This is about the general assembly. It can not be vetoed. It is just a resolution. It has no power. It is a statement.
The US veto power is on the security counsel, which is different.
Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria are nonissues to the assembly. Why is that?
@Arindam The press is forming public opinions but only on Gaza. There are 12 million Sudanese refugees. That dwarfs Gaza. All of the other wars also dwarf Gaza.
The 5 wars are the same. One group makes a claim and another group claims the same thing. There are no differences in any of the wars. Except the other four wars have more Russian arms.
The 6th war in Europe is Russian as well and dwarfs Gaza.
Are we only having opinions on Gaza because we are misled? Why no other opinions on the other wars? No other UN General Assembly cares.
Your link is about is about: UN members vote to demand Israel end occupation of Palestinian territories within 12 months
During the 1967 war, Israel captured the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Golan heights from neighboring Arab states. Soon after, it began establishing Jewish settlements in these territories.
The Palestinians want the West Bank and Gaza for a future state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. Israel considers the entirety of Jerusalem as its “eternal capital.”
When Israel was founded some of the tribes decided living with a Jewish dominant government was perfectly good. Today 19% of Israelis are Palestinians.
Most Palestinians are in Jordan. After 1967 Jordan began a process to end the divide between Israel and her Arab population.
Two groups of different Palestinian read Syrian tribesmen decided to never have peace.
Israel is done with them. Never having peace does not mean getting Gaza and the West Bank and Jerusalem and there will be peace. Quite the contrary that is the beginning of more war.
Gazan did have Gaza. Hamas translates as violence.
You still do not discuss Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, or Syria. Why not? All of it is claims and counterclaims.
I have already answered that question. Why do you avoid Israeli war with Lebanon? Why do you avoid Israeli war with Syria? Why do you avoid Israeli support of Russia in Syria?
This expanding military and political partnership with Iran has also not limited Russia’s direct collaboration with Israel. Rather, it has shaped Israel’s response to the Ukraine conflict and highlighted some of their shared interests in the region. Since its military intervention, Russia has coordinated with Israel over strikes on Iranian targets, as well as Tehran-backed groups—the most recent of which were the April 1, 2024, bombing of Iran’s consulate in Damascus and the targeting of an Iraqi militia’s base in southern Damascus on May 9. This coordination is influenced by a number of factors such as the strong demographic connections between the two countries, whereby some 15 percent of Israelis speak Russian. Putin has stated that “Israel is a Russian-speaking country,” while Israel continues to provide a residence and tax haven to Russian oligarchs. Moreover, both countries share an interest in maintaining a relatively weakened Iranian presence in Syria. Unsurprisingly, a deal to sell Russian planes to Iran fell through because of Israeli and American pressure, while Israel blocked the sale of Iron Dome missile defense technology to Ukraine and refrained from imposing sanctions on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine.
This balancing act between the different players is also evident in Russia’s approach to the most recent conflict in Gaza. While Russia failed to clearly condemn Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7 (in spite of the death of sixteen of its own citizens), releasing Russian hostages quickly became the center of Moscow’s interaction with the militant organization. The Russian effort resulted in the release of three Russian-Israeli hostages. Moscow also hosted Palestinian reconciliation talks in March 2024, but they were more beneficial in highlighting Russia’s role than in yielding actual results.
Finally, Russia has also sought to balance its support for the Assad regime with its tenuous but tactical cooperation with Turkey, which has deepened in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion. Initial tensions regarding Russia’s military involvement in Syria in 2015, particularly in support of the Assad regime—a target for removal by Ankara—eased with the creation of the Astana framework. This framework provided a platform for both countries to coordinate and engage in mutual interests. This included deconfliction over Turkey’s military operations in northeastern Syria by countering U.S. support for Syrian Kurds and undermining the semi-autonomous entity that has emerged from the rubble of the Syrian state.
Conclusion
Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015 reflected a more assertive foreign policy and demonstrated an interest in a wider regional role. It allowed Moscow to reserve a seat among other players who seek to design a new regional security architecture. However, Russia’s ability to expand its influence to Lebanon and beyond has been restricted. Although Russia maintains military prowess in Syria and key relationships with involved stakeholders such as Israel, Iran, and Turkey, as well as nonstate actors Hezbollah and Hamas, it remains unable to play an effective role in impacting broader regional challenges, such as the ongoing Gaza conflict. Russia only managed to secure the release three of its citizens from the Gaza strip, even though Moscow received a Hamas delegation after the October 7 attack. Similarly, despite its clout as the world’s largest and most powerful Orthodox nation, Russia has not gained greater influence in shaping church politics.
Similarly, Russia’s ambitions and its Syrian “success” remains incomplete given the continued failure of the Syrian state to reinforce its authority or achieve serious political reconciliation with its domestic adversaries. A wider collapse of the Syrian state would seriously hinder Moscow’s ambitions and taint its image as an important actor in the region.
Consequently, while Russia managed to leverage its Syria intervention to bolster its arm sales and relations with the Gulf region, the return of Syria to the Arab League has yet to trigger post conflict relief and reconstruction support, contrary to Russia’s hopes. Moscow’s ambitions for a wider influence in the region will most likely resume once the Ukraine conflict ends. Until then, Russia’s approach in Syria and the broader Levant will remain a delicate balancing act.
The UN is a group of 180 countries --or whatever-- most of whom don’t want war, don’t want suffering and deaths, and just want to not be colonized by the hegemon and/or its collaborators. (Hence, for example, what’s happening in Burkina Faso.) But that same hegemon prevents any meaningful actions toward world peace through its vetoes in the UN security council and/or its bullying in the UN’s general assembly and its persistent threats to “bring democracy” to any country that opposes its narratives.
Fortunately, the situation you mention that’s happening in West Asia is likely to be self-resolved by the aggressor self-destructing. Yes, meanwhile, a lot more people on either side of the conflict will die. But none of us has a magic wand we can wave to stop it. But we do have the ability to boycott the aggressors.