space here does not permit a full listing of all the Pentagon’s acquisition failures over the past three decades. But there are very real consequences to poorly conceived weapon programs. The Navy is retiring ships faster than they can be replaced. The Air Force has less than half the number of fighter aircraft today than it did in 1990.
While the services have been shedding force structure, the American people have watched as more and more of their money goes to the Pentagon every year. The proposed defense budget for 2025 will be nearly 50% higher than what it was in 2000. What’s even worse is that even though most of these big-ticket weapons and vehicles are vastly more expensive and delivered on average three years late, they don’t work like they are supposed to. Many have abysmal readiness rates. The F-35 fleet has a full mission capable rate of only 30%.
Sorry but something leaped out at me. I don’t know anything about “Responsible Statecraft.” I did a quick look-up. They seem legit and part of a mixed bag of Left & Right on foreign affairs which can’t be all bad.
But this line from the article pushed a button. Rather than building another helicopter, service leaders decided to build a revolutionary aircraft that can take off and land like a helicopter but fly like a fixed-wing airplane. That may look good on paper, but the concept has come with a steep cost.
I seem to remember the “Service leaders” weren’t seeking an ersatz flying machine. It was a political thing. If somebody can find a citation otherwise, fine. I’ll buy it. But Marines → Osprey-> shiny things, not how I remember it. My memory is they were told to “find a way to use it.”
Similar to the F-35. Or the Zumwalt class destroyer or Littoral Combat Ship fiascoes. They are sold as solving the needs of the respective services by retired field grade officers to their buddies still in the service. Promising the moon which existing technology cannot accomplish. And the taxpayer pays. The taxpayer always pays.
The f 35 billed as a multi-role aircraft designed to meet the needs of three different services and those of multiple partner nations. But the idea of a one-size-fits-all aircraft has been tried in the past with poor results. The Pentagon tried it with the F-111 in the 1960s and then had to scramble to build the F-14, F-15, F-16, and A-10 to make up for the capability shortfalls.
So the f-35 lacks the promised capability. Thus a need for an upgrade which the taxpayer pays[1].
Lockheed continued making the UN upgraded model which the US government would not accept. So there are a years backlog of F 35 to clear out[2].
And upgraded or not the F 35 still remains below mission capable rate for the services.
Of course, there are more. Like the time Lockheed proposed a variant of the existing AW-101 for the new fleet of Presidential helos, to replace the elderly Sea Kings. A big pile of money later, the program was cancelled, and the bits that Lockheed had managed to put together were sold to Canada as spare parts for their fleet of AW-101 derivatives. Now, Lockheed has a new Presidential helo contract. Supposedly based on the existing Sikorskey S-76. “existing design” they said. “low program risk”, they said. It’s going the same way as the earlier Lockheed helo program.
And now, here we go again. Constellation class frigates. Based on an established European design. “off the shelf” they said. “low program risk” they said. The Navy interest group on FB has been abuzz lately about this latest fiasco. iirc, three years behind schedule, so far, and with massive cost overruns.
But, recall the stated objective of “supply side economics”, and Shiny policy for nearly 45 years: first and only job is to make the “JCs” richer.