No we’re not crazy!

No we’re not crazy!

We still get a lot of people who think that we are sort of demented because we are investing in these very high growth and high valued SaaS stocks that just don’t fit the model of the kind of stocks that they are used to investing in. They think that these stocks are an illusion and that they will collapse any day now. They are sure that our investing in companies growing rapidly with little if any current profit must be terribly risky! Then they are appalled and frustrated when our “terribly risky” portfolios either don’t crash and burn, but keep rising instead, or temporarily crash, but even at their bottoms, are ahead of the market by a large margin, but as I said above we are investing in a different world. I’m afraid they just don’t really understand the model of these companies and what is going on with them.

First of all, these companies are growing very, very, VERY, rapidly. Stop and think carefully about this next thought: If you think about it, the kind of companies that we are investing in now never existed before! Ten years ago I searched for companies growing at 15% or 20% a year, and I’m sure that you did too. And 25% growth was a dream come true. Now I don’t even bother looking at a company with 20% or 25% revenue growth.

We are investing in a new model of enterprise. They have very high revenue growth year after year. I’m talking about 45% to 90% per year for most of them, but some even higher. I just looked at my top six positions which currently make up 90% of my portfolio, and they had an AVERAGE revenue growth rate of 70% this last quarter!!! That is NOT a misprint! An average revenue growth rate of 70% for the six of them !!! And these aren’t tiny penny-stocks. They have run rates close to a half-billion dollars on up… and they are still growing that fast. Does traditional EV/S valuation still work for a company growing at 70%?

Secondly, these are also very low capital intensive and very high gross margin companies (gross margins of 70% to 92%, for the most part). The reason for that is that they lease software on subscriptions, which is by its nature low capital intensive and high gross margin. And in general, those high gross margins continue to rise higher as the companies grow larger, as they have a bigger revenue base to absorb any cost of developing the software, and as they have more and more customers who simply renew their subscriptions, or increase their spend, without much additional sales cost. For an investor it’s like a dream come true.

That brings us to point three: The revenue of our companies is almost all recurring, because it’s on those software subscriptions, which have become an integral part of their customer’s businesses, and thus largely locked in. It’s not at all like selling refrigerators, or cell phones, or microchips, or in the old days like selling software. With our companies you KNOW that next year’s revenue will be greater. The only question is by how much? Think how different this is from companies that sell “things” and have to go out and sell them again next year to the same people or different ones. Does traditional EV/S valuation still work for a company like that?

Fourthly, before we leave those subscriptions, let’s note that because they are subscriptions, our company’s actual revenue is considerably more than what they can recognize and thus considerably more than what you see in their quarterly reports. If they SOLD something they could recognize all the revenue in the quarter they sold it. With subscriptions, even under ASC 606, our company can only take a relatively small part up front, and the rest over the lifetime of the subscription, even if the customer paid it all up front, and if our company already has the money in the bank. Does traditional EV/S valuation still work for a company like that?

Fifthly, they are land-and expand companies, meaning that their dollar-based net retention rates are generally greater than even 120%. This means that last year’s customers buy a lot more this year than they bought last year instead of having an attrition rate, or forbid-the-thought, being companies whose customers make one time purchases, or companies that sell hardware, and thus don’t even have ANY revenue guaranteed next year at all. I’ve never seen companies like ours before. Have you?

And think a little more about how low capital intensive our companies are. In order to expand sales they don’t have to go out and build or expand their factories! They don’t have any factories! (Think how car companies are always struggling with their factories, or chip companies with their overseas suppliers.) If our companies have more demand, they just lease more of the same software to more people. They can double their sales, or quadruple them, with almost no capex expense.
Does traditional EV/S valuation still work for a company like that?

Of course a company growing revenue 70% per year, with 92% recurring revenue, 82% gross margins, and a 130% dollar-based net retention rate is worth much, much, more than an old model company, with fairly low revenue growth, low gross margins, and with little or no visibility into revenue for the next year and beyond, but the same enterprise value, and the same current revenue! No wonder our companies get valued at much higher EV/S!

And revenue which has very high gross margins is worth more per dollar of current revenue (in other words, it’s worth a higher EV/S) than lower gross margin, revenue.

WHY? Let me explain it to you. EV/S, which is traditionally used for valuation, puts sales (revenue) as the denominator. But that’s silly! On $100 million of sales, Alteryx, with gross margins of 92%, keeps $92 million, while a grocery chain, with gross margins of 10%, keeps $10 million on the same $100 million of sales, or a normal S&P company with gross margins of 30% keeps $30, but to calculate EV/S you put the same $100 figure in the denominator for all of them. It’s nonsense! Revenue by itself doesn’t tell you much of anything. It’s the gross margin dollars which ought to go in the denominator, not total revenue.
Now, do you still think that traditional EV/S valuation works for companies like ours?

And now, WHY is the RATE OF GROWTH of revenue important for comparing EV/S? There’s a heck of a good reason! Next year our SaaS company growing at 70%, will have $170 of revenue instead of $100, and with its 82% gross profit margin, will keep $139 toward covering operating expenses.

This is while our conventional company growing revenue at a very respectable 20% , will have just $120 of revenue, and with its 30% margins it will keep just $36 towards operating expenses.

So now we have $139 gross margin versus $36 gross margin… just one year later! Now, do you still think that traditional EV/S valuation where you put the same $100 in the denominator, works for companies like ours?

The difference in compounding is enormous and grows each year. If we go just one additional year, our SaaS company will have $289 in revenue and will keep $237… while the conventional company will have revenue of $144 and keep $43.

Look at that again!
Both companies started two years ago with revenue of $100. Now our company is taking home $237 in gross profit(!) , while the conventional company is taking home $43!!! Just two years later!

Now, do you still think that traditional EV/S valuation, where you put the same $100 in the denominator, works for companies like ours?

I won’t trouble you with the calculation for the third year, but our SaaS company growing at 70% will keep $403 in gross profit, which is almost eight times the $52 the conventional company will keep in gross profit. That gives you an idea of the enormous power that compounding the combination of high growth and high gross margins has (and that our companies are blessed with).

And of course I know that our company’s growth rate will decrease with size, but I’m just trying to illustrate the effect of compounding here.

And for those who will maintain that companies can’t maintain high revenue growth for three years, Alteryx has been 59%, 53% and 55%, the last three years, and is increasing it this year, the fourth year, where its first three quarters averaged 58%.

To summarize
We have Factor One – A company with a higher gross margin takes home more dollars out of each $100 of revenue, and thus, by definition, is worth a higher EV/S, even without considering the higher rate of growth.

Then Factor Two, even more important. Companies with high rates of growth of revenue will compound that revenue enormously in just two or three years, and combined with the high gross margins, that will produce hugely more gross profit dollars than a conventional slower growing company that started with the same revenue.

That our companies have an even greater EV/S (EV divided by current sales), flows almost by definition from that, when compared to a conventional company with the same revenue!

Finally Factor Three, which is perhaps less easy to quantify, but a large percentage of recurring revenue, and a high dollar based net retention rate, gives much more security to the revenue and to its potential increase, and thus would warrant an even further increase to the EV/S in some investors’ eyes (like mine).

Again!
The huge, even enormous, relative number of gross profit dollars that our companies have, and will have in the future, for each current dollar of revenue, because of their growth rates and high gross margins, as well as their dollar based net retention rate, compared to the relatively small amount of gross profit that a conventional company has, and will have, for the same current dollar of revenue, is what gives our companies the much larger EV/S ratios. Simple as that!

And I know that a lot of our companies aren’t yet making any net profit, but any company with 72%, 82% or 92% gross margins can make a large profit whenever they decide to! All they need to do is slow down their enormous S&M spending, whose purpose is to grab every new customer they can grab while the grabbing is good. Actually, I’d rather they keep grabbing all those greenfield customers now, while they can, before someone else comes along who could grab them, because revenue will keep flowing from those customers pretty much forever on a figurative timescale. However for me personally as an investor, I strongly prefer that my companies show that they are at least working towards reducing losses and making a profit, as that implies that their business model is successful and that they don’t have to spend an excessive amount of money to acquire new customers.

Look, there has been a revolution in the world of business, and especially in the world of software. As recently as five or six years ago, with the exception of perhaps one or two companies, a company selling software would sell a customer a perpetual license to use it. Then they’d charge for updates that the customer might have to install in each of their hundreds of computers, and they’d charge for service, and they’d try to sell the customer a new updated version of the software in two or three or four years. The customer might decide to skip the next version and just wait for the one after if he’s happy with the current one. Think Microsoft and all those Microsoft Office and Word versions you had to buy. It was the same for big companies with their software.

This procedure was bad for both of them. It was terribly inconvenient for the software customer, and there was no visibility into the future for the company selling the software.

There was little if any recurring revenue.
For an investor, encountering a growth company that had even a small percentage of its revenue recurring was a major find. The only companies that had most of their revenue recurring were slow or no-growth utility type companies. Think: the electric company!

There was little or no recurring revenue because the customer who bought a perpetual license for a version of the software this year might not buy an updated version for 4 or 5 years. All you had that was recurring revenue were service contracts, and not every customer took a service contract.

It was the same with dollar-based net retention rate. There was simply no such thing. You were essentially making a one-time sale with the hope of making another sale in a few years.

As an investor, PE and profit was all you had to go on (besides hope).

Finding a company that was growing revenue at 20% per year was great. NO companies had revenue growth of 40% to 60% on a regular basis. It was unheard of! It was something you couldn’t even imagine, except perhaps for a tiny company growing off a very small base, or as a one-time occurrence. And 70% or 80% growth??? It was a fairy tale.

But then an incredible new world came along in which data, and Internet usage, and Cloud usage, and software usage, have all hit an inflection point and taken off, literally exploded in their usage. What these software companies are selling is actually needed by every company currently, in every field, whether it’s a bank, a grocery chain, an insurance company or an auto manufacturer. It’s not going to go away. Every company needs software now, needs the internet, needs a website, needs ecommerce of some sort, needs security against hacking, needs to be able to analyze and visualize data, to analyze customer patterns, needs… well you get the idea.

And something amazing called SaaS was developed. It stands for Software as a Service: Instead of selling the software on a perpetual license, you, the software company, lease the customer your software, and the customer makes monthly payments “forever.” You have visibility for the first time in your company’s life, and your customer doesn’t have the large upfront outlay of cash. These monthly payments you are getting are recurring revenue.

You can update your software monthly, weekly, or even daily using the Internet, which keeps your customer very happy and very hooked, and keeps him renewing his lease contract every three or so years. He doesn’t need to install your update individually on 1347 different computers in his business. Your software becomes an integral and essential part of your customer’s business. You can sell the customer additional programs, with new bells and whistles that your R&D department just perfected, or sell to additional departments in the same customer company, and your revenue from this customer will be higher next year than it was this year (dollar-based net expansion rate). This is referred to as land and expand.

Because of increasing spend by existing customers, and because of increasingly high demand for what you are selling from new customers, our companies may see revenue grow by 40%, 50%, or 60% at least, each year. This means that their revenue will quadruple or even quintuple in four years, or five at most.

Their margins rise with time because their monthly S&M charges for the recurring part of their revenue are miniscule compared to what they paid for the initial sale. They can make all their updates in the Cloud and it is even cheaper, and cheaper for their customer too, as the customer doesn’t need to buy all that computer hardware.

This is still early innings. All companies out there need what our companies are selling but most of them don’t have what they are selling yet. They want to go all out and sign up as many of these companies as possible before credible competitors emerge on the scene. This means increasing S&M expense now. You know that while a dollar of S&M expense spent today is mostly expensed against your current earnings, it will bring in (expanding) revenue almost forever in the future. This incredible opportunity also means spending on R&D so you continue to have the best products to sell. But this is all new and greenfield, and the imperative is to sign up as many customers as you can, as rapidly as you reasonably can while still providing good service, and not worry about current profits.

Just think about this revolution for a minute. Every good-sized company now uses more and more software every year. They all want to be part of the cloud, they all need what our companies are selling, and most of them don’t have it yet. The opportunities are enormous, and once the software is incorporated in the customers business it becomes harder and harder to change providers… really a pain for the customer and a risk of all kinds of disruptions to their business if they tear it out, so they will need a really, really, good reason to change.

So our software companies have mostly recurring revenue, and not only recurring, but expanding recurring revenue as the old customers increase their spend (dollar-based net retention rate), and new customers sign on. This means that each year our software companies add lots of new recurring revenue. And they are growing at rates that will quadruple their revenue in four years. (Actually 50% compounded for four years will quintuple their revenue in four years, but I’m being conservative :grinning:)

And that’s why I buy SaaS companies, that are growing revenue at rates I couldn’t have imagined a few years ago, and it’s why I don’t worry about them not making a profit now. My other criteria are still there: rapid revenue growth, recurring revenue, lack of debt, insider ownership, a moat, not capital intensive, not hardware, doing something really special, etc, etc, but I’m taking advantage of this new world.

People who are looking for conventional companies with PE’s of 15 or 20, and with 10% or 20% growth, are investing in the S&P and growing their portfolios at perhaps 12% per year, while we are growing at…. :grinning:…Well, I’m up 300% percent in just under three years of doing this.

To Conclude:
You say:

How terrible. This company has EV/S of 20! How horrible! How overpriced! That’s so much higher than the EV/S of the companies I’m used to looking at!

Well duh! What do you expect? The company has 85% revenue growth and 72% gross margins, and almost all of its revenue is recurring, and it has a dollar based renewal rate of 130%. Of course it has an EV/S of 25.

Of course a company that is leasing a software solution that every enterprise on the planet needs, and that the vast majority don’t have yet, and that all those companies will keep indefinitely once they install it, will have a higher EV/S ratio than a company selling a product that anyone can put off getting a new model of, or stop buying for the duration of the recession, etc. (You can live another year with your old cell phone, or computer, or car, or raincoat, or refrigerator, or kindle, or ski jacket, or your old factory, or whatever, but once you lease this software, you keep leasing it indefinitely, no stopping for a year.)

And of course, of course, of course, companies that have ALL these features, companies with 70-90% gross margins AND a subscription model with recurring revenue AND 125% net retention rates AND growing revenue at 50% to 90%, AND selling products that all enterprises need …are going to have very high EV/S rates.! What else would you expect? And I don’t know what is high, but I will never sell out just because the price has gone up, and because I think the EV/S is too high. I just don’t know where these guys will ultimately end up.

I hope this helps.

Saul

A link to the Knowledgebase for this board is in the Announcements panel that is on the right side of every page on this board.

For some additions to the Knowledgebase, bringing it up to date, I’d advise reading several other posts linked to on the panel, especially “How I Pick a Company to Invest In,” and “Why My Investing Criteria Have Changed,” and “Why It Really is Different.”

184 Likes

Brilliant! If those who don’t understand this now after that incredible and extensive pounding, never will. Many thx for your time and doctrine.

5 Likes

Thanks Saul for putting things so plainly. It just makes so much sense when you lay it all out like this.

I won’t trouble you with the calculation for the third year, but our SaaS company growing at 70% will keep $403 in gross profit, which is almost eight times the $52 the conventional company will keep in gross profit. That gives you an idea of the enormous power that compounding the combination of high growth and high gross margins has (and that our companies are blessed with).

If I may add a comment, I think that this quote is the salient point for understanding the rational of buying companies at these levels of p/s. Imagine the company used in Saul’s example is currently trading at a p/s multiple of 20.

Consider that the average p/s for the S&P 500 is 2.5. This number is what you would look for in a conventional company. The hypergrowth company is making 8x the profit of the conventional company in only three years and the p/s of the hypergrowth company is 8x the sales of the conventional company. So buying the hypergrowth name means you are factoring in three years of growth into the current price.

Is this a sensible thing to do? If you think there is a big risk that the growth is going to fall off a cliff, then it isn’t. But if you see the hypergrowth company carrying its advantages farther than three years into the future, then the hypergrowth company is a bargain. More than a few companies are going to have a very long runway. There are bargains to be had.

7 Likes

My problem with Saul’s write-up is that the wild profitability that these SaaS/software companies dangle with their high gross margins often proves to be a chimera. You’d like to believe that over the long-term these companies can take their foot off the accelerator and watch wild profits flow into their coffers. But that will be more of the exception than the rule.

Why? Because the minute growth starts to slow and competition heats up, the playbook for these companies is to spend EVEN MORE on S&M, restructure/cut pricing, ramp up R&D to build more products to sell, and make costly acquisitions to try to shore up growth. Software is a hyper-competitive space now more than ever for 2 reasons: (1) product development and innovation cycles that are shorter than ever thanks to modern tools which make developers extremely productive (not to mention the easing shortage of software engineers with expertise compared to just 5 years ago); and (2) the ease of deployment thanks to today’s cloud-based infrastructure makes it easier for a competitor with a better mouse-trap to displace you (the pain of deploying software to an enterprise used to be a huge barrier to entry to your competitors, but not so much any more).

In short, I would be careful to assume that the huge gross margins for these companies in their hyper-growth stages will automatically translate into huge profitability as they mature. I’ll follow-up with a longer post, but I wanted to get this counter-point out there to keep the conversation flowing.

65 Likes

Great post, Saul! I’ve been hanging around TMF for a couple of decades and some of their most successful recs have either been subscription type businesses like Netflix or toll collectors like MasterCard. Even Amazon can attribute a great deal of its success in recent years to its Prime membership fee, a reoccurring source of subscription like revenue. The same can be said for Costco. Thanks stating your case with such clarity.

Don

1 Like

Why? Because the minute growth starts to slow and competition heats up, the playbook for these companies is to spend EVEN MORE on S&M, restructure/cut pricing, ramp up R&D to build more products to sell, and make costly acquisitions to try to shore up growth.

There is a lot of “it depends” in what happens here. For example, one reason for growth to start to slow is that one is beginning to transition to the upper part of the S curve. That just means that the market is becoming saturated and no amount of that kind of fiddling is going to cause that to change.

If, however, the reason for slowing is an increasingly capable competitor, then one is likely to put the spend on R&D so that one can continue to stand out as the preferred product.

Or, maybe the market changes its mind about what it wants? Then, one has to figure how to get from here to there.

And, of course, more than one company … notably Apple … has responded to the slowing of one S curve by introducing a new product to start its own S curve. That is very hard to accomplish, but is one way to growth beyond expectations.

7 Likes

Capitalism,.

This is such a new field, but yet you write about a play book. I thought perhaps it was still being written. Perhaps you can share some examples of other SaaS companies which failed in the manner you describe. I think that would be informative and give us an example of what could be awaiting us.

Thanks
Gordon

3 Likes

Consider that the average p/s for the S&P 500 is 2.5. This number is what you would look for in a conventional company. The hypergrowth company is making 8x the profit of the conventional company in only three years and the p/s of the hypergrowth company is 8x the sales of the conventional company. So buying the hypergrowth name means you are factoring in three years of growth into the current price.

Is this a sensible thing to do? If you think there is a big risk that the growth is going to fall off a cliff, then it isn’t. But if you see the hypergrowth company carrying its advantages farther than three years into the future, then the hypergrowth company is a bargain. More than a few companies are going to have a very long runway. There are bargains to be had.

Hi Bobby,
Yes, and the key thing to keep in mind is that these companies will never be cheap unless the wheels come off for some unseen reason. Three years from now when they have 8 times the current gross margin dollars, they will still be at a high valuation if they are still growing revenue well.
Best,
Saul

5 Likes

My problem with Saul’s write-up is that the wild profitability that these SaaS/software companies dangle with their high gross margins often proves to be a chimera.

Hi capitalism, considering that this genre of companies being public companies is maybe 3 years old, and at this point, none of them have reached the point you are talking about, on what do you base that besides just a general feeling that it’s indecent for them to be valued so high?

Why? Because the minute growth starts to slow and competition heats up, the playbook for these companies is to spend EVEN MORE on S&M, restructure/cut pricing, ramp up R&D to build more products to sell, and make costly acquisitions to try to shore up growth.

Same question, since none of them have gotten there yet, how do you know what the playbook is going to be unless you are just all-knowing?

Saul

9 Likes

I wouldn’t loosely accuse someone of being “crazy”, either but there is such a thing as “irrational exuberance” (Greenspan’s term, not mine), combined with a short memory.

First of all, these companies are growing very, very, VERY, rapidly. Stop and think carefully about this next thought: If you think about it, the kind of companies that we are investing in now never existed before! Ten years ago I searched for companies growing at 15% or 20% a year, and I’m sure that you did too. And 25% growth was a dream come true. Now I don’t even bother looking at a company with 20% or 25% revenue growth.

And we heard all of this before, back in the 1980s and 1990s. All tech companies were new. All of them did things that no other company had done before. But how many of them are still around?

Any company with growth rates like that is either going to rule the world, or invite a lot of competition to the marketplace. THE PROBLEM is predicting who the survivors are going to be.

Do you use WordStar or WordPerfect to create a document? Do you use Lotus 1-2-3 for financial analysis? Do you surf the internet with AOL, or Prodigy, or CompuServe? Those were all good products, made by good companies.

And I know that a lot of our companies aren’t yet making any net profit, but any company with 72%, 82% or 92% gross margins can make a large profit whenever they decide to! All they need to do is slow down their enormous S&M spending, whose purpose is to grab every new customer they can grab while the grabbing is good.

Amazon went many years before being profitable, too. But Amazon is an outlier in any universe. I’d prefer to invest serious money in companies that “decide” to make a profit. And preferably, are in a position to pay me dividends.

Bill

9 Likes

Amazon went many years before being profitable, too. But Amazon is an outlier in any universe. I’d prefer to invest serious money in companies that “decide” to make a profit. And preferably, are in a position to pay me dividends.

I prefer a meat diet but I don’t go on the vegetarian board preaching about how tasty cows are.

Andy

53 Likes

Re;Post by Wradical

Questions raised here are spot on and go to the heart of risk perception something always of concern to investors.

Different folks have different risk levels but I assume, perhaps incorrectly, that subscribers to this service have committed to an investment strategy which involves a large number of high risk investments.

As Saul reports it his approach involves alot of buying and selling in a very few issues. I wonder at what point it becomes impractical of execution. Clearly portfolio size is an issue here. Is it not?

1 Like

Bill (Wradical),

I think there is a key difference in holding time frame for any of the companies here and what we have been using for LTBH investing. The companies here are in the vertical expansion space. This is a part of the S curve that has been so compressed as to lack any resemblance to those of “growth” companies from yesteryear.

Let me give you an example from the consumer products world. My company has been growing some segments at 20-25% per year since 2009. Since we produce luxury consumer durable goods, and our clients have profited greatly from the expansion in equities over that time, our products have been increasingly in demand. In addition, we have expanded our product models and refreshed our line up to match market opportunity and sector growth.

All of this effort has garnered us a top spot in our industry and GM rates approaching 30%. These numbers are astounding to others and have placed us in great position to continue seeking the ideal position to serve our markets.

In 10 years, we have seen compounding growth of the like not seen EVER in our market (due to our starting point, our market opportunity, and our execution).

Our company grew from 40 million in sales to 400million in that time.

Now, imagine that we did that in 3.5 years and did so with 90% margins.

We cannot be that nimble, because EACH product we sell REQUIRES weeks of planning and 100’s of man hours to execute. Our S&M expenses have been rising, too, BTW.

You also mention a bunch of names from 20+ years ago. LTBH will no more likely produce performance now as it didn’t then, either. Selling point is as important as buying point. Many of those companies were extremely profitable back in the day. Pivoting from them to the next better thing (like NFLX) at that time would have been logical, if you were checking sales, profit and margin numbers as we do today.

11 Likes

First off let me say I’ve been reading Saul’s board for 4-5 years now. I’m fully invested in high growth stocks, particularly most of the cloud/SaaS stocks discussed here with a few lesser held names also (TNDM, STNE, EXAS). It took me longer than most to make the switch from MF LTBH stocks. I did better than the averages in the past, but nowhere near the returns I’ve seen since moving fully into these stocks. I say that to show that I’m on the team, a believer that many of our stocks are going to continue to be amazing investments over time, but, I also think capitalism has a point that shouldn’t be glossed over.

Capitalism:

…the minute growth starts to slow and competition heats up, the playbook for these companies is to spend EVEN MORE on S&M, restructure/cut pricing, ramp up R&D to build more products to sell, and make costly acquisitions to try to shore up growth.

Saul:

Same question, since none of them have gotten there yet, how do you know what the playbook is going to be…

There were a couple other comments in other replies also questioning how Capitalism could say that when these companies are too new to have had that happen to them yet. I don’t know that you could call it “a playbook”, but I tend to think it has happened with names such as SHOP, NTNX, TWLO, and most recently ZS and maybe MDB. Not all exactly what Cap stated, but definitely slowing growth, followed by increased spending (usually in sales to try and get the growth moving in the right direction again), moving further away from profitability than they were at. I don’t necessarily think what the above stocks have done warrants completely selling out of them (although I did completely get out of NTNX and TWLO), but these companies do seem to increase spending when growth has slowed, which makes the lack of profits even more pronounced, and trend in the wrong direction.

SHOP was the first high growth stock I got into years ago and I remember Saul stating many times how they could turn a profit at any time, by just cutting their spend whenever they want (at the time they were right around break even most quarters). And I agree they, and many others, could, do that to turn a profit, but we’ve yet to see any of them do it. When growth slows, they increase spend, under the guise of landing all the customers they can now, investing for future profits, but we’ve yet to really see that scenario play out (becoming very profitable).

Again, I agree with the companies stance to try and get all the customers they can as fast as they can, but I also see Capitalism’s point that when growth slows, from what I’ve seen, the companies spend even more to try and shore that growth up any way they can. Won’t necessarily turn out badly for them (look at SHOP!), but we just don’t know yet how that will play out.

Just my thoughts on the matter.

28 Likes

I wouldn’t loosely accuse someone of being “crazy”, either but there is such a thing as “irrational exuberance” (Greenspan’s term, not mine), combined with a short memory.

And we heard all of this before, back in the 1980s and 1990s. All tech companies were new. All of them did things that no other company had done before. But how many of them are still around?

Economist Joseph Schumpeter coined the expression “Creative destruction” over 75 years ago in his book Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy and Ray Kurzweil in his book, The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence, said that not only are things speeding up, but time itself is shrinking.

SaaS is proving them right, not only have WordStar, WordPerfect, Lotus 1-2-3, AOL, Prodigy, CompuServe and many other successful products and services been replaced but the march from datacenter to desktop to server farms now continues to cloud computing and SaaS delivery. At 50% growth rates, SaaS “S” curves will be compressed if their markets don’t grow faster than markets did before. This is an important issue in the longevity of our SaaS investments.

Classical economics dealt mainly with the Law of Diminishing Returns. You use the best land first then expand to less desirable land until you run out of land altogether, diminishing returns. With technology, specially digital technology, the Law of Increasing Returns comes into play. The first copy of Windows cost millions of dollars, the next copy costs the price of a CD. Now not even that as clients just download it to their computer. What is the market for Windows? At first it was the number of desktop computers out there. Had Windows transitioned to mobile its market would have grown by one or two orders of magnitude. Apple’s MacOS did manage it by morphing into iOS – “S” curve after “S” curve. Disk drives showed a similar progress, each generation (24 inch, 14 inch, 5.25 inch, 3.5 inch, 2.5 inch, 1.8 inch, SSD) creating its own “S” curve.

Not all markets grow at the same rate. Smartphones are limited by the number of humans, not so data which is close to limitless. Every conversation is new data. Robots and AI create data so data is not limited by humans. One reason I like MongoDB is because its potential market, being data, is effectively limitless unlike products and services that target humans.

Saul’s argument has merit but so does the other side in that nothing lasts forever. How true is the phrase “this time it’s different?” It is and it isn’t, depending on what you are talking about. The trick is to learn to navigate these fast moving waters. LTBH works very well with index funds at the cost of getting market average results. If you want better you have to address faster growing industry segments and currently SaaS is the poster child of growth. But one cannot invest in SaaS with mid 20th Century criteria because things are moving a lot faster. I credit a lot of Saul’s success to his ability to be nimble. Maybe it was his life’s work that taught him to think on his feet. I wonder if the skill is transferrable.

Denny Schlesinger

Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy
https://www.amazon.com/Capitalism-Socialism-Democracy-Perenn…

The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence
https://www.amazon.com/Age-Spiritual-Machines-Computers-Inte…

History of hard disk drives
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_hard_disk_drives

68 Likes

I follow Bert but also Morningstar. I was curious to see what M* has as FVE for our companies. I was really surprised at the results a mainstream service gives our stocks. Four stars means undervalued and three means fairly valued.

Four stars stocks: CRM TWLO VEEV PINS.
Three star stocks: ESTC MDB ZS COUP DDOG DOCU CRWD DT PING SPLK ZM FSLY SAIL WORK.

It is pretty amazing when a stalwart rating service gets that our stocks are not overvalued (1-2 stars) but within a buy range.

Saul, “they” are missing it!

Mark

6 Likes

Interesting article about what the “market” finds attractive in SaaS stocks and an attempt to explain some of the price action in SaaS stocks.

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-to-separate-the-winner…

4 Likes

Agree with much on both sides here. Thankful to Saul for his generosity in sharing his new knowledge so willingly and enthusiastically.

The way i look at it, Saul is saying that despite the runup in valuation for the most hypergrowth, high margin, high retention, low capital investment, subscription model, SAAS stocks, the sector yet stands in the early innings for global growth and the market continues to undervalue future growth. And despite the undulations in stock prices, these companies with enormous untapped TAM continue to offer amazing alpha opportunity.

That makes a lot of sense to me in aggregate but i also agree with Warren Buffett’s admonition in 3 1999 speeches that during any emerging tech revolution, it is not so easy to know who the winners will be. WEB used the auto and airline industries of a century earlier to point out that the vast majority of those companies failed despite the pervasive life changing technologies they contributed to the travel economy.

Immodest as it may be, and with perhaps unwise chutzpah and audacity, i am using principles that i think increases my chances to defy Buffet, and to identify the most likely winners in this SAAS revolution. My view is that our chances of success increase as we place more importance on brilliant, honorable, shareholder friendly leadership. I think that companies grow or shrink to size of leadership capability and that honorable shareholder friendly leaders mind their fiduciary obligations to all shareholders as much or more than they do to insiders and executives. Leadership is the dominant variable for my picks.

I’ve listed some of the companies here in the past that i think qualify in that regard (e.g. RNG, ROKU, AYX, TTD). In the sector we discuss on this forum, when i obtain high potential growth technology stock ideas, whether from here, Bert, or elsewhere, and am satisfied with the numbers, i spend the bulk of my time researching the history of the company and especially the current (and past) leadership.

One old school miss: Despite the hundreds of e tail companies competing 20+ years ago, there was one almost certain winner apparent at the time despite the moteless ease of entry and the obvious unlimited TAM…Jeff Bezos. We knew then that Bezos was a giant but i made no money because i wrongly thought all along that Amazon.com was considerably overvalued and that the stock would become available at a lower price. Even during the dark days of the Internet bust, the relative price was not low enough to suit me. Big mistake. That and other similar mistakes eventually led me to rethinking valuation, and to places like ticker target and to Saul’s investing discussion.

So far so good.

14 Likes

considering that this genre of companies being public companies is maybe 3 years old…

There were 7 SaaS IPOs from 2003 to 2005, including the poster child salesforce.com (CRM). There were 55 SaaS IPOs from 2007 to 2015.

none of them have reached the point you are talking about…

Have you looked at FireEye (FEYE) or MobileIron (MOBL)? It’s possible you’re right, but another possibility is you’re experiencing survivorship bias.

What has changed in the last three years is the amount of money chasing these unicorns. From millions of dollars invested to billions of dollars. This has enabled these startups to grow faster than their predecessors and IPO with larger market caps. Even with the recent declines, sales multiples are at record highs. Think recency bias and price anchoring.

Not to say that will change. Just to be aware.

Ears

15 Likes

Hi ears,

I didn’t say that there weren’t any companies that called themselves “SaaS” companies, or who leased part of their software. What I said was that as little as 5 or 6 years ago you couldn’t imagine a company growing revenue 70% a year, much less have six in your portfolio which averaged 70% a year, and not little start-ups but companies with revenue run rates in the range of a half billion dollars or more! It would have been a fairy tale. Impossible.

And to have them have high 72% to 92% margins as well??? And net retention rates of 120% to 140%.

Obviously the companies, with the exception of CRM, that you are talking about were nothing like these, or we would all have been well aware of them, as they would have been growing like mad right in front of our eyes. How could we have missed 50 of them???

And to say the current ones are growing like mad because of billions in seed money? That makes no sense. Datadog, one of the highest valuation companies burnt all of $30 million getting to its current run rate of $96 million a quarter, and obviously well over a half billion in the next four quarters.

I know you like to try to punch holes in our investments, but I don’t buy your arguments.

Sorry,

Saul

25 Likes