My explanation of our valuation expansion

I had hoped to generate some discussion with my explanation of why our companies have had such a valuation expansion, but with all the 174 recs on my end of the month summary, the explanation seems to have gotten lost, so I’ll try it again. Agreement, disagreement, or just comments are all welcome. Here it is again.
Saul

Some investors are very questioning of the valuation of our stocks, which are very high-valued in EV/S terms compared to conventional stocks. I’m sure that some of you have wondered how and why our companies are valued so much higher than conventional companies. I therefore thought that I should give you a more detailed explanation about why our companies have had such a valuation expansion, which has occurred as other investors (and the market) have gradually realized what I will be explaining below. I’ve gone over and over and over my explanation many times to make it as clear as possible, and I hope that it is understandable to you and makes good sense…

It’s not that this “time” is different, it’s what we are investing in that’s different. What we are investing in never existed before. Look, ten years ago I searched for companies growing at 15% or 20% a year. And 25% was a dream come true. Now I wouldn’t even bother looking at a company with 20% or 25% revenue growth.

We are investing in a new model of enterprise. Our companies have very high revenue growth year after year. I’m talking about 40% to 65% per year for most of them, but some even higher. These are very high gross margin companies (70% to 92% for the most part). Their revenue is almost all recurring and thus largely locked in, and their dollar-based net retention rates are generally considerably greater than a very respectable 115-120%, meaning that last year’s customers buy a lot more this year than they bought last year, instead of having an attrition rate, or even, forbid-the-thought, companies which have customers making one time purchases, and thus which don’t even have any revenue guaranteed next year at all. I’ve never seen companies like ours before. Have you?

Now of course a company growing revenue 50% per year, with 95% recurring revenue, 92% gross margins, and a 130% dollar-based net retention rate is worth a much, much, higher EV/S than the old model of company, with fairly low revenue growth, low gross margins, and with little or no visibility into revenue for the next year and beyond!

And of course companies without security of revenue had to show a profit (PE) before we’d invest in them. Of course we pay more for a company where revenue is recurring.

And, of course rapidly growing revenue which has very high gross margins is worth more per dollar of present revenue (in other words, it has a higher EV/S) than slower growing, and lower gross margin, revenue. WHY? Let me explain it to you.

Look at it this way. Let’s consider an extreme example for clarity of understanding: I’ll take hypothetical conventional or traditional company and compare it with an equally imaginary one of our SaaS companies:

Let’s say that our conventional company has a 23% gross margin. That means it keeps $23 out of every $100 of revenue to cover operating expenses and profit. And let’s say our SaaS company has a 92% gross margin. That means that it keeps $92 out of that same $100 of revenue. (I said it would be an extreme example, but Alteryx had a 92% gross margin last year, and a 55% rate of revenue growth).

Almost by definition, the SaaS company is worth four times as much as the conventional company for every dollar of revenue, because it keeps four times as much of every dollar of that revenue as gross profit….

Thus, it would be totally normal for the SaaS company to have an EV/S ratio four times as high as the conventional company, even if they were growing at the same rate. The high margin company should have an EV/S ratio four times as high! (And, for example, if you were comparing it to a conventional company whose gross margins were 31%, our SaaS company should have an EV/S three times as high, etc.)

Note that that is WITHOUT even taking into account the higher rate of growth, which compounds, and without taking into account the recurring revenue.

“Okay, so tell me:”… WHY is the rate of growth important for comparing EV/S? There’s a heck of a good reason! Next year our company growing at 50% with high margins will have $150 of revenue instead of $100, and with its 92% gross profit margin, it will keep $138 toward covering operating expenses.

Let’s say our conventional company is growing at a nice steady respectable 10% per year. Next year, it will have just $110 of revenue, and with its 23% margins it will keep just $25 towards operating expenses. So now we have $138 versus $25… one year later! The difference in compounding is enormous and grows each year…

It’s astounding in a way, but if we go just one additional year later our SaaS company will have $225 in revenue and will keep $207… while the conventional company will have revenue of $121 and keeps $28.

Look at that again! The two companies both started two years ago with revenue of $100. Now our company is taking home $207 in gross profit , while the conventional company is taking home $28!!! Just two years later!

I won’t trouble you with the calculation for the third year, but our SaaS company growing at 50% will keep $310 in gross profit, which is ten times the $31 the conventional company will keep in gross profit. That gives you an idea of the enormous power of the combination of high growth and high gross margins that our companies are blessed with.

And for those who will maintain that companies can’t maintain 50% revenue growth for three years, Zscaler was over 50% the last two years, and at 59% and 65% the first two quarters of this fiscal year. Twilio was 66%, 44% and 63% for the last three years, Alteryx has been 59%, 53% and 55%, etc, etc, etc.

If the conventional company is trading at an enterprise value of let’s say, four times its revenue, isn’t our SaaS company worth 15 times revenue, or 20 times… or 25 times!

Remember that in two years the SaaS company will be taking home 7.4 times as many dollars in gross profit as the conventional company, and 7.4 times an EV/S of 4 gives you an EV/S of about 30. That’s what many people simply don’t get. You don’t even have to look at that 10x three-year example, which would justify an EV/S of 40.

You can argue that the rate of growth for the conventional company should be 13% instead of 10%, or that it should have a gross margin of 28%, or 35%, instead of 23%, and that will change the numbers slightly, but it won’t change the story at all.

And in our defense, my example used 50% revenue growth, but Okta was the only stock in my portfolio with revenue growth that low last quarter. All the others were above it. In fact, the percent rates of growth of revenue for my companies last quarter were 50%, 51%, 56%, 58%, 59%, 65%, 71%, 81%, and 108%. Thus you see that using 50% for our SaaS companies in the calculation was no exaggeration. In fact, it was actually being quite conservative. And five of my nine companies had gross margins over 80%, and two others were over 75%.

Now let’s consider that our company has almost all recurring revenue, and a dollar based net retention rate of 130%, which means that it is enormously more certain that our SaaS company will have increased revenue next year than that the conventional company will even have the same revenue next year. How much is that worth in increased EV/S? Is that security of our revenue worth another 30% tacked on? Or 20%, or 40%. I don’t know. But it becomes clear that, by simple arithmatic, the reason that our SaaS companies are exploding in EV/S is that the market is starting to do the same arithmatic that I just did.

To summarize
We have Factor One – that a company with a higher percentage of gross profit, takes home more dollars out of each $100 of revenue, and thus, by definition, is worth a higher EV/S, even without considering the higher rate of growth.

Then Factor Two, which is perhaps even more important, that companies with high rates of growth of revenue will compound that revenue enormously in just two or three years, and that, combined with the high gross profit margins, will produce hugely more gross profit margin dollars than a conventional slower growing company that started with the same revenue.

That our companies have an even greater EV/S (EV divided by current sales), flows by definition from that, when compared to a conventional company with the same revenue!

Finally Factor Three, which is perhaps less easy to quantify, but a large percentage of recurring revenue and a high dollar based net retention rate gives much more security to the revenue, and to its potential increase, and thus would warrant an even further increase to the EV/S in some investors’ eyes (like mine).

To summarize the summary,
What we are talking about is that the huge, even enormous, present and future relative number of gross profit margin dollars that our companies have, and will have in the future, for each current dollar of revenue, because of their growth rates and high gross margins, compared to the relatively small amount of gross margin profit that a traditional company has, and will have, for the same current dollar of revenue, is what gives our companies the much larger EV/S ratios. Simple as that!

And don’t bother telling me our companies are not making any profit. Any company with 75%, 85% or 95% gross margins can make a profit whenever they decide to! All they need to do is slow down their enormous S&M spending, whose purpose is to grab every new customer they can grab while the grabbing is good. Personally, I’d rather they keep grabbing all those customers now, because revenue will keep flowing from them for the indefinite future.

So YES, this is a different set of facts we are dealing with. And yes, it is different this time. That’s how I see it anyway. And I hope that I made it clear for you.

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Your explanation makes sense but it can be condensed by using the “S” curve.

All growth tends to follow the sigmoid (“S”) curve. What all have in common is that the size of the market is what limits the growth. Old industrial technologies took decades to saturate their markets while growing at a stately percent.

Asset light, SaaS business model companies can grow a lot faster but cannot exceed their market size. What that means in practice is that the “S” is tall and thin instead of short and fat like the old industrials. That means that the top will be reached much sooner unless the market itself can grow.

When selling cars and TVs the population is what limits the market and population grows slowly. On the other hand, data really has no limit, you can create as much as you want. The fast growers you are talking about are mostly about data. That being the case, the "S is not tall and thin but tall and FAT!

It’s a different ball game! Eighteen inning with six outs per inning, and six strikes per batter!

Denny Schlesinger

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Makes total sense to me!
I like that there is a mathematical justification to the price (valuation) we are paying for our stocks in the portfolio.
Thanks so much for explaining this. I’m always here every day reading and trying not to post. Since you mentioned that no one commented on this I decided to chime in that it’s veey helpful
Thank you Saul!

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Sometimes illustrations fall from unexpected sources. From a link in a SA article about MongoDB

Global Cloud database market accounted for $ 6.12 billion in 2017 and is expected to reach $ 495.26 billion by 2026 growing at a CAGR of 62.9% during the forecast period.

http://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/01/25/1705453…

That is a whooping 63% CAGR for a decade. That being the case, there is no reason why MDB cannot grow at 65-70% for a decade or more!

Denny Schlesinger

The SA article:
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4266979-mongodb-running-spa…

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I thought this was a great addition to your monthly update, Saul.

Especially the “hypothetical” example with numbers showing how quickly, and how dramatically, the numbers favor this “new” SaaS model, and run away from the conventional model.

When you see those numbers, it really adds to my confidence to hold/add to these stocks as long as they continue to perform.

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…Especially the “hypothetical” example with numbers showing how quickly, and how dramatically, the numbers favor this “new” SaaS model, and run away from the conventional model. When you see those numbers, it really adds to my confidence to hold/add to these stocks as long as they continue to perform.

Thanks foodles, it really impressed me too.

Makes total sense to me! I like that there is a mathematical justification to the price (valuation) we are paying for our stocks in the portfolio. Thanks so much for explaining this.

Hi Musicali, That’s the way I see it too. We all intuited it, but it’s nice to see the numbers. And why in the world are you trying not to post. If you have something useful to say, don’t hesitate. That’s what the board is for.

When selling cars and TVs the population is what limits the market and population grows slowly. On the other hand, data really has no limit, you can create as much as you want. The fast growers you are talking about are mostly about data. That being the case, the "S is not tall and thin but tall and FAT! It’s a different ball game! Eighteen inning with six outs per inning, and six strikes per batter!.. Sometimes illustrations fall from unexpected sources. From a link in a SA article about MongoDB

Global Cloud database market accounted for $6 billion in 2017, and is expected to reach $495 billion by 2026 growing at a CAGR of 63% during the forecast period.

That is a whooping 63% CAGR for a decade. That being the case, there is no reason why MDB cannot grow at 65-70% for a decade or more!

Hi Denny, What a great illustration!

Saul

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It is a great explanation Saul. And it makes a lot of sense.

SaaS revenues are recurring and visible so these companies don’t often miss earnings because management teams are able to forecast with greater certainty than a hardware provider (NVDA is a classic example with the crypto bubble).

Then you have higher margins because software is so scalable. It is silly to say “I will never pay more than a 10 PE” when there is so much nuance. And that is what you and a bunch of people on this board have picked up so well.

Layer on top the net expansion rates and you have recurring revenues that are actually increasing each year because the software is becoming more and more important to customers.

It’s no wonder that most of your companies are enterprise software companies. These are software applications that have high switching costs. This is the difference between consumer software and enterprise.

For example, an aggregator like Priceline is great but from a consumer’s perspective, it isn’t all that hard to switch to Kayak or something else. Versus switching from Okta would be so much more difficult. You’d have to change all the provisions and make sure the new applications integrate well with all of your current apps. And how much would you be saving? If the costs savings are $50,000 for a huge enterprise, the headache and time consumption probably won’t be worth it.

Executives can spend $50k on a sales dinner for goodness sakes!

I’m not claiming anything new here. We know that these companies are sticky, the margins are incredible, growing hasn’t been slowing, and the market loves it.

But there is a limit.

I’m not saying this will happen but it is basic economics. The assumptions that are priced into some of these companies will be difficult to attain.

For example, if ZScaler grows 35% for the next 5 years and does 25% net margins by then (assuming 5% annual dilution) with a PE of 60, we get an annualized 8% return.

This is quite possible but it isn’t a walk in the park. The biggest question mark is the multiple. We don’t know what the macro environment is like so there isn’t a margin of safety.

And in my eyes, that’s the biggest difference between a growth and a value investor. Margin of safety.

Value people say that a situation really isn’t as bad as it seems. And the low valuation affords them that margin of safety.

Us growth people believe these companies will do even better than everyone thinks even though the expectations are already high.

So the way I see it, there are two ways to succeed in growth investing.

1. The Rule Breaker way

  • More like a VC, pick a lot of companies and let the best ones carry you to glory. The drawdown of this method is that a few positions become a huge part of your portfolio. This requires holding companies for a long, long time.

2. The modified buy and hold

  • The second method is the Saul method. Just stay on top of the companies and don’t be afraid to switch lanes to the better horse. This is why valuation doesn’t matter as much because there will rarely be a company that is held for 5 years. So in my Zscaler example, it doesn’t matter much. As long as the company is outperforming expectations, it’s all good. Then, boom, once the company has a bad quarter, don’t be afraid to sell. If a company goes up 100% in a year, has one bad quarter and tanks 20%, that is still a 60% return if you sell out.

So this is my only caution. If you invest like this you need to be on top of things. Having a concentrated portfolio does not allow you to sit back and buy and forget.

The reason that Saul has been able to return over 30% for a long, long time is his ability to get in and out of positions. It is the rare company that can grow its stock price by 30% annually. In fact, in the past 20 years there have only been 2 stocks in the S&P 500 that have done so. That’s less than .5%.

While it is possible to pick those companies, for them to make a huge difference, you’d need to let them grow to become a huge part of your portfolio.

So it is not likely. That’s why trading in and out based on solid criteria seems to work. You get a lot of the multiple expansion thrown into the business growth as other investors start to realize.

And for the modified buy and holders, the market is so fickle that timing it is ridiculously frustrating. The only thing that matters is not investing in a bubble. And that can be tough because seeing other people make more money than you is the single best way to make mistakes.

This post wasn’t so much a disagreement as just a comment for people following your strategy. You said just as much more eloquently but thought I’d insert.

Best,
Fish

19 Likes

Sometimes illustrations fall from unexpected sources. From a link in a SA article about MongoDB

Global Cloud database market accounted for $ 6.12 billion in 2017 and is expected to reach $ 495.26 billion by 2026 growing at a CAGR of 62.9% during the forecast period.

http://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2019/01/25/1705453…

That is a whooping 63% CAGR for a decade. That being the case, there is no reason why MDB cannot grow at 65-70% for a decade or more!

If that is correct, that is really just mind boggling what that would do to an investment growing at that rate for that long ($7,500 becomes $1,000,000)! And with MDB seemingly one of, if not, the top noSQL database companies competing for their share of that, you would think they should beat that sector rate.

I had hoped to generate some discussion with my explanation of why our companies have had such a valuation expansion, but with all the 174 recs on my end of the month summary, the explanation seems to have gotten lost, so I’ll try it again. Agreement, disagreement, or just comments are all welcome. Here it is again.

Hi Saul,

Well reasoned and thought out explanation I thought to myself, so I agree. The only other thing(s) I could possibly think of to add would be that most, if not every one of our companies is no where remotely close to approaching their self described TAM’s at all ($25-50bln depending) and none of them need or have to come anywhere near their TAM in order for them to perform well in our portfolios. I think most of our companies are also expected to continue their amazing growth for several years, if not more. I think the big money/market maker investors are driving up the prices in expectation of all these factors.

I remember once long ago, a company could maybe have a 50%+ growth year which would be some kind of aberration and quickly come down. My how things have changed with the advent of subscription based/recurring revenue!

Best,
Matt

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That is a whooping 63% CAGR for a decade. That being the case, there is no reason why MDB cannot grow at 65-70% for a decade or more!

I don’t believe MDB will be able to play in all of that $495 billion space. For example the report mentions Alibaba as an industry participant as well as AWS and Google. I don’t think NoSQL can be a $495 billion industry in a few years, but this is more of ALL spending on the cloud. The Cloud Titans are like $80 billion between all of them right now so even this number will require a lot of growth to get to $495 billion in 2026.

I do however believe NoSQL can be a very big market in the future. Just don’t see it that soon that fast.

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I don’t believe MDB will be able to play in all of that $495 billion space.

I do however believe NoSQL can be a very big market in the future. Just don’t see it that soon that fast.

It certainly wasn’t meant to be an exact forecast but if the market grows at 65% and if now MongoDB has 10% of the market both Mongo and the market can grow at 65% and Mongo still only has 10% of the market! :wink:

Denny Schlesinger

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OK, with the current database market being around $80 billion today in its entirety, I am surprised that someone would put a report out that just cloud database would be a $495 billion industry in a few years. But OK, we’ll see. I also didn’t know that Alibaba and Tencent apparently have their own database. Apparently it’s the norm for everyone involved in the cloud to have their own databases these days.

I had hoped to generate some discussion with my explanation of why our companies have had such a valuation expansion, but with all the 174 recs on my end of the month summary, the explanation seems to have gotten lost, so I’ll try it again. Agreement, disagreement, or just comments are all welcome.

I have a comment. Your post embodies virtually everything you’ve been doing since I’ve been following the board, which probably goes back almost to the beginning.

It has taken me quite a while to adjust my thinking and my behavior to reflect the objective evidence you so eloquently describe. I’m not all the way there. But I’m working on it. In fact, I still have about 20% of my portfolio in companies I bought pre-Saul times that you’d prefer not owning (AAPL, ISRG, CMG, MIDD).

Despite all of the evidence to the contrary, many of us simply don’t have the confidence to act with 100% conviction, even though we know this behavior is detrimental to maximizing the probability of financial success.

After reading and re-reading your knowledge base, I started doing better and simpler analyses on my companies. Today, I keep a summary sheet on all of them (some better than others). Over time, I’ve come to a lot of the same conclusions that you outlined, albeit in a less coherent manner. But there is this part of me that keeps me from being completely consequential in my decision making.

I suppose part of this, for me, can be explained by the big drop we had at the end of last year, while our companies continued executing. Some of them have doubled since then. But they dropped pretty fast, and the primary reason for this volatility seems to be sentiment. It’s easy to think that our high fliers will drop a lot more than the market, anchoring on all time highs and forgetting that we’ll lose only a few months worth of gains and that they’ll typically recover a lot faster than the market.

Our companies get extremely valued, they get whacked hard, a lot of angst appears, we wonder if this is the end of the run and then suddenly they’re at new highs.

The other part is psychological. It’s difficult making life altering financial decisions when everybody else invests like they always have, despite any amount of objective evidence available. It’s a lot easier being screwed when everybody else is screwed and attributing your success to luck and believing that you’re just an outlier and that your demise is not far off. It’s human nature.

This board and your thought experiments, especially this one, have helped me be a better investor. While I’m not yet at your level, I’m successfully moving in the right direction. I’m sure there are many others that feel the same way.

DJ

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Your post embodies virtually everything you’ve been doing since I’ve been following the board, which probably goes back almost to the beginning. It has taken me quite a while to adjust my thinking and my behavior to reflect the objective evidence you so eloquently describe. I’m not all the way there. But I’m working on it… Despite all of the evidence to the contrary, many of us simply don’t have the confidence to act with 100% conviction, even though we know this behavior is detrimental to maximizing the probability of financial success…

…It’s difficult making life altering financial decisions when everybody else invests like they always have, despite any amount of objective evidence available… This board and your thought experiments, especially this one, have helped me be a better investor. While I’m not yet at your level, I’m successfully moving in the right direction. I’m sure there are many others that feel the same way.

Hi FourthStooge, thanks so much for your kind and perceptive comments.
Saul

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The advantage of the individual investor is to move in and out with agility, based on any reason determined rationale is her/his conviction or investing thesis.

I tend to side with Fish and Sauls original take on ZM - valuations may be baked in.

I also do not disagree with Saul when he states that the numbers do not lie!

The relative valuation of companies to Gross Profit growth rate is a correlation I track. There is a correlation. It’s pretty straight forward but it’s not perfect. TAM seems to matter and the products journey in TAM matters.

What I cannot quantify is the TAM, competition, and technological superiority of one company versus the next. I let gross profit growth rate do that for me.

If ALL SaaS stocks accelerated to ZMs valuation, I’d call that an uneasy feeling. The fact is, ZMs gross profit growth rate tracks to the relative P/S of many of the other stocks we track.

I have no position in ZM as I believe it - and several others - may be running hot. But what would I know - the market probably knows more I do.

I sleep better at night betting on others.

What we are experiencing is the market valuing SaaS more and more based on what Saul and others pointing out. Ever expanding spend.

That will slow one day
That will stop one day
There will be a substitute product
There will be a next innovation.

The cool part? When it does you, and I, can get out quicker than the institutions.

So I pay attention to how well these SaaS companies service, integrate, and enrich the companies they have. I follow churn. It matters, a lot.

Fish said the most important post in here; you have to actively engaged in a concentrated growth portfolio. That’s what I’ve learned from here.

The juice is worth the squeeze.

PS. I’m still not sure why it was okay to leave ESTC when there was open source competition from AMZN, but rebuying back into MDB after the same threat passed.

It also doesn’t matter. It’s your money. Know why you make the decisions. Learn how others make theirs.

Just a Fool

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The assumptions that are priced into some of these companies will be difficult to attain. For example, if ZScaler grows 35% for the next 5 years and does 25% net margins by then (assuming 5% annual dilution) with a PE of 60, we get an annualized 8% return.

Hi Fish, It’s odd that you should pick Zscaler for your negative pessimistic example. Its revenue growth for the first two quarters of this fiscal year have been 59% and 65%. In fact for the past four quarters it’s been rising from 49% to 54% to 59% to 64%. On what basis are you seeing 35% per year.

I don’t have a crystal ball into what they will announce tomorrow, but lets say the rate quits rising and just stays the same. Right now a rate of 63% to 64% for the fiscal year sounds reasonably conservative (Billings were up 74% last quarter). So to hit your average of 35% means that they will average only 28% for the remaining four years. Do you think that is even possible???

Besides, after giving them 63.5% this fiscal year, it’s hard to imagine them below say 52% next year, so to hit your 35% for the next five years they’d have to grow at only 19.8% average for the last three years.

Okay, let’s say that for the third year their rate of growth falls from 52% to 40%. Then to hit your average of “35% for the next five years” they’d have to grow at only 9.7% for each of the last two years, after being at 40% the previous year.

I’m afraid that “35% for the next five years” example doesn’t make any sense. It’s quite beyond pessimistic, and approaching the ridiculous, or so it seems today, with the information currently at our disposal.

Best,

Saul

By the way, it’s not just the numbers I’m picking. I said that it’s hard to imagine them dropping next year from 63.5% to below 52%, but let’s say they do, and drop to 49% instead. That would still mean that they’d only grow at 20.8% for each of the next three years, which seems equally impossible. And if they then dropped to 38% for the third year, to hit 35% for the five years they’d still get to grow at only 12.2% for each of the last two years !!!???

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Sorry Fish, in rereading again what I wrote, it seemed a bit harsh and sarcastic, and I want to apologize. I guess I was just flabbergasted by your example, which seemed unbelievably low to me.
Best wishes,
Saul

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Saul,

Excellent post. Excellent logic. This post encouraged me to see how ZM checked out against your example of a traditional company. BTW, I bought a starter position in ZM last week.

Using 82% margins and growth of 100% Yr 1, 80% Yr 2, 60% Yr 3, and 50% Yr 4 you get Gross Profit of $472.32 with ZM and $30.61 for the traditional company. Using your 4X multiple for the traditional company, ZM could be somehwere around 60X (over 15 times more profit than the traditional company).

And all of this is not taking into account anything else, like management (founder lead/visionary), emerging market (TAM/SAM), being a leader or top dog (disruptor - though this one might be expected with the growth rate), or optionality, or any other possible way of ranking/comparing companies.

Having does this little/simple exercise, I feel even better now than I did about owning some ZM (and understand why it could be and is valued so highly). I am very interested to see how their first report next week turns out.

Thank you Saul for taking the time to help us all make sense of this. Each time you put out your monthly report I get better and better at making use of all the tools you have given to us over the years (tracking companies, tracking my investments, listening/reading conference calls, studying reports, reading articles, and understanding the companies I have invested in better).

It is one thing to read your monthlies and see the numbers and logic, but it is a whole other thing to do it yourself and I am so thankful for your help (along with many many others here). I am really starting to progress.

In the end, this helps me to teach my kids better about investing and helps me to keep my emotions a lot more in check so that when these stocks drop 10% (sometimes for no reason at all), I can look back at my tracking and see that we only have gone back to the same price we were a couple of weeks ago. If I was not tracking my portfolio I most certainly would have been panicking.

For most here I am sure all of this is nothing new, but for me this is and has been HUGE!

THANKS AGAIN!

Daniel

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Saul,
I am a new investor fortunate enough to have found your board. First time i saw your monty portfolio report, I could not believe my luck to have come across something so valuable.
Your logic, knowledge base and explanation makes perfect sense in a way that i, who didnt have any background information about stocks and investing have been able to follow through and have learned so much from you and other experienced contributors.Thank you all.

This time using the numbers to illustrate the difference between conventional companies and the kind of companies this board invests in has been specially helpful to see how this time it really is different.

I know my post is not adding value to the board but i am learning and hoping i will be able to contribute some day.

Best Regard,

FBella

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The bit about gross margin concerns me. Let me go back to basics a bit to help explain:
Let’s say that our conventional company has a 23% gross margin. That means it keeps $23 out of every $100 of revenue to cover operating expenses and profit.

Implicit in that statement is that the COGS (Cost of Goods Sold) has been subtracted out in the calculation.

  Gross Margin = (Net Revenue - COGS)/Net Revenue

One problem becomes classifying what is a COGS and what isn’t. Typically, anything that scales the more of the thing/service you sell should be considered a COGS. If you make cars, then the steel you buy is a COGS. If you provide SaaS on top of AWS, then you should definitely consider your AWS charges as a COGS.

Here’s an article on the subject: https://www.founderviews.com/cogs-in-saas/

It gets more complicated if, say, your SaaS company hosts its own servers (ZScaler?). Now, when you add a new customer, you probably don’t run out and buy more servers. (But, at some point, you do. Under GAAP rules, you’re supposed to account for that via “absorption costing,” which would spread out the cost of buying and running servers (eg, electricity and support personnel) across all your sold things/services as contributing to COGS. But, the Gross Margin often discussed for investing purposes is the non-GAAP version that doesn’t include overhead, since that tells you something about how much the company can make by incrementally selling more, or what it needs to sell to cover its overhead, etc.)

Obviously, Gross Margin for software companies will be high. This is nothing new. In the old days, when you bought Microsoft Office, the COGS was a DVD (CD or even floppies if you’re really old :^)), a manual, and a box. Today for some software there is no COGS - the customer downloads a file, then runs it and enters a supplied serial number. That’s literally 100% Gross Margin assuming the server hosting the downloadable file and generating serial numbers doesn’t cost you more as you sell more product. But, that doesn’t guarantee profitability by itself.

With software companies, what you have to watch out for are things like development costs. How many software architects, programmers, testers, etc. do they need to hire and for how long and what equipment and environment are needed to support them? The fixed costs for developing software are not to be overlooked. While a company like Ikea that sells furniture can sell the same table design for years and years (which means development costs are one-time and low), companies that sell software are constantly improving and updating the software. So, Ikea has relatively high COGS (particle board, dowels, etc.), with low development costs (designer for a week), while Microsoft had relatively low COGS (a cardboard box with a DVD and manual), but high development costs (thousands of highly paid programmers in Seattle).

As a result, a startup software company might have a super high Gross Margin, but if sales are minimal and development costs are high, that company could be burning cash at a very high rate and losing a ton of money overall.

What’s important here is total revenue and, yes, Revenue Growth. As Saul said, one great thing about a business with a low COGS/high Gross Margin is that when it sells more, more of that revenue goes to cover operating expenses and when that’s covered (and depreciation and taxes also, as in EBITDA), then the rest is profit. And also as Saul said, when a SaaS company’s business model has recurring revenue (customers pay monthly or quarterly or yearly for the service), then it’s not like a car company that has to find new car buyers literally every day because it might be several years before someone who bought a car looks to buy another. So, sales costs can be lower and revenue can be more predictable.

What this diatribe is leading to is that I disagree with Saul on this statement:
We have Factor One – that a company with a higher percentage of gross profit, takes home more dollars out of each $100 of revenue, and thus, by definition, is worth a higher EV/S, even without considering the higher rate of growth.

A software or SaaS company without a high rate of growth that is not yet profitable may take a long time to become profitable, and even if it is profitable may not grow to be much more profitable. Just because a company has a high Gross Profit doesn’t mean that profit is covering expenses - which as discussed can be considerable and ongoing for software - and without a high rate of growth that company may go nowhere for a long time. So I don’t think just having a high GM demands a high EV/S just by itself.

Saul also says:
Any company with 75%, 85% or 95% gross margins can make a profit whenever they decide to!

Again, I disagree. Since R&D costs for developing software aren’t included in COGS, the Gross Margin for software will always be super high, yet if sales aren’t sufficient in quantity then the company will lose money paying hundreds or thousands of software engineers to develop/improve/maintain that software. If they can’t find enough buyers they won’t turn a profit. If they fire the software engineers to reduce overhead costs then their product will probably become less attractive to potential buyers, and maybe quickly. So, even though development costs aren’t considered in calculating Gross Margin, they need to be considered. This is why my parenthetical section above about GAAP and Gross Margin exists, but companies talking Gross Margin aren’t talking GAAP for very valid reasons. It’s not accurate to say that all companies with a high GM can “make a profit whenever they decide” - they have to have a product/service people want to “buy” at a certain price point that results in them covering expenses and such.

Let’s say a SaaS company has a product with a GM of 95%. That company may go bankrupt in short order while another SaaS company has a product with a GM of 99% may make money hand over fist. How’s this possible for just a 4% increase in GM? What considering Gross Margin alone misses is that the first company is selling their SaaS for $100/month with a COGS of $5 while the second company is selling their SaaS for $10,000/month with a COGS of $100. If the costs of developing the software for the two SaaS products is similar, the first company may struggle to survive - with a GM of 95%!

So, I don’t see how Factor One can be considered on its own, unless we’re talking GAAP Gross Margin, in which case I’m wrong here, but I don’t think the Gross Margin numbers being tossed about are calculated under GAAP rules with absorption costing.

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