This post is about my thoughts/analysis gleaned from looking at securitized trust data. There’s two parts to it.
PART 1: Did a second bank partner drop credit score requirements for UPST?
**Year Number of trusts**
2021 YTD 11
2020 6
2019 3
2018 2
2017 1
**Trust Amount**
21-ST9 $83M Note1 (10/8/21)
21-4 493
21-ST8 80
21-ST7 74
21-3 486
21-ST6 82
21-ST5 68
21-ST4 102
21-2 476 Note2 (5/11/21)
21-ST3 64 Note3 (4/9/21)
21-1 208
20-3 270
20-2 66
20-ST3 75
20-1 375
20-ST2 110
20-ST1 87
19-3 346
19-2 358
19-1 232
18-2 187
18-1 227
17-2 219
17-1 192
**Year Securitized Amount ($ millions)**
2021 H1 2133
2020 983
2019 936
2018 414
2017 411
**Year Loan transacted dollar amount ($ millions)**
2021 H1 4524
2020 3445
2019 2724
Note1
As of the newest UPST securitized trust issue report, dated 10/8/21, I noticed a new change today: the minimum credit score requirement for Finwise bank was decreased.
(Recall that, Finwise is the second largest bank partner of UPST). The KBRA report says in September 2021, the underwriting policy for FinWise originated loans was updated by lowering the minimum credit score from 580 to 300.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but the lowest credit score anyone can get is exactly 300, right? So a minimum requirement of 300 means there is effectively no longer a FICO score barrier!
We know from Q2 earnings call in August, that it was mentioned one bank had dropped their requirement…could it be possible that this is a second bank doing so?
Well, I suppose there is a chance that Finwise is actually that first unnamed bank who dropped their requirement and they only just implemented this new policy in September.
But either way, this is HUGE for 4 reasons:
-
UPST’s AI model can learn/improve faster now that it’s exposed to more ‘edge cases’. The traditionally considered ‘deep subprime’ (defined as a score below 580) borrowers that typically nobody would ever touch, can now be run through UPST’s model.
-
Possibly increased ‘network effect’. Other banks might be sold on the idea of getting rid of their FICO requirements if a second bank has dropped that with UPST. (caveat is that Finwise is actually just the first bank doing so, as noted above).
-
Decreased concentration risk, in the sense that, Finwise clearly likes originating loans with UPST and trusts them a lot, so why would they want to stop partnering with UPST?
-
Finwise bank already powers a VERY significant chunk of loans (according to the last 10Q, Finwise originates 32% of the total loan transaction volume https://discussion.fool.com/upst-10q-34901669.aspx?sort=postdate…).
This means a very significant increase in potential revenue via expansion of the addressable market for UPST. And I mean that quite literally: expansion of the actual personal loan market.
Here’s what I mean: if you look at the last most recent LendingClub and Avant trust reports from KBRA, there are ZERO borrowers with a score below 660 for LendingClub, and ZERO borrowers with a score below 580 for Avant. UPST’s fintech competitors are just NOT willing to touch the deep subprime market! There is NO competition for this pool of borrowers. These borrowers are currently a very small fraction of the existing personal loan market as most lenders reject them outright!
Now, according to Experian and FICO, 16% of the total American population has a score between 300-580. That means 52 million Americans.
And according to 2017 data from Oliver Wyman, the 90+ days-past-due rates for score 300 to 570 ranged as low as 44.8% to 19.6% (see table below).
So, let’s just suppose very conservatively, that ~50% of these people ultimately default.
That leaves 26 million “hidden prime” borrowers in the FICO category of deep subprime, all for UPST to tap into! To me, this seems like almost a ‘greenfield opportunity’ that just opened up.
Now, keep in mind, not all deep subprime folks are those who have ‘damaged’ credit, many simply just have a ‘thin’ file with little credit experience.
Finally, we should distinguish that having no minimum FICO score requirement is different than a scenario of a borrower who has NO credit score at all (there are about another 26 million Americans in this category). Those fall under different requirements (see Note2 and Note3 below)
FICO 90+ DPD rate
571-590 15.5%
551-570 19.6%
530-550 23.7%
511-530 29.0%
491-510 33.4%
471-490 37.4%
451-470 39.9%
300-450 44.8%
(sources: https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliver-wyman/v2/publ… and https://www.fico.com/sites/default/files/inline-images/Scree…)
Note2 and Note3
The 2021-2 UPST trust (report issued May 11, 2021) and 2021-ST2 UPST trust (report issued April 9, 2021) both showed a new change in requirements by Cross RIver Bank.
CRB lowered its minimum credit score requirement from 620 to 600 in February 2021.
CRB also raised the maximum allowed Debt to Income ratio to 50% from 45%, and loosened the ‘no bankruptcies permitted within the last 12 months’ rule to within the last 3 years.
I think part of the reason why criteria is being relaxed by CRB, is they are also seeing the positive results of their retained loans and are trusting UPST’s AI models more and more over time.
(For Finwise, ever since becoming a bank partner in 2019, they never had debt to income ratio maximums, bankkruptcy or max inquiry requirements. Finwise appears to have been fully on-board with trusting the AI models way more than CRB!)
PART 2: Can we predict Q3 results with knowledge of UPST trust data?
I’ve been following the UPST securitized trust reports from KBRA closely. Since Q2 earnings I’ve tried to see if I could use the KBRA reports to ‘predict’ how business is performing.
Unfortunately, although we see the volume of trusts and size of trusts have grown considerably (see tables above) over time, I’ve realized it’s not possible to use this information to forecast Q3 performance.
This is for a number of reasons, such as variable dates of loan statistical cutoffs, the average weighted months seasoned of loans included in each trust is always 4 months (which will always overlap two quarters) and also the fact that if you do the math, not all loans are securitized. There is a huge chunk that are going to whole loan sales, the comprehensive data of which is not possible as a layperson.
(Whole loans sales are when institutional portfolio managers will buy up entire borrower loans from UPST. In this way, the borrower loan was not packaged into a securitized trust where thousands of other similar loans are pooled together.)
Here’s the boring math, if anyone cares to read:
If you read the 10Q reports, you find that "in the year ended December 31, 2020, 21% of the loans funded through our platform were retained by the originating bank and 77% of loans were purchased by institutional investors through our loan funding programs.
Our institutional investors and buyers that participate in our loan funding programs invest in Upstart-powered loans through whole loan purchases, purchases of pass-through certificates and investments in asset-backed securitizations."
The 10Q filings show $3.445B was originated in 2020, and $4.524B in 2021 H1.
The filings also show 2.652B and 3.414B respectively were purchased for resale (these are the loans destined for whole loan sales or securitizations/pass through trusts).
We also know 69.9M and 42.55M were held on UPST’s balance sheet for research per the 10Q.
So you can deduce 723M and 1.067B retained by banks respectively (this matches the 21% retained rate in 2020 stated above, and yields 23% bank retention in 2021 H1). So at least we know the trend is more and more banks are retaining the loans directly, rather than selling back to UPST for immediate securitization)
Using this information, if you subtract from the 2020 total dollar amount of trusts (1.191B) it means in 2020, about 1.461B went to whole loan sales.
It’s hard to know what that whole loan sale figure is for 2021, due to the various loan cutoff dates for the trusts.
As such, we can’t really estimate any meaningful information to help us predict Q3 results.
All we know is that securitization amounts and number of trusts has accelerated in 2021 versus 2020, which is a good thing of course, indicating higher and higher institutional demand (see tables above)
Also, shoutout to a person on twitter who messaged me with Bloomberg terminal info that the UPST consumer loan trusts have also had upsizing in offerings increase over time, thanks to rise in demand (see below)
PRICED: Upstart $671.36M Consumer Loan ABS
2021-09-17 17:22:24.925 GMT
(Bloomberg) – Increased to $671.36m from $493.456m.
Versus, from earlier in the year the upsizing of offerings were smaller:
“PRICED: Upstart $475.9M Consumer Loan ABS via Goldman; Upsized
2021-05-04 20:09:12.316 GMT
(Bloomberg) – Increased to $475.875m from $412.011m.