UPST Q4 – great quarter

[jonwayne235]

Does UPST make the cutoff to rejoin my portfolio today, after reporting great Q4 numbers?

As a recap: I first bought UPST in May 2021 after Q1 earnings and maintained at least 80% allocation (90% on earnings day through Q2 and Q3). Why did I go crazy with the allocation? At the time I was overly confident with looking at review counts, google trends, website traffic data to correlate with earnings results, after ‘backtesting’ it to prior quarters both pre and post IPO. It worked fantastically for Q2.

Obviously, fraud attack in Q3 threw all that out the window. I sold to 0% allocation on Q3 numbers, retook a 15% allocation the next day, then sold all of that again, in first week of December 2021 when I felt the valuations for superior hypergrowth SaaS companies were too attractive to pass up.
No real positions were re-established since then, particularly after my other concerns of UPST’s business mounted.

Now, post Q4 – how did UPST do?

First, Q4 results.
(I wrote on twitter my prediction/expectation yesterday)
https://twitter.com/jonwayne235/status/1493644197710159873?s…
Expectation: 494K loans, $285M fee revenue, avg loan size $8600 (flat QoQ), fee take rate 6.7%
Actual: 495K loans, $287M fee revenue, avg loan size $8275 (down QoQ), fee take rate 7.01%

Q4 met my prediction and expectations perfectly for fee revenue and loan count. Loan sizes fell more than I like, but was made up for by fee take rate increase.
Why did I want loan sizes to stay flat, even though we know they are moving downmarket to lower, ‘traditionally subprime’ borrowers who tend to take smaller loans?
Because they talked about being competitive for traditionally higher FICO, higher income, larger loan borrowers last quarter. I want to see these ‘bigger borrowers’ make up for the smaller fish. Looks like that might not necessarily be happening (yet?).

So, loan size drop remains a problem, but in this context it’s a minor issue, as take rate did go up to compensate.
I’m not sure what’s driving the fee take rate change. The 10Q might provide information on this, and hopefully this is something that is sustained for next quarter.

Second, FY22 guidance.
Expectation: Q1 guide $320M, FY22 guide $1.1B with no auto guide given.
Actual: Q1 guide $305M, FY22 guide $1.4B with “$1.5B auto financing volume”

This is a huge upside surprise. $1.4B total rev guide is way bigger than I expected. If we assume they ‘beat and raise’ as necessary for the wall-street game, actual FY revenue may be higher.

What do I want UPST to do in FY22 (and I have to believe that they can realistically do it)?
This answer for me is dependent on what a non-SaaS company needs to grow, to be considered “on par” with a SaaS-like company.

Non-SaaS, direct consumer facing business will command lower valuation than a “recurring revenue-like” B2B company.
As an example, any future economic slowdown will curtail UPST more than BILL.com (see UPST’s -80% drop QoQ in COVID vs BILL’s +5.5% QoQ growth, as proof).
Lumpy ‘unexpected’ “growth volatility” quarter to quarter will also be lower valued (this is certainly less desirable than a company with merely an ‘expected’ quarter to quarter seasonality).

So, in order for me to consider UPST on par with other companies I already own, I want to see FY22 deliver >20% QoQ growth, every quarter.
As I wrote in prior posts/tweets, in 2021 pre-Q3, I was already expecting at least 30% QoQ of fee revenue growth, so this is nothing new – it’s not a goal post being moved here.
Last year, I expected UPST to taper down to >20% QoQ through 2022, as the law of large numbers kicked in for personal loan growth.

That means I want something like: Q1 345M, Q2 414M, Q3 497M, Q4 596M which equals 1.85B in fee revenue. Add in interest-income (the low quality revenue that I don’t care about), that pushes it to $1.96B in total revenue.
Does that number seem “insane” to you? Well, in 2021, it didn’t look too crazy to me, prior to Q3’s failure! It’s why I didn’t sell at $400 at the “top” months ago – at the time, I fully expected this to be realistic to achieve.

Is it possible today? I’m leaning towards ‘no’.
Assume loan sizes continue to fall 4% each quarter (which matches the current trend) and take rate stays at 7%. This means to generate 1.85B in personal loan fee revenue, 3.6 million loans must be originated. It means next Q1, they need to do 620K loans to be on track for this.

Trustpilot review count appears to correlate quite well with loan transaction numbers. (It’s how I arrived at Q4’s ‘near-perfect’ loan transaction number prediction)
6080 reviews in Q3 with 362780 loans. That’s 59.7 loans per review.
8336 reviews in Q4 with 495205 loans. That’s 59.4 loans per review
At roughly halfway through Q1 (February 15 2022), there were 4236 reviews.
4236 x 2 x 59.55 = maybe 504507 loans for Q1. Unfortunately, that falls short of the 620K needed.

Well, this now brings me to the next item.
Third, Q1 guide.
504507 loans at identical take rate/loan size = 292M fee revenue. Add interest income, maybe 309.5M total revenue in Q1.
That’s an in-line result with a tiny beat above their Q1 guide of $305M. (This matches well with their typical Q1 seasonality)

This is why auto revenue is absolutely critical. Since I can’t realistically expect UPST to do 1.96B total revenue in 2022 off of personal loans alone with the above calculations, we need auto fees to kick in serious high gear to counteract the law of large numbers.

Fourth item: auto guidance.
They guide for FY22: $1.5B in auto loan financing volume
This is a disturbingly small guide. If we assume a “take rate” of 3%, that’s auto revenue of $45 million. Not enough to make up for a personal loan shortfall, even if their ‘actual’ result ends up double that of this initial (presumably conservative) guidance.

For the first time, they also did not give out auto-refi transaction numbers for Q4, which is a ‘red flag’ to me. I have a suspicion they would be bragging about a huge jump in auto-refi transactions, had it actually occurred.
Finally, it remains very vague what exactly auto revenue economics are like. Per the conference, they will be getting revenue ratably over the life of loan or something? and no upfront fees?

Other concern: delinquency rates
I find it funny they cited our “public forum” regarding delinquencies, when in fact, the person who first noted the rising delinquencies as a problem was the Wedbush analyst, not me, in December (who then flagged a continued delinq spike in January a second time). My post about it was in January.

Regarding their explanation of delinquencies: I am no finance expert so I can’t do anything but take their claim at face value that everything is perfectly fine. Hopefully things are.
The best proof of their performance, of course, is with time, so it is still important to monitor the KBRA reports.
The Feb 4 surveillance report (which I don’t think anyone posted about before here), did NOT look great for 2021 trusts (for the first time, UPST pass throughs’ cumulative net loss rates were under-performing the KBRA projections! See column 2 in the table vs column 3: https://imgchest.com/p/ne7bppjk453)

A minor ‘quibble’ about share buyback
This is somewhat of a turn off. Why announce a $400M share buyback authorization to signal confidence in your shares being underpriced, when instead, management could have just stopped selling their own shares at the lows, and personally buy them on the open market?

For example, the CEO of Asana has been doing this (see here: http://openinsider.com/insider/Moskovitz-Dustin-A./1549917)

Meanwhile, here is UPST’s CEO sales since Q3: http://openinsider.com/insider/Girouard-Dave/1832805)
I mean, come on, if I truly believed my company is underpriced, and believe my business is destined to become a FAANG, would I really be trimming my stake like this?
At the very least, he could have been like Paul Gu, who did stop selling entirely, after the share price crashed post-Q3 (http://openinsider.com/insider/Gu-Paul/1832812).

SUMMARY
If I had a portfolio of 20+ companies, I’d buy UPST here. But I’m running a concentrated hypergrowth basket, so if I want to include something it has to meet really high expectations. I need to be convinced to sell parts of my other high conviction holdings for UPST.

For a non-SaaS company with outsized macro risks, I’m looking for all metrics to be ‘perfect’. The way I frame it for myself: Why should I buy a company that has lumpy, not recurring revenue, if they are not significantly exceeding the growth rates of a SaaS-like company?

I would choose DDOG at 70% growth in 2022 over UPST at 90% growth in 2022, for example.
DDOG and my other portfolio companies also do not have similar regulatory risk, concentration risk, recession risk, fraud risk etc as UPST.

UPST:
-Q4 result met my expectations
-FY guide greatly exceeded my expectations. Guidance 1.4B (And I want the actual results to be over 1.9B)
-FY auto guide of 1.5B transaction volume however, is way too low to me. A better auto guide with more clarity, would have pushed me to add UPST. I can’t see them getting to 1.9B total revenue easily, without better auto loan visibility. It’s interesting they don’t mention autorefi transaction volume on yesterday’s call, for the first time.
-Unclear picture on autorefi or auto-retail take rate - they will be getting revenue ratably over life of loan or something? and no upfront fees?
-Delinquency rates still remain a concern to me - there are vintages for the first time that are underperforming KBRA projections in February

I also want to say this loud and clear: this is the very high bar I have set for my own portfolio. Your portfolio thresholds are likely very different.

Best of luck to all shareholders and I hope UPST blows it out the water for quarters to come!

[Citibeach44]

Jon
You do incredibly thorough write ups, even when you don’t own the company, so your thoughts are appreciated. I can see that you own DDOG from this post. You state that since your portfolio is incredibky concentrated, that really only have room for almost perfection if not perfection to take a position.
I’ve either missed your monthly portfolio performance posts, or you don’t do them. So I’m curious if you would be willing to share what other companies you are invested in right now.

I don’t want to get off topic here, but if UPST doesn’t make the cut, I’m very curious to see who does.

Thanks in advance.

TMB

[HannesRS]

Thank you for your summary. One thing that I miss in your assessment, is the amazing leverage this company produces when their products reach scale. Of course, growth rate is one of the most important metrics for future returns. Many studies are showing that - but ultimately it’s all about getting that growth to the bottom line and making profit. Normally this happens when growth rates are slowing down - this is especially true for the SaaS business since “the winner takes it all”.

So to have a company in hyper growth mode, which is also producing significant net income, is very rare imo.

Upstart does it:
Q4 2021
Total revenue increased 252% YoY
GAAP net income was $58.9 million
Adjusted EBITDA was $91.0 million
(EBITDA margin was 30% of revenue)

Sure, these will be lower in the next quarters, until auto loans are in a similar state as the personal loan business is right now. But when reaching scale, I’m pretty sure we will see the same pattern there. This, combined with a very fair valuation, huge addressable market and a management I like, makes me willing to give them a spot in my portfolio. Until they have proven their ability to execute their big plans, this will be a <10% position for me - so I have the stomach to give them a longer leash.

I have to say that I had no position in 2021 - so my relationship with UPST is not as strained as others.

[gerrard87]

regarding the point about buybacks. Have the transactions been pre-planned by the CEO (10b5-1)? Is it possible to interrupt them at any time? M

Also, it’s not like the 400m is out the window, we don’t know if and when they will use it. Of course, this can be seen positively or negatively as you like.

What I find good after Call now is that I know what to expect in the next 2 years with UPST, I have a more clear picture of new products, there growth development and TAM enlargement. Can the same be said of DDOG and MNDY? DDOG and MNDY are already international, have many large customers etc. how and where else should they grow? I don’t think they will bring out new products in the next year or so, which will increase there TAM again significantly. They will run against the wall. There is already strong competition in there fields too, they already have to share the cake…

Besides, it is always preached here that a stock will be held indefinitely (as long as the numbers are right, right?) but practice shows that even SaaS stocks here in the forum (despite recurring revenues, which seem to be the must have feature here) are held only 2-4 quarters at most.

UPST has business risks and not a SaaS model. But is already traded with a considerable valuation discount because of that!
UPST is cash low positive, has 400m buyback, new products with even bigger market in the pipeline etc. Unfortunately, traditional SaaS stocks don’t have that feature

[fireblade909]

UPST is cash low positive, has 400m buyback, new products with even bigger market in the pipeline etc. Unfortunately, traditional SaaS stocks don’t have that feature

Gerrard, I think you are a little off base with this general point on SaaS companies. Plenty of our SaaS companies have multiple ‘new products with even bigger market’ such that DDOG and NET for example will report on the number of modules used by each customer. Also I am sure you agree that it is strange for companies in hypergrowth / investment mode to buy back their own shares. You will see that CRWD, DDOG and now NET are FCF positive aren’t they?

Anyway, as you can see we are having a healthy debate here which is in stark contrast to your earlier comment that only cheerleaders are allowed here. The original poster on this thread has single handedly debated the pros and cons of UPST in 1 post! And most are grateful for that insight and perspective. YMMV

[LearningInvest0r]

Folks, UPST had a good ER and their annual guidance was very good and surprised the market, that’s a fact.

Now, those people from our board who are heavily invested into UPST - just a friendly opinion - please understand fully the nature of the beast u are invested into and that’s a neo lender. The bottom line - this is a lending business (with AI edge) with a reselling of packaged loans to Wallstreet. Loans are predominantly personal unsecured focused on sub-prime (low credit scoring) clients. When there are/were/won’t be buyers for these loans they will have to take them on own balance sheet (see 2020). The bottom line profitability will evaporate as soon as the hits on the loan book will have to be reflected in P/L. If u have huge positions in a (neo) lending business - please study lending business in detail. Just a friendly advice.

Second point from my side - CEO was PERSONALLY selling the stock (be it in automatic or not - he can control that) and the company has been buying? That’s hilarious. He is selling anf and using SHAREHOLDERS’ money to buy it. And u guys are excited about such CEO? I personally assess people based on ACTIONS/FACTS and not WORDS. And the guy is comparing himself to Google? I wanna see where he stands in 10 years from today.

I don’t have a position in UPST anymore and not buying into it. I see better opportunities for my portfolio among SaaS/cloud stocks.

Please no personal attacks to people who are still expressing risks/negatives as to Upstart as a business or a stock.

Best,
V

[NvB]

Hi V,

In relation to the CEO selling and the company believing the shares undervalued I do not see it as such an outrageous contradiction as you do. Let me explain my thinking:

1. CEO needs money and sells. He has still plenty of skin in the game which is how I measure that the action/facts are consistent.
2. The guy did build the office suite for google back in the day so I can see why he would use that analogy. So for me his actions/facts back that up, ie he has earned the right to compare himself google.
3. 10 years ago he founded upstart and I think the actions/fact so far back him up that he will be just fine in 10 years time.

Thanks again for forcing me to think and articulate my thinking.
Onwards and upwards,
Nik

[jonwayne235]

I’ve either missed your monthly portfolio performance posts, or you don’t do them. So I’m curious if you would be willing to share what other companies you are invested in right now.

Hi Tryingmybest,

I listed my holdings in a previous post: https://discussion.fool.com/msft-earnings-35036808.aspx

“My current holdings - many are cloud related businesses - DDOG, SNOW, NET, ZS, S, MNDY, BILL”
One new addition was purchased last week: MDB.
These 8 companies are what we hold in taxable brokerage and “non”-taxable accounts.

In the taxable account, 30% margin has been utilized since late January (the week when the indexes hit a “bottom”).

Across all accounts together: DDOG 30%, SNOW 20%, ZS 18%, BILL 15%, S 11%, MDB 8%, NET 8%, MNDY 8%
You may notice it adds up to >100%, this is due to use of margin in the taxable account.

I haven’t written any monthly portfolio posts since I’m not sure I can contribute much to the board in that manner, there are ‘dozens’ of reviews that crop up every 30 days by other posters, which all summarize the companies discussed here

[coldmountain]

hi Learning: I think you have misunderstood upstart’s business. It keeps a small portfolio of loans on its books as it does r&d, but that is not significant in the larger picture. Other than that, it has no direct credit risk from the loans that pass through its platform – that is entirely held by the financial institutions that extend the loans, or those that ultimately buy the syndicated loans.

Upstart makes its money from fees charged to the banks, who rely on upstart’s software to make the decision on whether the loan applicant is solid.

coldmountain

[CrazyCzech]

I completely agree with Learning. It is absolutely true that Upstart relies on securitization markets. They avoid talking about this (perhaps for regulatory reasons) but it is a fact that a majority of their loans are sold to Cross River Bank. Those loans are packaged into structured credit instruments and sold off to investors. Anybody who invests in UPST should absolutely understand this dynamic. For anyone that thinks CRB keeps loans for themselves, do simple search on the internet for what their business is.

from UPST most recent 10q:

Cross River Bank, or CRB, a New Jersey-chartered community bank, originates a substantial majority of the loans on our platform. In the nine months ended September 30, 2020 and 2021, CRB originated approximately 72% and 58%, respectively, of the Transaction Volume, Number of Loans. CRB also accounts for a large portion of our revenues. In the nine months ended September 30, 2020 and 2021, fees received from CRB accounted for 65% and 59%, respectively, of our total revenue. CRB funds a certain portion of these originated loans by retaining them on its own balance sheet, and sells the remainder of the loans to us, which we in turn sell to institutional investors and to our warehouse trust special purpose entities. Our most recent commercial arrangement with CRB began on January 1, 2019 and has a term of four years with an automatic renewal provision for an additional two years following the initial four year term. Either party may choose to not renew by providing the other party 120 days’ notice prior to the end of the initial term or any renewal term. In addition, even during the term of our arrangement, CRB could choose to reduce the volume of Upstart-powered loans that it chooses to fund and retain on its balance sheet or to originate at all. We or CRB may terminate our arrangement immediately upon a material breach and failure to cure such breach within a cure period, if any representations or warranties are found to be false and such error is not cured within a cure period, bankruptcy or insolvency of either party, receipt of an order or judgement by a governmental entity, a material adverse effect, or a change of control whereby such party involved in such change of control provides 90 days’ notice to the other and payment of a termination fee of $450,000. If we are unable to continue to increase the number of other bank partners on our platform or if CRB or one of our other bank partners were to suspend, limit or cease their operations or otherwise terminate their relationship with us, our business, financial condition and results of operations would be adversely affected.

[MajorFool20]

Why should I buy a company that has lumpy, not recurring revenue, if they are not significantly exceeding the growth rates of a SaaS-like company? I would choose DDOG at 70% growth in 2022 over UPST at 90% growth in 2022, for example.

I think this a lot of this boils down to risk and reward. I will use your example to compare the two. Datadog is currently worth ~$53B and Upstart is worth ~$13B. In other words, Datadog is valued 300% or 4x higher than Upstart.

Datadog FY 22 forecast is just above $1.5B and Upstart forecast $1.4B. We can say with pretty high certainty that Datadog will beat their forecast handily thanks to their steady eddy SaaS business model. Upstart on the other hand, is not such a sure bet since they are more exposed to economic factors outside of their control. However, for the sake of argument, let’s assume 2022 is a ‘typical’ year and Upstart hums along beating and raising as they usually do. Datadog will likely end up somewhere around $1.7-1.9B and Upstart somewhere in the ballpark of $1.5-1.8B.

In terms of profitability, Upstart is slightly ahead in this regard although Datadog is rapidly increasing their bottom line. It is safe to assume that if they both meet their revenue forecast for 2022, Upstart will likely be a bit more profitable in terms of operating margins.

So, we have two business that are expected to finish the year with similar revenue and income figures at a comparable growth rate. Of course, they are two totally different business models and Datadog will always hold the premium (rightfully so) however, I think it begs the question - Is the benefit of the SaaS like consistency and durability worth 4x the value of a company like Upstart? I don’t know, but I think there is significant upside in Upstart given its lower valuation. This is why I own shares of UPST. I believe it is far more likely that UPST will double this year than DDOG if both execute well. That’s not to say I don’t think DDOG will do well, it is my largest position, however I see more potential at current prices today in UPST, albeit at a higher risk. If they were valued similarly, it would be a no brainer to own DDOG over UPST but with a 300% discrepancy, I think there could be value in shares of UPST.

With DDOG, we know what we have in the bag. An excellent company firing on all cylinders. Upstart is more like a bucking bronco. We can’t be as sure what to except, and it is likely to provide wild and bumpy ride. However, if the company is able to execute and meet/exceed their expectations, I have no doubt the stock will see a very healthy return from its price of $150 today. In my view, investors are trading a higher risk for the potential of a greater reward. Given this, I can understand why it might not find a home in every portfolio. The picture is much murkier compared to a company like Datadog, but for a business growing 65%+ with a 20% operating margins at a ~$1.4B+ run rate, I see lots of room to run from a market cap of only $13B.

Rex
Long UPST, 12%

PS - Jonwayne, thanks for all you bring to this board. Your analysis of Upstart has been incredible and I really appreciate all you put into your post. I personally am very glad you found this board.

[kwealth]

“Second point from my side - CEO was PERSONALLY selling the stock (be it in automatic or not - he can control that) and the company has been buying? That’s hilarious. He is selling anf and using SHAREHOLDERS’ money to buy it. And u guys are excited about such CEO? I personally assess people based on ACTIONS/FACTS and not WORDS. And the guy is comparing himself to Google? I wanna see where he stands in 10 years from today.”

Are you referring to the buyback that was announced on the earnings call? If so, the company has absolutely not yet bought any of the CEO’s stock sales.

Also, the CEO set up a 10b5-1 plan in May 2021 to sell a predetermined amount of shares on a regular basis. For how long, I’m not sure. But Girouard doesn’t even know exactly when the sales will take place. He’s an extraordinarily wealthy man who has a predefined plan in place to diversify a small portion of his net worth.

In what world is a company executing a stock buyback somehow considered positive for a CEO and negative for shareholders? We literally only have stock to show for our interest in UPST. They just put aside $400M to take some of it off our hands if we want to offer it back to them. And if they don’t buy back a single share, who cares? And if there’s now a $400M bid at some price lower than here, as a shareholder I’m not complaining.

[PaulWBryant]

Jonwayne, thanks for all you bring to this board. Your analysis of Upstart has been incredible and I really appreciate all you put into your post. I personally am very glad you found this board.

That’s a lovely thing to say to someone you disagree with about Upstart, Rex. Thank you! I second this sentiment about Jon’s thoughtful posts.

I myself sold my tiny Upstart position after the pop, because frankly I think they’re doing something cool, but I don’t know how to value it. Maybe Datadog should be valued 4x higher than Upstart (or more). Upstart’s CEO even said on the call, lending is cyclical. He then said he believes the disruption they’re doing (AI lending) will overcome that. Maybe.

But it was absolutely a great quarter and impressive guide. The above is just what I did. We each might feel differently.

Bear

[Donal]

“Trustpilot review count appears to correlate quite well with loan transaction numbers. (It’s how I arrived at Q4’s ‘near-perfect’ loan transaction number prediction)
6080 reviews in Q3 with 362780 loans. That’s 59.7 loans per review.
8336 reviews in Q4 with 495205 loans. That’s 59.4 loans per review
At roughly halfway through Q1 (February 15 2022), there were 4236 reviews.
4236 x 2 x 59.55 = maybe 504507 loans for Q1. Unfortunately, that falls short of the 620K needed.”

I think you underestimated here in that you didn’t project the obvious growth trajectory into the second half of Q1, it won’t bring it to 620K but could get up to 560K.

Thanks for your work.
D

[brittlerock]

As usual, John, that’s an incredible in depth, soundly researched and well reasoned analysis . . . As mentioned already, even if I don’t fully agree with your conclusions, I am grateful for your contributions.

But in the end, as you noted Your portfolio thresholds are likely very different.

Yup, mine are different - not entirely, but different when it comes to Upstart. Yeah, like yourself and it seems almost everyone on this board, I’m long DDOG, but that position is pretty much at the upper end of my comfort zone. And I might be a little more “diversified” than others, 10 positions . . . Make that 9 positions as I exited AMPL this morning (ouch).

But while I can’t really argue too much with your assessment of Upstart, and it’s undeniable that they lack the recurring revenue that our subscription based SaaS companies have (though Dave did allude repeat customer during the CC, not they same, but sort of the same), IMHO they are the leader by a long way as a market disruptor in a position that’s virtually impossible to surpass. In a nutshell, they have a scientifically validate tool for assessing the lending risk for individuals. FICO based assessment (and similar techniques) is based on “common sense”. Fair Isaac didn’t really invent FICO, they simply standardized that which was already in general practice.

And while you are looking at Upstart’s primary market, unsecured personal loans <$50K for the hidden prime borrower, you pretty much wrote off auto lending. And didn’t even mention micro-loans (disrupting payday lending), small business loans, penetration into the prime borrower market and the Spanish speaker interface. All of those markets have been or will be introduced this year. And mortgage lending is scheduled for 2023. So from my perspective, there is more revenue opportunity than you acknowledged. No, I can’t quantify it, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist. And I’m curious about this comment: If we assume a “take rate” of 3%, that’s auto revenue of $45 million. I must have missed something (entirely possible). Why would assume this take rate?

As for some other issues, like the stock buy-back plan, I don’t see that as an issue at all. They said that they felt that were times when their own assessment was that their stock was undervalued by the market. They intend to opportunistically take advantage of that situation. In other words, they may or may not buy Upstart stock. Dave Girouard’s personal stock sale/purchase is irrelevant so far as I’m concerned. He has his own portfolio management criteria.

And I’ll add a comment pretty much irrelevant to the above conversation having to do with posting monthly reviews in that you also addressed this question. I don’t post a monthly review because I just don’t feel like I can add anything that isn’t covered more than once by others who do post their reviews. I’m not hiding anything. There’s nothing unique about my portfolio. It’s just that the board is already at overload. Why post something that would be totally redundant at best?

And one last comment - You’ve re-tweaked my interest in MDB. I love the company, but exited the stock quite a while ago. Based on your comment, I’m going to have to go back for another look.