WSM's portfolio 30 Apr 2023

I’ve not done an update last month, so here goes for April and March.

It’s been a roller-coaster for many of us (except the wise/lucky ones who drove Tesla and the large tech caps to greatness this year).

I will not discuss all my companies, but I include write-ups for the companies I own that have reported up to yesterday: Cloudflare, Enphase, Celcius Holdings and Transmedics. So if those are of interest to you, read on!

What I did in March

I made a bunch of big changes in March. Some of which were not great, some of which were. I jumped into 4 new relatively big positions, all of which I’ve been following for a while, some of which I’ve own previously and all of which have been discussed/mentioned on the board before: Global-e, Celcius Holdings, Monday, Enphase energy and Samsara. I felt that I was going in circles with the same companies and wanted to try new positions outside of my normal wheelhouse. There was certainly a risk of jumping from the SaaS frying pan into the non-SaaS fire…but I felt that what I was doing wasn’t working so well, especially after having gone in with such a big Snowflake position and gotten burnt when they released results. Like Saul, outsized positions have not worked well for me. I got out of BILL, TTD and DDOG.

What I did in April

In April I trimmed that outsized Global-e position, trimmed Transmedics and Samsara, and, after re-reading the Cloudflare Q4 call decided to up that position and have it as my top position going into earnings…and given that I’m writing this after they’ve announced Q1 results, there’s that big position thing biting me again…I also built my Snowflake and Crowdstrike positions up again.

2023 YTD Return :

Month YTD
January +7.2%
February: +17.3%
March: +15.1%
April: +2.1%

Portfolio end April

Company 30/4 31/3 28/2
Cloudflare 15.1% 10.4% 8.3%
Monday 12.1% 10.0%
Snowflake 12.1% 6.2% 24.3%
SentinelOne 11.9% 11.4% 11.3%
Celcius Holdings 11.8% 10.2%
Crowdstrike 10.8% 3.0% 0.6%
Global e-online 10.4% 16.3%
Enphase 8.1% 11.5%
Transmedics 3.9% 14.1% 12.1%
Samsara 2.2% 10.4% -
Bill - 5.3% 16.4%
The Trade Desk - - 3.6%
Datadog - - 5.8%
Cash 1.9% -8.8% 17.7%
YTD return 2.1% 15.1% 17.3%


I’m not rehashing the great debate about Cloudflare’s quarter here. I still think Prince is a good CEO, I still think they have an incredible innovation engine and I still think it’s a great company. But the numbers were bad enough vs the past that I had to seriously consider what was going on and to re-evaluate the size of the position (it was my biggest going into earnings).

On the numbers, I felt it was a bad quarter. I think they guided too high and I think their sales performance was not great. Their cRPO of the prior quarter was pointing to revenue of around $292m and they hit $290m but guided higher. NRR was already falling for many Q’s. So why did they guide so aggressively? Were they not paying attention?

And then we have Zscaler’s pre-release of earnings which points to revenue growth of at least 46% vs Cloudflare’s 37%. So Zscaler is by no means the big old laggard here…their sales machine clearly seems to be outstripping Cloudflare’s in complex Zero Trust boardroom sales.

Clearly Prince’s messaging this Q was not as good as prior quarters (but hey, good news is always an easy sell). So what was Prince thinking? Apparently Y Combinator asks their founders one key question, namely “What’s slowing you down?” and ignores many other questions. It seems that is what Prince was attempting to answer, in as transparent a way as he could. So clearly he saw the same things as us: growth slowing down, them not hitting their guidance for the first time in forever, customer growth slowing, etc. etc. This quote is key to me, in terms of his thinking:

As I take stock, we are not limited by the size of our market for our products, we are not limited by our ability to innovate, we are not limited by pipeline opportunity, and we are not limited by sales capacity. So what are we limited by?

He then goes on to say it’s the sales team broadly and some 100 people specifically, and that they are fixing that. There are two views here: the CEO is publicly throwing the GTM team under the bus, or he’s being extremely transparent as is the culture at Cloudflare. My take? A bit of both. If the new CRO does not fix this, he’s gone. Clearly the pressure is on.

This whole narrative and the focus on, and importance given, to the new CRO worried me though. Is the new CRO part of the cause of the poor sales performance? Did he go bulldozing into the GTM team and cause confusion and demotivation? His appointment in November last year and the subsequent decline in new customer acquisition is correlated. Is correlation causation in this case? Or did he in stead come in just in the nick of time and is now maturing the GTM machine to be able to sell more complex products like Zero Trust?

To try to find out I spent some time looking at the achievements and plans of the new CRO, Marc Boroditsky. Prince and the company seem to have a lot staked on this single individual atm. Boroditsky was CRO at Twilio from mid 2020 to Aug 2022. What did Twilio’s revenue growth look like in this period? Starting in Q2 2020 to Q3 2022 this was Twilio’s revenue growth yoy:


The last number above, 33%, is Q3 2022, basically when he left. Twilio gross margin also went from 56% to 51% in this time. Not good. So he took over the CRO reins at Twilio in the midst of the pandemic which drove a lot of demand for Twilio and he left when revenue growth kept going down. His leaving coincided with a restructuring of the GTM team at Twilio (September 2022), and the new CRO who replaced him there had this to say about the mistakes made by her predecessor (i.e. by Boroditsky):

These principles drove the changes that we implemented as part of our restructuring that we announced at September. We believe this will set up our go-to-market team for long-term selling success. One of the key things I did when I joined Twilio was to dig deep into the lessons learned from the initial integration of Segment into Twilio, and while I don’t think that the end goal was off-base, our approach for integration of the sales force and sales process were overly aggressive.

We didn’t properly enable Twilio field sales. We also made some decisions that led to significantly elevated attrition across the sellers that were most knowledgeable of the Segment product. […] We’ve learned a number of lessons from these missteps. We’ve now hired the capacity we need and we’re onboarding new segment and engaged focused talent, while we also enable our enterprise sellers to originate segment and engage business. As such, we’ve stabilized the team.

So turning back to Cloudflare again. What are Borditsky’s plans? He laid them out in quite a bit of detail in this slide deck at their recent investor day. You can watch him here timestamp 1:04.

It’s worth looking at the whole thing (Broditski’s piece is in the middle of the prezzo) as he paints a picture of a relatively broken GTM machine which does not conform to a normal distribution of sales per sales rep but rather one in which a tiny number of sales reps carry the whole org - a so-called bimodal distribution. From 1:12 timestamp in the presentation he positively rips into the GTM org

This is what he believes needs fixing. That’s a lot:

And this is what he’s planning for this year:

The first of those 5 initiatives is a new organisational structure, which looks like this:

And then there are slides for the other 4 initiatives too. Is he being overly aggressive? Are the changes causing some of the most talented and knowledgeable sales people to look elsewhere? I.e. is this a repeat of what happened at Twilio on his watch?

I did not like the extent to which he ripped into the sales team. If I worked at Cloudflare in sales I would feel threatened regardless of whether I performed well: my entire part of the organisation has just been made to look very bad by the CEO and my new boss. The message to the whole org is that everything else in the company is great, but the GTM team is terrible. And that’s where I work…This is not just a quick fix of 100 underperforming sales execs, this is a complete revamp of the GTM machine imho. Can they out-execute themselves out of this?

I’m not sure, but I don’t like the lingering questions I have about the new CRO, the causes of the poor performance and the scope and messaging of the GTM changes. In addition they touted strong cash flow…but wait a minute. Their capex as a % revenue was only 5% this Q and for the year they guided back to the normal 11%-13%-ish which they have always had - there will be catch-up capex in the rest of the year. So they boosted CF this Q by curtailing capex, but this is not structural; it’s temporary. If capex was at more normal levels, CF would have been negative. I struggle to see many positives in the short term. Which is why I’ll be watching from the sidelines for a while. I’m mostly out of NET as we speak.

Enphase Energy

Revenue in Q1 grew to $726m, up 0.2% qoq. This is the lowest qoq growth I have except for the first two COVID quarters of 2020 when revenue went negative qoq. There’s been a lot of good discussion about the results, but I guess the crux is that the yoy performance looks great but qoq is not great (even when adjusting for seasonality).

And the CEO said that he expects Q2 to be the low point for batteries and for the pressure on inverter sales also remaining in Q2. Then they guided for a pretty wide $700-750m for next Q. So that’s -3.6% to 3.3% qoq for next Q. So not awe-inspiring stuff growth-wise expected next Q either, even though the operating and FCF margins were fantastic at >30% for both and will probably continue to be so. So what are the headwinds? Interest rates in the US and NEM3.0 in California. And probably the interplay between the two. And the CEO said a number of times that he expects demand to pick up strongly when interest rates go down again. However when will that be?

The two engines of growth are the US: 65% of revenue and Europe: 35%. Europe remains in hypergrowth, but as long as the US stays in a funk, revenue growth will disappoint. And that is the crux of the matter for me. Whereas there is Russia’s antics in Europe giving people the resolve to do as much as possible right now to get off gas and to invest in energy self-sufficiency, in the US I would guess it is easy to wait a year or two with one’s solar installation if things are a little tight. So US demand could possibly be softer for longer.

On the plus side, though, there’s the potential upside from the IRA benefit which they estimate at between $20 and $30 per inverter and which is explicitly excluded from guidance. And they gave us an expectation of doing 50k in this quarter, ramping up to 4.5m end 2024 assuming robust demand. The CEO suggested doing a linear extrapolation between the points to get to an estimate of the ramp to one of the analysts. So let’s do that to see what they could end up getting as benefit, per quarter going forward:

IRA benefit Q2 2023 Q3 Q4 Q1 2024 Q2 Q3 Q4
Unit shipped 50,000 791,667 1,533,333 2,275,000 3,016,667 3,758,333 4,500,000
Benefit ($m) $1.3 $19.8 $38.3 $56.9 $75.4 $94.0 $112.5

That seems like a lot of gravy…$59.4m of benefit expected this year, and $338.8m next year. Am I calculating this right??

I think the long-term tailwinds are intact and there is a ton of upside from here if the US recovers, but I worry that it may take longer than expected. However on the flip-side we have Europe hypergrowing along and the huge expected IRA benefit.

On balance, I don’t feel comfortable with too large a position, and I trimmed it somewhat.

Celcius Holdings

Celcius reported Q1 yesterday and I’m including some more information here. It was a fantastic quarter.

Intro to the company:

Q1 2023 Results:

All SEC filings incl latest 10-Q: SEC Filings - Celsius Holdings Inc.

This twitter link sums up the quarter vs expectations:

I’m going to just leave everyone with the numbers here, and let that speak for itself. This is a company rapidly gaining market share, with very limited SBC and which is profitable and growing faster than Snowflake was at similar revenue levels. Don’t believe me? Here’s the graph:

Two negatives: they sell stuff, so there is inventory, debtors and all that normal stuff to think of and manage, and they have gross margins in the mid 40%'s - similar to ENPH and Global-e. The good thing about those? They are managing them well, and margins are on the up.

Revenue $m Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 QoQ Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 YoY Q2 Q3 Q4
2020 28.2 30 36.8 35.7 6% 23% -3%
2021 50.0 65.1 94.9 104.3 40% 30% 46% 10% 77% 117% 158% 192%
2022 133.4 154 188.2 178 28% 15% 22% -5% 167% 137% 98% 71%
2023 259.9 46% 95%

Wow. Just wow. The massive revenue growth was driven by them getting into many more stores in the US than they were in previously, driven by their Pepsi partnership - ACV was up significantly. They upped ACV from the 60% range to above 90% in a single quarter (in MULOC and Convenience channels). The revenue growth story is all US; Europe is only planned for 2024 - probably starting with the largest markets UK and Germany. In the US they doubled their market share from 3.7% a year ago to 7.5% now, with an aim to get to 10% (an analyst seemed to imply that this should be “imminent”).

Gross margins are in the mid 40-s and holding steady even as they grow at breakneck pace:

GP % Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2020 46.0% 43.3% 47.6% 48.7%
2021 41.2% 43.3% 39.7% 39.9%
2022 40.4% 38.5% 41.8% 44.4%
2023 43.8%

EBITDA is kicking very nicely and they had a record 19% EBITDA margin in Q1:

EBITDA $m Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2020 2.7 2.6 6.7 3
2021 4.7 8.0 10.3 10.9
2022 14.8 17.1 24.8 13.4
2023 48.7

Net profit margin sits at 13% for the quarter - another record.

Inventory turn was 3.8 pa this quarter - a record of the last two years. However this explains a “negative” in the numbers. Cash flow was negative. Why? Because their debtors spiked as they sold so much into the channels. This is however normal for any rapidly growing company that sells stuff, and the extent of the cash used this quarter to finance this massive growth - only $13.8m - is very small compared to the cash they have on hand of $596m.

I thought it was a great quarter and I’m impressed with their execution. Keeping all of my shares.


@AnalogKid70 knows this company well and wrote up the recent results nicely here.

The top-line was fantastic, and showed a marked change/step-up in two revenue constituents: US OCS liver, which grew 192% yoy bu 43.5% just in the last quarter! The other big one is Non-US revenue which seems like a drag as it grew by “only” 78% yoy, but it also grew 78% qoq after having been stagnant before that. So a pretty big upward inflection there. OCS Lung is still a drag on growth:

Revenue $m Q US Liver US Heart US Lung Non-US Total
2021 Q4 1.5 4 1.8 2.5 9.8
2022 Q1 7.9 3.7 2 2.3 15.9
2022 Q2 9.6 5.9 2.6 2.4 20.5
2022 Q3 12.4 8.2 1.3 2.4 24.3
2022 Q4 16.1 11 1.9 2.3 31.3
2023 Q1 23.1 13 1.4 4.1 41.6
yoy 192.4% 251.4% -30.0% 78.3% 161.6%
qoq 43.5% 18.2% -26.3% 78.3% 32.9%

In terms of the durability/runway left, I believe that from the demand side there is a lot of room left, and all they need to do is make sure they have capacity. To that end the CEO indicated that the expected capacity increase from new clean room, which got FDA approval in Q1, is 4x in next 18 months. So plenty being done to ensure they capitalise on the runway left in their existing “TAM”.

On margins there is also great progress towards profitability. Operating profit margins improved by 54%pts in one year!

Op % Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
2020 -107% -232% -65% -78%
2021 -92% -121% -217% -116%
2022 -59% -47% -21% -21%
2023 -5%

However the big discussion was their plan to own the distribution - i.e. the jets flying organs from donors to OCS centres. This is quite a game-changer for them obviously and has potential risk and changes the business model quite significantly ito capital intensity. The CEO spent a lot of time on this, so this is no mere intention. By my read they will discuss this in detail and actually do this towards the end of this year. And the recent convertible loan issue of $400m plus the cash they have on hand will probably be used to fund this - that’s north of $1bn that they have on hand…that’s a lot of cash but given that they want to potentially own or lease the jets and buy a company, I don’t know how far that will go. Anyway, this move will fundamentally alter this business and will require keeping a keen eye on.

In the Q&A the CEO stated:

We evaluated all different options of how to build the TransMedics aviation business in TransMedics. We have completely eliminated the organic option of adding one plane at a time because it will take significantly long time for TransMedics to secure a Part 135 charter operating license is going to take at least 12 to 18 months. So our two most efficient paths are either acquiring a Part 135 operator that had significant assets of jets that we can leverage quickly or creating a joint venture with one operator that had, again, a license and a significant number of assets. These are the two options that we are actively pursuing across the United States.

So it sounds to me like they are going to buy someone. The CFO stated that he would expect GM to come down and for revenue to increase by between $20k and $30k per transplant if they were to do this.

So how much is that? Assuming $100k per transplant currently, that’s a 20%-30% increase in revenue, but for how much capital? How much incremental opex? I guess we’ll have to wait and see on this one but it does add a level of uncertainty.

Lastly, about why they are going to do this, it sounds like they have to, the CEO had this to say about why:

But more importantly, we are very concerned that our volume by year-end is going to literally be at a much higher scale that could actually start becoming a bottleneck finding airplanes. We’re having problems finding airplanes for our missions today. Not at the end of the year, and we know our volume is going to be significantly higher by year-end and definitely into 2024.

I thought it was a great quarter, but the added risk of their logistics/jet fleet plans makes me want to keep this one relatively small. I won’t be upping my stake much from the current ±4% level.

Finishing up

I, like, Saul and probably many others have also been feeling rather despondent of late. And this last month gave no respite. Cloudflare disappointed and got punished, Enphase disappointed (a bit less) and got punished (also a bit less). My portfolio lost value. Hopefully things get a little less surprising in the months ahead.

Onward and upward!


Previous reviews

Feb 2023

Jan 2023

Dec 2022 full-year

Dec 2021 full-year

Dec 2020 full-year


Greatly enjoyed your take on NET Q, Willem.

And I certainly understand the disappointment in mgmt & exiting, but don’t view it myself as so negative. I’ve long discussed how important their GTM shift was in moving from bottom-up to top-down, since I found the co in Feb-20 and brought it to the board. My big disappointment is more that GTM has just been left to flounder around the past 2+ years instead of it being a heavy focus since Zero Trust & SASE became a bigger focus (the part of the stack suddenly needing to be purchased by CIO, which expanded to other parts in Cloudflare One in Oct-20). They should have been heavily focused on this since then! I think they made that clear when they talked on investor day about making standards more lax during the heyday of COVID pushing demand, and the prior Q’s comments about being embarrassed that they weren’t measuring GTM processes the way they should have been. But we know they are certainly paying attn now … but I wish they had upgraded their CRO/CMO long ago (the prior CRO was there for 10 years). They spend a lot of time coasting on their prior GTM structure. So I’m happy to see the new CRO/CMO in place and moving fast.

I too looked to the CRO’s prior exp to get a feel for fit. My takeaway is more that I do wish the new CRO had more a blend of top-down AND bottom-up experience, which is where NET is heading. TWLO didn’t really have that, and had a very convolved strategy over the past few years of acquisitions and expanding into new markets & capabilities. Recall that TWLO’s long-time COO left in late 2021, followed by CRO several mo later. I feel that that mass exodus of key talent speaks volumes.

So I feel the CRO’s prior stint at TWLO isn’t going to tell us much (unfortunately!). TWLO is a pretty diff company (and diff mgmt style infused from the top down), and also feel the time frame being over the COVID period greatly clouds any direct comparison to what he’ll be doing at NET. I would note that he ran global sales for 3 years there before being CRO for the last 2 (and was there 7yr total), so you may want to open the aperture a bit more, and look at TWLO from 2018 to 2022 instead of just COVID. TWLO has a huge amount of legacy infra needs around SMS, so looking at GM and other op metrics aren’t really fair (being more under COO than CRO), and it is all muddled by all the other (IMHO bad) decisions TWLO was making around acquisitions and market moves into email (SendGrid), contact centers, reverse ETL (Segment), et al.

PS TWLO just had earnings and is down -15% on terrible guide. Things didn’t improve there after the COO and then CRO left. I think there are real structural issues at TWLO that aren’t present at NET, and a lack of focus. NET remains focused on strategy and innovation – just not GTM.

I’d also note the backward-looking criticism from their new CRO you found was about a major acquisition that moved TWLO into a new market direction – which isn’t happening at NET. TWLO was moving in all kinds of dirs at once, and doing it by acquisition. I think the market directions are set for NET and now (as its been for 3yrs now since following NET!) they just need to execute. That’s where the disappointment is for me – it took way too long to recognize these issues.

While earnings were really muddled by intermixing all the problems, I liked the CRO’s breakdown of changes, and there were a few mentions on the call about their staff really liking the changes and feeling propelled by them. I ultimately see the NET GTM issues as being similar to ZS’s (though ZS wasn’t going from bottom up to top down), and are solvable – so I think a new CRO can turn things around quickly (as it did at ZS).

  • muji

I would assert that they are solvable, but not similar to Zscaler’s. But I admit I don’t really know…why would you say they are similar to Zscalers?

I feel like a bottom-up sales model is a great thing. I can see why they would want to add top-down and have BOTH. A hybrid approach. But what I can’t see is why bottom-up failed in the meantime.



I went through full 3 hours of NET’s investor day videos…
I thought the new CRO has good handle on the situation… aparantly, he did point out many of the issues in his job interview with the board even before he joined… which makes me confident.
I think the 100 reps being less performing is “smaller / less intensity” crisis really of performance management magnified due to timing issue right now…
bigger problem AND opportunity NET has is building true enterprise class GTM (think of SNOW) - that includes sales but also other functions… and the new CRO presentation addressed that as well… again makes me a little more confident … and hopefully all of that will lead to better monetization of NET’s services (where I think is a big upside)…

Lets hope they execute on this.


Hey Muji

Appreciate the thoughts.

Two points - one to address @PaulWBryant 's question about the bottom-up approach and why that has seemingly failed. I think the bottom-up approach works well for their legacy products, where they are probably bumping up against maturity. One of the analysts asked about whether the “CDN business” or the security business was most impacted and the CFO kind of deflected the question by saying they don’t internally talk about it that way and giving a rather generic (to my mind) non-answer. But I think it’s fair to assume that their legacy business relies on a bottoms-up sales approach and that this has worked well for basically the entirety of their existence - but has probably started to slow of late as it gets rather large.

So their continued growth depends on also successfully selling their new products, of which Zero Trust is arguably the biggest one (not to beat the same drum, but they have failed to give us a breakdown of their revenue by product, so we just don’t know). Zero Trust requires a top-down sales approach. One does not sell a big DB transformation like SNOW, a new billing system for a telco, or a company-wide Zero Trust transformation with a bottoms-up approach imo. So to succeed they should have built a good corporate sales machine to sell these solutions to the C-suite. And they failed to do that for 2+ years - which is @CMF_muji 's point. And I agree.

Secondly, about the new CRO: I agree that I’m perhaps not being fair about his track record at TWLO. And he may very well have the right medicine to fix the sales machine at NET.

However I differ about the conclusion that it could play out similarly to ZS. Whereas ZS had a working top-down approach and they curtailed capacity in stead of accelerating into the demand of Covid (so their mistake was one of not continuing to build on an already fairly successful corp sales machine), NET seems to have a dysfunctional corp sales/top-down sales machine. And sales teams are fragile things in my experience. There’s an elusive “momentum” in sales teams that seems to feed on itself. Once this is lost, sales teams can quickly falter, wilt, wither, lose confidence. Publicly naming and shaming a team does not build that team’s confidence.

Once lost, restoring that momentum and confidence is a tough task, and one that takes time in the best of situations and with the best leadership, which this is possibly not.

I agree that the CRO could be the right person for the task, his suggested changes at NET could be the right ones, his track-record at TWLO could in fact be better than what a cursory glance at the numbers would suggest, and he could be wholly innocent of the current problems at TWLO (but that’s all unproven imo and a lot of “could be’s”).

Even if all that is true, though, I feel that the changes being made currently will rob NET of sales momentum in selling their complex Zero Trust products for at least a couple of quarters. A couple of quarters where their big adversary ZS (and others) have their tails up. The ZS sales team is even being called arrogant by some - a good thing imo as it exudes confidence and momentum. I fear there won’t be a lot of descaling done for the remainder of this year. I could be wrong of course, but I would rather not take that chance at this time - it’s a turnaround story for NET’s Zero Trust/new product revenues imo.



They are shifting to the hybrid approach you mentioned, not moving away from bottom-up. they had bottom-up and are also adopting top-down for specific areas of their stack.

I think the GTM issues lied more in newer top-down enterprise sales side. but certainly the bottom-up GTM ops can grow stale and worsen at the scale Cloudflare is seeing. I’m sure the CRO is attempting to unify these sides into one sales machine to address gaps & failures in both.


The reason I said Cloudflare now is that unlike Zscaler prior to their issues is that Cloudflare has never (yet) succeeded with top-down sales…at least not meaningfully when looked at as a portion of their revenue.

That’s why I harp on how speculative Cloudflare is as an investment. They seem to have a decent legacy business going, but none of their awesome innovative products they seem to pump out once a week…none have really moved the needle much (yet).



Bear, I think that tracking of new products is not that bad for NET. It could be faster, of course, but it’s not bad. DDOG is faster in this respect with more than 50% ARR coming from not infra monitoring but NET is definitely growing revenues from new products at materially faster rate than from older ones. Please check the most recent presentation from their Investor’s day (pages 120-123). Zero Trust product now used by more than 20% of their clients and developers services also used by 20%+ of total clients.


This point has been made before but I don’t think that the investor prezzo really tells us that much, @LearningInvest0r . Cloudflare do not split out their revenue. So we don’t know. Splitting out attach rates is not the same as splitting out revenue.

Many older companies have bundled things together and then claimed usage (and even revenue) based on having sold a bundle of products, some of which customers want and some which they don’t (think sms, voice and data bundles of telco’s or channel bundles of cable operators).

Until they split out how much revenue comes from the different parts of their business, I will doubt how well the act 2 and 3 stuff are doing.

No doubt they track that internally. So why not share it externally? Perhaps because the picture isn’t as pretty as they would like it to be? The fact that they seem to have stopped reporting on some numbers that probably aren’t that flattering anymore adds a bit of weight to this line of thinking.