A reminder for those worried about valuation

For those worried about whether our SaaS stocks will come back and why they are valued at such a higher EV/S than Walmart and General Motors, I thought that this was a very appropriate time to pull this from my June End of the Month. Even if you’ve read it already, rereading it might soothe your jangled nerves. It worked for mine.
Saul

AN EXPLANATION OF THE VALUATION OF OUR STOCKS
I’m sure that some of you have wondered why our companies are valued so much higher than conventional companies. There’s been a lot of discussion and worry on the board (which is a good thing, and a lot better than if there was no worry). Here’s a more detailed explanation of their valuation expansion. It has occurred because other investors (and the market) have gradually come to realize the facts I explain below. I’ve tried to make the explanation as clear as possible, and I hope that it makes good sense to you.

The kind of companies that we are investing in now never existed before! Look, ten years ago I searched for companies growing at 15% or 20% a year. And 25% was a dream come true. Now I don’t even bother looking at a company with 20% or 25% revenue growth.

We are investing in a new model of enterprise. Our companies have very high revenue growth year after year. I’m talking about 40% to 65% per year for most of them, but some even higher. These are also very high gross margin companies (70% to 92% for the most part). Their revenue is almost all recurring, on software subscriptions and thus largely locked in, and their dollar-based net retention rates are generally greater than even 120%. This means that last year’s customers buy a lot more this year than they bought last year instead of having an attrition rate, or forbid-the-thought, being companies whose customers make one time purchases, or companies that sell hardware, and thus don’t even have ANY revenue guaranteed next year at all. I’ve never seen companies like ours before. Have you?

Think how different this is from companies that sell “things” and have to go out and sell them again next year to the same people or different ones. And think how low capital intensive our companies are. No factories that have to be built or enlarged to expand sales! Just lease more software.

Of course a company growing revenue 50% per year, with 95% recurring revenue, 92% gross margins, and a 130% dollar-based net retention rate is worth a much, much, higher EV/S than the old model of company, with fairly low revenue growth, low gross margins, and with little or no visibility into revenue for the next year and beyond!

And revenue which has very high gross margins is worth more per dollar of current revenue (in other words, it’s worth a higher EV/S) than lower gross margin, revenue. WHY? Let me explain it to you.

EV/S, which is traditionally used for evaluation, puts sales (revenue) as the denominator. But that’s silly! On $100 million of sales Alteryx, with gross margins of 90%, keeps $90 million, while a grocery chain, with gross margins of 10%, keeps $10 million on the same $100 million of sales. Revenue by itself doesn’t tell you much of anything. It’s the gross margin dollars which ought to go in the denominator, not total revenue.

Let’s consider an extreme example for clarity of understanding: I’ll take a hypothetical conventional company and compare it with an equally imaginary one of our SaaS companies:

Let’s say that our conventional company has a 23% gross margin. That means it keeps $23 out of every $100 of revenue to cover operating expenses and profit. And let’s say our SaaS company has a 92% gross margin. That means that it keeps $92 out of that same $100 of revenue. (I said it would be an extreme example, but Alteryx had a 92% gross margin last year, and a 55% rate of revenue growth).

Almost by definition, the high gross margin company is worth four times as much as the conventional company FOR EVERY MILLION DOLLARS OF REVENUE, because it keeps four times as much of every dollar of that revenue as gross profit. (It’s not the revenue that counts, its what you keep out of it. For example, a grocery chain may keep only 5% of its revenue.)

Thus, it’s totally normal for the SaaS company, with high gross margins, to have an EV/S ratio four times as high as the conventional company, even if they were growing at the same rate. The high margin company SHOULD have an EV/S ratio four times as high! (And, for example, if you were comparing it to a conventional company whose gross margins were 31%, our SaaS company should have an EV/S three times as high, etc.)

Note that that is WITHOUT even taking into account the higher rate of growth, which compounds, and without taking into account the recurring revenue.

WHY is the RATE OF GROWTH of revenue important for comparing EV/S? There’s a heck of a good reason! Next year our SaaS company growing at 50%, will have $150 of revenue instead of $100, and with its 92% gross profit margin, it will keep $138 toward covering operating expenses.

Let’s say our conventional company is growing at a nice steady respectable 10% per year. Next year, it will have just $110 of revenue, and with its 23% margins it will keep just $25 towards operating expenses. So now we have $138 versus $25… one year later!

The difference in compounding is enormous and grows each year. If we go just one additional year later, our SaaS company will have $225 in revenue and will keep $207… while the conventional company will have revenue of $121 and keep $28.

Look at that again! Both companies started two years ago with revenue of $100. Now our company is taking home $207 in gross profit , while the conventional company is taking home $28!!! Just two years later!

I won’t trouble you with the calculation for the third year, but our SaaS company growing at 50% will keep $310 in gross profit, which is ten times the $31 the conventional company will keep in gross profit. That gives you an idea of the enormous power that the combination of high growth and high gross margins (that our companies are blessed with), has.

And for those who will maintain that companies can’t maintain 50% revenue growth for three years, Zscaler was over 50% the last two years, and at 59% and 65% the first two quarters of this fiscal year. Twilio was 66%, 44% and 63% for the last three years, Alteryx has been 59%, 53% and 55%, etc, etc, etc.

If the conventional company is trading at an enterprise value of let’s say, four times its revenue, isn’t our SaaS company worth four times THAT! Or six times that, … or who knows, ten times that?

Remember that in two years the SaaS company will be taking home 7.4 times as many dollars in gross profit as the conventional company, and 7.4 times an EV/S of 4 gives you an EV/S of about 30. That’s what many people simply don’t get. You don’t even have to look at that 10x three-year example, which would justify an EV/S of 40.

You can argue that the rate of growth for the conventional company should be 13% instead of 10%, or that it should have a gross margin of 28%, or 35%, instead of 23%, and that will change the numbers slightly, but it won’t change the story at all.

And in our defense, my example used 50% revenue growth, but as of the end of May, when I made up this example, Okta was the only stock in my portfolio with revenue growth that low last quarter. All the others were above it. In fact, the percent rates of growth of revenue for my companies in the previous quarter were 50%, 51%, 56%, 55%, 59%, 65%, 71%, 81%, and 108%. Thus using 50% for our SaaS companies in the calculation was no exaggeration. In fact, it was actually being quite conservative. And five of my nine companies had gross margins over 80%, and two others were over 75%.

Now let’s consider that our company has almost all recurring revenue, and a dollar based net retention rate of 130%, which means that it is enormously more certain that our SaaS company will have increased revenue next year than that the conventional company will even have the same revenue next year. How much is that worth in increased EV/S? Is that security of our revenue worth another 30% tacked on? Or 20%, or 40%. I don’t know. But it becomes clear that, by simple arithmatic, the reason that our SaaS companies are exploding in EV/S is that the market is starting to do the same arithmatic that I just did.

To summarize

We have Factor One – A company with a higher gross margin takes home more dollars out of each $100 of revenue, and thus, by definition, is worth a higher EV/S, even without considering the higher rate of growth.

Then Factor Two, even more important. Companies with high rates of growth of revenue will compound that revenue enormously in just two or three years, and combined with the high gross margins, that will produce hugely more gross profit dollars than a conventional slower growing company that started with the same revenue.

That our companies have an even greater EV/S (EV divided by current sales), flows by definition from that, when compared to a conventional company with the same revenue!

Finally Factor Three, which is perhaps less easy to quantify, but a large percentage of recurring revenue, and a high dollar based net retention rate, gives much more security to the revenue and to its potential increase, and thus would warrant an even further increase to the EV/S in some investors’ eyes (like mine).

To summarize the summary,
The huge, even enormous, relative number of gross profit dollars that our companies have, and will have in the future, for each current dollar of revenue, because of their growth rates and high gross margins, compared to the relatively small amount of gross profit that a conventional company has, and will have, for the same current dollar of revenue, is what gives our companies the much larger EV/S ratios. Simple as that!

And don’t bother telling me our companies are not making any profit. Any company with 75%, 85% or 95% gross margins can make a profit whenever they decide to! All they need to do is slow down their enormous S&M spending, whose purpose is to grab every new customer they can grab while the grabbing is good. Personally, I’d rather they keep grabbing all those customers now, because revenue will keep flowing from them for the indefinite future.

So this is an entirely different set of facts we are dealing with. That’s how I see it anyway. And I hope that I made it clear for you.

ON MARKET TIMING
Let me remind you that I’m no good on timing the market, and I don’t try. If I did, I would have exited all my positions at the end of April 2017, when I was up 26% in four months and my portfolio had already beaten my total results of the previous two years (combined!). It was clearly time to get out and wait for the pullback that never came!

Picking good companies makes much more sense to me than trying to pick good companies AND trying to time the market too. I have stocks in a small group of remarkable companies, in which I have high confidence for the most part. I feel that they mostly dominate their markets or their niches, they are category crushers or disruptors, they have customers that absolutely need them, they have long runways, and they will have great futures.

All enterprises, whatever industry they are in, use more and more software, want to use the cloud, AI, big data, and the rest, and they need the software that our compaies are leasing. Most of our companies provide the picks and shovels for enterprise companies switching over to the cloud, and the enterprise companies NEED what our companies have to offer.

Again, good luck and good investing to you all,

Saul

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Gary, from our board, kindly sent me this link to an article from The Investor’s Field Guide (which I had never heard of) with a little article on EV/S

investorfieldguide.com/a-history-of-the-price-to-sales-ratio…

The article pointed out that :

Higher margin businesses tend to trade at higher price-to-sales multiples. Which brings us to two important quirks about the p/sales ratio: margins and leverage.

First, If you sort all large stocks into five buckets based on their price-to-sales, and then calculate the total net margin for each bucket (total income/ total sales), you see a clear trend: higher price-to-sales = higher average margins, and lower price-to-sales = lower average margins.

Saul: Well, of course, that’s what I’ve been saying)

A second quirk is that companies with more debt (high debt/equity ratios) tend to trade a cheaper multiples of sales, whereas those with little or no debt tend to look more expensive (as their sales are being generated with less borrowed capital).

Saul: Our SaaS stocks have no net debt because of low capital expenses, and thus look more expensive.

Saul

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Our SaaS stocks have no net debt because of low capital expenses, and thus look more expensive.

Few random observations:

  • SaaS companies don’t have debt because they are able to get cheap financing through equity.
  • While a business like (WMT, HD, easy examples) invest in their stores, it shows up as assets in balance sheet, on the other hand the investments made by SaaS (in SGA) pass through the income statement and the only place you see it is on the accumulated NOL (Net operating Losses); This sort of messes up the traditional ROE calculations, or various GAAP based valuations; On the other hand an investment in a store may be salvaged partially whereas the investment on the SGA has a very finite life and if it is not converted into sales within a period, basically it is lost (also the reason they are treated as operating expense and not as “assets”); hence the SaaS stocks react big on sales execution issues.
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I know of no better example of the benefits of the business model, and scalability of these SaaS companies compared to a low margin/high asset requirement model, than comparing your favorite SaaS company to Carvana. Carvana pays $439 in interest per car sold. Versus $95 in interest per car sold last year.

Debt, and the interest expense that comes with it, is a nonissue for these SaaS companies because they just don’t have to spend so much on assets needed to grow their revenues, relative to their gross profit. Here in this case the asset (that does not show on the balance sheet) would be that SG&A and R&D.

This isn’t just financial statement trickery. There truly is greater leverage in software.

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This isn’t just financial statement trickery. There truly is greater leverage in software.

Just to be clear, I am not saying there is any financial statement trickery involved. Leverage is not unique to SaaS, you have it with software, and in other tech companies like Google, etc.

Again, R&D can be a long-term asset, and SGA is bit tricky, only if you convert it into a paid customer. If not, that SGA is lost, it is not an “asset”, you will not be able to leverage today’s SGA spend 2 or 3 years later.

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you will not be able to leverage today’s SGA spend 2 or 3 years later.

My Citi credit card is 29 years old and my web hosting account is over 15 years old. David Skok analyses the “S” in SGA in terms of “Lifetime Value” (LTV)

What’s your TRUE customer lifetime value (LTV)? – DCF provides the answer

Overview

The old formula that everyone uses for customer lifetime value (LTV)) –average gross profit per customer divided by churn – ceases to work properly when you have very long customer lifetimes and negative churn. LTV can become infinite, which clearly doesn’t reflect reality. This post offers a new way to calculate LTV based on discounted cash flow analysis that takes into account the risks associated with revenue that is far off in the future, and the time value of money. The resulting LTV can help companies better understand and manage their future revenue streams and it much more accurately reflects what an investor would pay for that future flow of cash.

https://www.forentrepreneurs.com/ltv/

And not all R&D is successful. Edsel? 737 MAX? How many we never hear about?

Denny Schlesinger

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Saul,
I fully understand and agree with your analysis.

Yet, there’s a wrinkle. Not every trade is driven by logic and analysis. Estimates place algorithmic trades at 70% of the total. I don’t know what logic resides inside those algorithms, in fact it’s a closely guarded secret. But I can’t help but to think that they are largely driven by technical indicators rather than fundamentals. With a falling stock price, once a certain trip point is reached the sell pressure for that stock cascades in an effort to head off further losses. This happens with total ignorance of revenue growth, margins, retention, etc. At least, that’s my assumption.

In addition, as you noted, If the conventional company is trading at an enterprise value of let’s say, four times its revenue, isn’t our SaaS company worth four times THAT! Or six times that, … or who knows, ten times that? For those investors who recognize the same factors you have documented, there remains the or who knows. In other words, valuation is not irrelevant, it’s just awfully hard to assess. I think this played a part in the recent crumbling of Zscaler’s stock price. I think that the reaction to guidance has been over compensation to a report that was actually not that bad, but that’s probably due to the algorithms firing off after the trip point was reached.

The recovery in stock price is always slower than the decay. It’s much easier to define a trip point on the way down than on the way up.

I’m not taking issue with your analysis. As I said I understand and agree with it, but I’m trying to understand how things actually play out in the market. If you follow financial articles published at SA and other places (I know you do), valuation is almost always a part of the discussion. And the analysis you provided is absent more often than not. I assume members of this board know that the quality of analysis found at SA varies widely. I’ve read a large number of articles that build arguments on information that is factually wrong. But, we seem to be living in a time when facts are less important than assertions.

What to make of all this with respect to investing decisions? I wish I had a good answer to that question. Saul is telling us to calm down because the valuation of this new class of business can’t be bound by traditional measures. It truly is different. While I believe that that assessment is true, I also don’t think that it is widely recognized.

Further, I think a recession in the relative near term is inevitable at this point. I can’t fathom what would turn the economy around quickly enough to forestall one and IMO there’s little doubt that we are headed in that direction. I had investments during the dot com debacle, but really they were more like speculative bets based on not much of anything factually substantive. I was also invested during the 2008 meltdown. My investments at the time were based on the advice provided primarily by subscriptions to investment news letters. In retrospect, the quality of the advice was pretty low. I just bemoaned the loss of equity, but did little in response to it.

I think valuation is important if for no other reason because it is important to other investors, probably the majority of other investors. And in another respect it’s irrelevant to trades driven by technical indicators. So far, I’ve not sold everything and used the proceeds to buy gold. But the situation is unnerving. Being right is not of great consolation in light of the erosion in my portfolio.

It’s a conundrum and at present I’m stuck with indecision. Quite uncomfortable.

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The recovery in stock price is always slower than the decay.


My gains by Jan/Feb of 2019, off of Dec 24 2018 lows, says otherwise.

My opinion only, but the proliferation of info, access and speed of access to that info, for machine-trading/algos, means the rotations and pivots can be much faster than in previous years.

My expectation is some of these hardest-hit will pop back up to a certain level fairly quickly. Not necessarily back to ATH in a heartbeat, but many/most can go up 15% from here and still be well off highs. Given these stocks can move up 10% in a day on no news, that 15% gain can come in a hurry.

No idea if this is bottom of rotation, but acquisition costs provide me with a floor, so I am wading in with remainder of cash soon.

Dreamer

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But the situation is unnerving…Quite uncomfortable.

You’re not alone, brittlerock, I’m sure many are unnerved/uncomfortable, myself included, as I posted about a couple days ago.

I think a recession in the relative near term is inevitable at this point. I can’t fathom what would turn the economy around quickly enough to forestall one and IMO there’s little doubt that we are headed in that direction.

I do disagree with the bolded sections above. I agree with “recession is inevitable”, as that’s always the case, it’s just a matter of when, I just can’t say that it will be “in the relative near term” (although I guess it depends on your definition of that). Nobody can predict these things, so I don’t try.

All that said, it looks like the other shoe has dropped on our high growth stocks today as many are giving up the slight gains they made midweek after Monday’s rout.

Throughout the week I brought my cash position down from 18% to 15% with adds to a good many of my holdings. Not buying more today, but will wait to see what Monday brings as those seem like they can be bad days. If next week remains this low for our stocks (or even goes down more), I’ll probably bring my cash position from 15% down to 10-12%.

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A little excerpt from Beth Kindig’s blog/newsletter (I’m a free subscriber, but you do need to sign up). This is cut from a much longer article and is just a piece of the conclusion:

https://beth.technology/how-to-pick-long-term-stock-winners-….

"How to evaluate cloud software
The evidence doesn’t point to a rational reason for the sell-offs. Some stocks are priced high, but knowing which ones deserve to be, is going to be more important than ever.

• The larger the market, the safer the investment… Does the product solve a pain and reduce overhead for businesses? These will outlast the more niche markets and products that are considered a convenience. To illustrate, if you are providing software for office communications that replaces office telecom equipment, not only is your product a necessity but it will be the solution to high telecom bills during a time when costs are being cut. There are numerous (such) examples.

Ignore earnings estimates

• We hear a lot about competitive moats, yet high switching costs is a protective buffer that serves two purposes: It locks in subscription revenue and staves off competitors… Look for companies that have high switching costs.

My prediction is this may be one of the last cycles when tech is considered less safe than value stocks. As the market will find out (the hard way), cloud software is actually very safe. It is insulated from trade wars and overseas manufacturing issues. It reduces costs for enterprises, which is ideal for a recession.

Lastly, cloud software is at the beginning of a rapid growth cycle compared to its counterparts in tech — such as mobile, e-commerce and advertising — which are reaching saturation, are finding themselves in the cross hairs of anti-trust, and are susceptible to consumer spending changes.

The best companies in the category of “cloud software” will continue to post rapid growth regardless of economic conditions, and the investors who run from this sector will suffer bigger losses from missed opportunities than investors who know their winners."

Sensible woman,

Saul

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While it is true that this is a new breed of businesses, they still are subject to the laws of competition. When gold was first discovered in California, the first couple of guys got rich. Then everyone else came kept coming, until it became so saturated that most people started to lose money. Because these SaaS companies are so successful, it’s just an invitation for more competitors to enter and enter FAST. Look at how fast the gold rush came and went. Look at how many internet companies sprung up out of nowhere and so quickly. The same thing happened in the crypto market before the crash, with the number of altcoins that sprung up suddenly. It does not take long for competitors to come.

The second is TA. In brief, I’ve had my share of “conviction” companies. I generally buy them near highs, like IBD. Once they start tanking, the technical damage is so great that the stock just cannot get up anymore, at least within a reasonable time frame. ZS and CRWD, in my view, have sustained so much technical damage that it would be very hard to rise for months, at the very least. In many ways, if a stock doesn’t bounce back right away, such as TTD a few months back, the path of least resistance is down. I’ve lost a lot of money with that lesson!

Finally, I compare companies with ones that are in the same industry to estimate the ceiling. For instance, the market cap of PANW is about 20B. It’s a leader and it’s about as much as the market is willing to value a cybersecurity business. CRWD was something like 20B and ZS was like 15B. PANW isn’t growing as fast, but it’s more established.

For what it’s worth, ZS and CRWD are one of my larger holdings, so I’ve had a bad week.

DoesMIWork

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A little excerpt from Beth Kindig’s blog/newsletter…

Wow, thanks as usual, Saul! That piece is quite the endorsement for the stocks discussed here, and for holding and even adding as able at these lower prices. Yes, it feels good to hear someone else saying these companies really are different, even if it rings of confirmation bias.

Sounds like she should (or could already) be a welcome member of your board’s community! :rofl:

Wow, thanks as usual, Saul! … Yes, it feels good to hear someone else saying these companies really are different, even if it rings of confirmation bias.

Hi Foodles,
Yes someone else who is a very valued contributor to the board wrote the same thing to me off-board:

Thanks for posting that article. I was actually already aware of most of the points she made, but somehow having an outside authority enumerate them is reassuring.

And I make three. It was reassuring for me as well, to get the confirmation from someone who is apparently a really competent professional in the field, saying the same things we’ve been saying, and wording it so clearly. It was especially reassuring for me to hear the same thing from Bert and from Beth on the same day.

Best,

Saul

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It does not take long for competitors to come.

There is nothing about SaaS that makes it easier or faster to come up with a top flight complex product. With the gold rush, a small amount of money would provide one with the standard equipment and then one merely had to show up and find a place that was not already occupied. One cannot similarly show up with a new document DB, search engine, security product, or whatever.

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My prediction is this may be one of the last cycles when tech is considered less safe than value stocks. As the market will find out (the hard way), cloud software is actually very safe. It is insulated from trade wars and overseas manufacturing issues. It reduces costs for enterprises, which is ideal for a recession.

Lastly, cloud software is at the beginning of a rapid growth cycle compared to its counterparts in tech — such as mobile, e-commerce and advertising — which are reaching saturation, are finding themselves in the cross hairs of anti-trust, and are susceptible to consumer spending changes.

Hi Saul,

This is good stuff, and she echo’s what Bert has been saying all along - if/when a recession ever hits, these companies will be the least likely to be cut by enterprises, due to the fantastic ROI they get from these SAAS companies, as they become mission critical their day to day operations.

During a recession, would Uber cut Elastic’s search services? Good grief, could you imagine? They would send you drivers from PA from your trip from Manhattan to JFK Airport.

You could can envision scenarios for each of our SAAS companies and come to the conclusion that they are very valuable to the customers they serve. Also the average investor probably forgets that these companies dont worry about manufacturing costs, tarrifs, and so forth. The last month or so has felt eerily similar to last year around this time as well.

I’ll go ahead and subscribe to her letter as well… I like sensible folk. :slight_smile: Plus it’s also comforting to get some reassurance that we arent all nuts.

Best,
Matt

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I know that this board does not include technical analysis, but IBD has basically issued a sell report on most of the stocks discussed on this board. Most stocks have fallen below their 50 day and 200 day Moving average on significant weekly volume. This normally means at least a few quarters before these stocks return to their glory, and of course this depends on their performance exceeding expectations. A few of these stocks might be large winners, but most will never regain their highs.

Good luck and happy investing.

John

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Thanks Denny,

Your post 59735 may have been the single most important post I’ve read since reading Saul’s knowledge base and in my seriously humble opinion may be a reason if not the reason for the recent recalibration to the value of the Saas business model.
Is that over dramatic? I hope to hear why from more intelligent people than I, which are in over abundance on this board for sure.

Jason

Sorry,
Denny’s post I referred to is above at 59700.

Thanks

these companies will be the least likely to be cut by enterprises that is not the whole story. Existing software would not be cut but many companies would not buy more. They will hoard cash when they are fearful, especially if they have a lot of debt. And debt is the one thing that kills companies in recessions. Valuations of Saul NPI type stocks even at today’s cut prices are dependent on growth. Which will slow. And buying power of many institutions will be cut by redemptions as well as by fear and the lemming like behavior of institutional investors.

In any case we are buying stocks not companies and stock prices of all of these companies will likely fall in a recession. They are not “safe” .

cloud software is at the beginning of a rapid growth cycle compared to its counterparts in tech that I do agree with. But it’s hard at this early stage to be sure of the ultimate winners

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There is nothing about SaaS that makes it easier or faster to come up with a top flight complex product. With the gold rush, a small amount of money would provide one with the standard equipment and then one merely had to show up and find a place that was not already occupied. One cannot similarly show up with a new document DB, search engine, security product, or whatever.

I wish that were true. It is worse, an incumbent has technical debt and is built on older technology. They have pressure to be cashflow positive. A newcomer can build a stack for next to nothing, have billions in VC money at their disposal, have an established market to attack, have predictable margins to set to steal business, and have much more tolerance from their investors for cash burn.

There is a new distributed database (as I’ve mentioned, document dbs just a subset of distributed data stores, as is Elastic) popping up all the time. Riak, notably, has been bankrupted by newer entrants. There are literally dozens of highly credible security endpoint startups in funding series B-C. Security probably has the toughest road because of lack of proof of ML models and the talent is so tight, but some of those startups are toying with hybrid models.

It’s frighteningly easy to disrupt an entrenched PaaS and those 90% margins are big fat targets.

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