Shortage of soldiers is Ukraine’s most serious challenge as it enters another year of war with Russia
In the early years of Russia’s invasion, Ukraine largely tried to keep its youngest men away from the front lines. They would be needed to rebuild the country once the war was over.
It also illustrates Ukraine’s impossible choice four years into a war that has decimated its professional army: how to safeguard and nurture a rising generation while at the same time ensuring a steady flow of bodies to the front line?
Most men willing to fight signed up long ago. Infantry units are full of older men unfit for arduous combat missions. Front-line stints are far longer than they used to be, compounding exhaustion. Many other men are either in hiding or have paid bribes to flee the country illegally.
“Manpower is likely the single most important factor that will determine how 2026 goes for Ukraine on the battlefield,” said Rob Lee, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute think tank who regularly visits Ukraine’s front lines. “As well as how far Russia is able to advance.”
The WSJ cribbed noted that report off of Google AI about Russia.
Russia has lost this war. None of its goals have been met. The losses are far greater than Ukraine’s losses.
Google Query AI
AI Overview
As of early 2026, the war is taking a massive toll on Russia, characterized by high casualties and a strained economy, despite its military holding onto roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory
. While Russia has intensified attacks, it is facing a severe “long-term loss” to its economy and military capabilities.
Here is a breakdown of how the war is going for Russia:
Military Losses and Manpower
Staggering Casualties: Casualty rates for Russia have been extremely high, with reports indicating they reached over 1,000 daily in late 2025, and total casualties potentially approaching 2 million (including dead and wounded) by early 2026.
Equipment Attrition: Russia is struggling to replace equipment, with some reports suggesting they are losing infantry vehicles at a rate of 9 to 1 compared to production.
Manpower Crisis: Russia is experiencing a “growing human capital deficit” and a shrinking pool of working-age people, forcing them to rely on less experienced recruits.
Strategic Failure: The initial goal to rapidly take Kyiv failed, and the war has become a grinding, long-term conflict, stalling major advancements while damaging the reputation of the Russian military.
Economic Strain
Overheated Economy: The Russian economy is under severe pressure, with high inflation and a labor shortage.
Sanctions Impact: Sanctions are severely restricting Russia’s ability to import critical technology and consumer goods.
Energy Dependence: The long-term economic outlook is weak, as Russia is increasingly reliant on selling energy while global demand shifts away from fossil fuels.
Geopolitical and Strategic Situation
International Isolation: Russia’s soft power has been severely damaged, and its relations with the West are likely permanently altered.
Territorial “Burden”: The occupied territories in Ukraine are described as a “suitcase without a handle,” representing a significant economic burden to rebuild and maintain.
Continued Offensive: Despite these issues, Russia continues to press forward with relentless attacks on civilian infrastructure to force a favorable outcome.
Summary of the Situation
While Russia has not lost the war and continues to advance slowly in certain areas, the cost has been immense, making the conflict a “disaster” for the country in the long term, both economically and militarily. The conflict is in a state of “precarious balance” with no clear winner, yet with deep, long-lasting consequences for Russia.
Donald Trump’s revelation that he persuaded Vladimir Putin to pause strikes on Kyiv, if not other major Ukrainian cities, during “extraordinary cold” in Ukraine demonstrates that the U.S. leader remains personally involved in his team’s efforts to mediate a ceasefire that could have tangible humanitarian impact, even if a comprehensive political solution to the war remains elusive. The Kremlin’s confirmation of a halt on attacks on the Ukrainian capital (but not other cities) until Feb. 1, and a reportedly quiet night in Kyiv on Jan. 29–30, suggest a tactical pause rather than a broader de-escalation by Putin, whose negotiators are to meet their Ukrainian counterparts in Abu Dabi on Feb. 1 for what would be a first bilateral negotiation in some time.1 Meanwhile, Ukraine’s largest energy provider DTEK said Russian attacks have cost his company 60–70% of its generation capacity with Ukrainians receiving only 3–4 hours of power per day as temperatures plummeted to –20°C (–4°F) outside.
RM’s analysis of ISW data for the past four weeks (Dec. 30, 2025–Jan. 27, 2026) indicates that Russian forces gained 106 square miles of Ukrainian territory in that period. That constitutes a decrease over the 117 square miles it gained over the previous four-week period (Dec. 2–Dec. 30, 2025), according to the Jan. 28, 2026, issue of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Card. This week has seen the Russian forces capture Orikhovo-Vasylivka in the Donetsk Oblast and Zlahoda in the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
Ukraine’s recent setbacks around Huliaipole in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast highlight the central challenge facing the Ukrainian Army: a lack of troops to defend every sector equally, creating gaps where Moscow’s forces can advance more easily, according to The New York Times. Russian units often outnumber Ukrainian ones by up to 10:1 in some sectors, according to The Wall Street Journal. The personnel shortages have become so acute that some Ukrainian officers describe battalions that should field 500 soldiers but are “lucky” to have 100, of whom maybe 50 are combat‑ready, amid draft‑dodging, desertion and exhaustion, according to NYT. Incoming Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov recently said about 2 million Ukrainians are dodging the draft and more than 200,000 soldiers have deserted—roughly one‑fifth of the armed forces, according to WSJ.
A new CSIS report estimates that between February 2022 and December 2025 Russia has suffered about 1.2 million military casualties in Ukraine (killed, wounded and missing), including 275,000–325,000 killed, while Ukraine has incurred an estimated 500,000–600,000 military casualties and 100,000–140,000 fatalities. At current rates, CSIS warns combined losses could reach 2 million by spring 2026. Exiled Russian media outlet Meduza says the CSIS range for Russian fatalities broadly aligns with its and Media Zona’s name‑based counts of roughly 300,000 Russian soldiers killed by the end of 2025. However, Meduza stresses that many wounded later return to combat, so it avoids publishing a single “total losses” figure that merges irreversible deaths with temporary “sanitary” losses.
If Ukraine fights now the gains would be minor. It is winter time.
If Russia fights now the gains are minor but their losses in manpower and equipment are very problematic.
When there are 50 soldiers evacuating a position vs. 500, it tells you Ukraine is keeping it safe. News reports and blogs could be right or could be propaganda. In all wars propaganda comes first.
So the Ukrainians are killing 2.32 to 2.75 Russians per Ukrainian killed.
Russia’s population is 3.6 times Ukraine. Likely now more, now that many Ukrainian shave fled Ukraine. It seems Ukraine will run out of soldiers before Russia does.
Advocates for deserters say the ruling reinforces Russian President Vladimir Putin’s message that there is no safe exit for those who flee the front, as European governments harden asylum policies and as peace talks between Russia and Ukraine have stalled.
Putin does not, has simply not dared draft significant numbers of Petersburg Moscow area Russian Russians without risking revolt of his core population.
All his weird stuff of the Ukraine invasion of conquest as a “special operation” instead of war was to evade the constitutional provisions against doing what he is doing. Regarding manpower he has been crippled from the beginning.
A large portion of the men fighting for Russia in Ukraine are from “Asian” populations in much poorer regions (conquered colonies of Czarist Russia), and those soldiers mostly participate because of the provision of a large bounty on joining and an even larger one to the family of a dead soldier. That strategy appears to have run its course — lots of bounties paid and resistance to more death and dislocation rising rapidly (as well as price inflation in those poor regions from bounties paid).
All my Russian friends with children have gotten them safely away. The smartest of them are part of a significant Russian brain drain to China.
I liken the above to the US Vietnam War. Presidents did not want to send middle class children to war. So college deferments. And no national guard units to Vietnam. There were long waiting lists to join the national guard in the Vietnam era. For those that could not access those solutions; there was always Canada.
War was for the unwashed, andnot politically influential.
Hm funny how different political entities come up with similar solutions.