Iranâs strikes cannot be dismissed as acts of scattered retaliation, the flailing lashing out of a dying regime. Rather, they represent a strategy of horizontal escalation, a bid to transform the stakes of a conflict by widening its scope and extending its duration. Such a strategy allows a weaker combatant to alter the calculus of a more powerful foe. And it has worked in the past, to the detriment of the United States. In Vietnam and Serbia, U.S. adversaries responded to overwhelming displays of American airpower with horizontal escalation, eventually leading to American defeat, in the former case, and, in the latter, frustrating U.S. war aims and spurring the worst episode of ethnic cleansing in Europe since World War II.
Although the United States has hugely battered Iran, it must reckon with the implications of Iranâs response. Otherwise, it will find itself losing control of the war it started.
Iran cannot defeat the United States or Israel in a conventional military contest. It does not need to. Its objective is to gain greater political leverage.
First, Iran has demonstrated resilience. U.S. decapitation strikes intended to paralyze the Iranian military. By launching large-scale retaliation within hours of losing the supreme leader and many senior commanders, Tehran signaled continuity of command and operational capacity.
Second, Iran has widened the conflict well beyond Iranian territory, effecting what scholars call âmultiplication of exposure.â Rather than confining retaliation to just Israel, Iran struck or aimed at targets in at least nine countries, most hosting U.S. forces: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Greece, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
The message was unmistakable: those countries that host American forces would face severe consequences and the war that Israel and the United States started will spread.
The war has migrated into boardrooms and parliamentary chambers.
Numerous actors have now entered the conflict, each pursuing distinct interests, none fully coordinated, and all capable of altering the trajectory of escalation beyond Washingtonâs control.
The final dimension of Iranâs strategy is time. The longer multiple states feel pressure, the more that politics both within and among regional states can intensify the conflict. Without a version of NATO in the Middle East or a single American general effectively running the military operation for all the countries targeted by Iran, there is a high risk of wires getting crossed.
It plays directly to the audience that Iran seeks to persuade: the Muslim populations across the region that may not be ideologically aligned with Iran but are generally poorly disposed toward Israel.
This attack on Gulf shows how those governments are aligned with US & Israeli interest which not know to their Muslim populations that may cause unrest in those nations.
There is no easy off ramp for the US to declare & leave. If the US leaves now it is obvious the US doesnât have the perceived power they have projected. To actually make regime change will require boots on the ground. While it is unknown of the result. Likely it will followed the path of Afghanistan, Syria, Libya & Iraq. Not exactly victories.