BD,
After OLLI reported, I revisit a post I made on the Fool’s OLLI premium board back in May with a follow up post. Here what I wrote on that board this week(apologies to those without access to the Fool’s premium boards):
Gives “locked and loaded,” a whole new meaning, eh?
See this post for context:
https://discussion.fool.com/4056/say-what-olli-cc-transcript-341…
The contrast between the CEO’s, shall we say “exuberant” confidence in May and this quarter’s results is notable.
Here is CEO Butler in May: Yeah. We’re really, really confident. I mean, we are really, really locked and loaded, the deals have been flying. I absolutely am speaking with 100% confidence as I did about two years ago that I’ve never seen it better. It continues. We are ready for the spring selling season, just need a little break on this weather, but I got all the confidence. We’re ready to roll. We’ve done quite well, as I told you, although it’s not going to move the needle, Matt, but in the clothing area, most recently, obviously, we had the run on the toys, we had a great houseware Q4, we did very well in candy, but the HBA continues to be strong. I really feel good about where we’re at.
And CEO Butler yesterday: This was certainly, by Ollie’s standards, a tough quarter. Despite the challenges we faced, we grew our top line by nearly 16%, driven, in part, by strong sales from the 29 stores we opened in the first half of the year, more than double the number opened in the same period last year, including 13 former Toys R Us locations. The exceptional strength, rapid pace of openings and larger footprint of these new stores impacted comparable store sales through increased cannibalization and supply chain pressures that reduced comparable store inventory levels. Comparable store sales were also affected by headwinds from store classes with exceptionally strong first-year sales now normalizing as they entered the comparable store base. Our gross margin in the quarter was pressured by both unfavorable merchandise margin as well as deleveraging of supply chain costs as we underestimated the impact of our accelerated new store growth on our operations. That said, we have made great strides in correcting these short-term issues, with comparable store inventory levels now back in line with our expectations.
Hmmm…Something doesn’t really add up here, how could things change so much in three short months? Interesting too that Butler cherry picks the top-line growth to highlight when in fact the company had a horrible quarter. Here’s what I wrote about the CEO statements back in May on the conference call:
“Hmmm. I’m getting that funny caveat emptor, heebie geebie investor feeling.”
Whilst my “spin” detector was at high alert last quarter, it is now fully pinned at the top of its range. Here are all the important facts beyond what is highlighted in the CEO statement:
Comparable store sales decreased 1.7% from a 4.4% increase in the prior year.
The Company opened eight stores during the quarter, ending the period with a total of 332 stores in 23 states, an increase in store count of 17.7% year over year.
Net income decreased 15.7% to $25.2 million and net income per diluted share decreased 15.6% to $0.38.
Adjusted net income(1) decreased 9.9% to $23.5 million and adjusted net income per diluted share(1) decreased 12.5% to $0.35.
Adjusted EBITDA decreased 6.8% to $37.5 million.
https://investors.ollies.us/news-releases/news-release-detai…
Finally, it is worth re-reading this statement and letting it sink in:
The exceptional strength, rapid pace of openings and larger footprint of these new stores impacted comparable store sales through increased cannibalization and supply chain pressures that reduced comparable store inventory levels. Comparable store sales were also affected by headwinds from store classes with exceptionally strong first-year sales now normalizing as they entered the comparable store base. Our gross margin in the quarter was pressured by both unfavorable merchandise margin as well as deleveraging of supply chain costs as we underestimated the impact of our accelerated new store growth on our operations.
Increased cannibalization; supply chain pressures; headwinds from store classes with exceptionally strong first year sales now normalized (chuckle, snort, lol); gross margin “pressured” by unfavorable merchandise margin; deleveraging of supply chain costs; we underestimated impact of accelerated new store growth on operations.
If all of that doesn’t give an OLLI investor pause, I’m not sure what would.
Looks like whatever it was that was “locked in loaded” back in May has backfired on OLLI here in August. It’s probably time for leadership to stop trying to sell investors on the stock and start focusing on better managing and leading the business.
Swift…
No position OLLI