NO drone or missile attacks.
But hundreds of millions of euros of damage has been inflicted by Russia.
Unconventional warfare upon NATO by Russia.
Russia is waging an unconventional war on Europe.
Through its campaign of sabotage, vandalism, espionage and covert action, Russia’s aim has been to destabilise European governments, undermine public*
support for Ukraine by imposing social and economic
costs on Europe, and weaken the collective ability of
NATO and the European Union to respond to Russian
aggression.
Europe’s critical infrastructure is particularly vulnerable to sabotage because it is
in such a poor state following decades of deferred maintenance and a lack of investment from national governments and the private sector.
While much attention has been given to Russian
cyber operations and disinformation campaigns, far
less has been written about the Kremlin’s systematic targeting of European Critical Infrastructure
(ECI)
Russia targets bases, production facilities and those facilities
involved in transporting military aid to Ukraine.
However, recognising the inherent uncertainty in attributing covert activity, each
incident is assessed using a tiered confidence system, aligned with best practice.8
Where attribution is ambiguous, the aim has been to distinguish between
what is known, what is judged probable, and where there is significant uncertainty.
The absence of mass casualties
does not imply an absence of intent or capability. Rather,
it reflects a strategy designed to intimidate, disrupt and
probe the resolve of European governments in a manner carefully calibrated to avoid crossing the threshold that would trigger a forceful retaliatory response.
About 90% of NATO’s military transportation uses civilian
assets; more than half of the satellite communications
for defence purposes are provided by the commercial sector; and 75% of the support NATO operations receive from host nations comes from local commercial
sources.
As IISS data shows, confirmed Russian sabotage of
ECI increased 246% from 2023 to 2024. This sharp escalation aligns closely with Western removal of restrictions on Ukraine’s use of advanced Western‑supplied weapons, particularly long‑range systems used to strike inside
Russia.
More recently, some of the most disruptive attacks have
involved anchor-dragging by Russia’s ‘shadow fleet’. The
shadow fleet travels to and from the ports of Primorsk
and Ust-Luga over a large number of submarine cables
policymakers have been increasingly concerned by the vulnerability of submarine cables given how reliant the European economy is on them. Cables
transmit around 95% of global data flows and underpin
an estimated USD$10 trillion in financial transactions
every day, and yet they are vulnerable due to physical
exposure, strategic importance, large attack surface and
limited redundancy.16 Submarine cables are particularly
vulnerable, with more than 70% of yearly incidents
caused by unintended cable damage from commercial
marine activity.
Russian sabotage operations in Europe have accelerated, increasing in both the frequency and boldness of physical attacks. It is highly likely that, in July 2024, the
GRU attempted to target cargo planes by implanting a magnesium-based flammable substance in electric massagers. These devices exploded at DHL logistics hubs in Germany, Poland and the UK and were test runs for potential future
attacks against cargo aircraft.
Russia operates below traditional deterrence thresholds due to both its own design and European policy failures. Europe’s reactive posture has failed to inflict
sufficient penalties. Despite persistent challenges,
however, some European countermeasures have
imposed costs. This includes the expulsion of Russian
diplomats and intelligence operatives, which degraded
the Russian intelligence services’ networks and infrastructure.